1		FOR PUBLICATION	
2 3		FILED	
4	IN THE SUPREME	COURT OF TENNESSEE	
5 6	AT JACKSON December 22, 1997		
7		Cecil Crowson, Jr.	
8 9		Appellate Court Clerk	
9 10			
11	STATE OF TENNESSEE, (
12 13	(Plaintiff-Appellee,	Henry County	
14	flaincill-Appellee, (Henry Councy	
15		Hon. C. Creed McGinley, Judge	
16 17	v. (S. Ct. No. 02S01-9607-CC-00068	
18	(b. cc. No. 02501 9007 cc 00000	
19	(
20 21	DAVID WILLARD PHIPPS, JR., (
22	(
23	Defendant-Appellant. (
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28 29	CONCURRING OPINION		
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32	I concur in the decision to remand the case to the		
33	trial court with instructions; however, I would impose a more		
34	precise standard for determining if the presumption of		
35	vindictiveness has been overcome.		
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37	The majority states that the presumption of		
38	vindictiveness "may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence		
39	which demonstrates that the prosecutor's decision was motivated		
40	by legitimate purpose," and further, "the State must proffer fact		
41	specific, legitimate, on-the-record explanations for its conduct		

which dispel the appearance of vindictiveness." Majority

opinion, p. 20. Consequently, the proof presented by the State

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1 must show a legitimate, as opposed to specious, purpose for the 2 increased punishment which will dispel the appearance, as opposed 3 to the reality, of vindictiveness. This standard would not be met with proof which showed only that the prosecutor acted in 5 good faith. It is the "fear of vindictiveness" which may chill a 6 defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally 7 attack the first conviction. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 8 94 S. Ct. 2098, 2102 (1974). As stated in <u>In Re Bower</u>, 700 P.2d 9 1269, 1277 (Cal. 1985), "[t]he presumption is not based on the 10 subjective state of mind of the individual prosecutor and does

not imply that he or she individually harbors an improper

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motive."

In my view, this high standard cannot be met with evidence of facts or information which was reasonably available to the prosecutor when the original charge was made. I would apply the rule adopted by the California Supreme Court in In Re Bower:

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In order to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness, the prosecution must demonstrate that (1) the increase in charge was justified by some objective change in circumstances or in the state of the evidence which legitimately influenced the charging process and (2) that the new information could not reasonably have been discovered at the time the prosecution exercised its discretion to bring the original charge.

32 <u>Id.</u>

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1	I am authorized to state that Justice Birch joins in	
2	this Concurring Opinion.	
3 4 5 6	Reid, J.	