1		FOR PUBLICATION	
2 3 4	IN THE SUPREME	COURT OF TENNESSEIFILED	
5 6	AT KNOXVILLE December 15, 1997		
7 8 9		Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk	
10	STATE OF TENNESSEE,		
11 12 13	Appellee,	( ( Hamilton County	
14		(	
15 16	v. (	( Hon. Stephen M. Bevil, ( Judge	
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18 19			
20	LEROY HALL,		
21 22	Appellant.	( Supreme Court No. ( 03S01-9701-CR-00010	
23			
24 25			
26	GOVERND THE ORING OF		
27 28	<u>CONCURRING OPINION</u>		
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30 31	I concur in affirming the verdict of guilty of		
32	premeditated murder and the sentence of death.		
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34	Four issues are before the Court - jury instructions		
35	regarding nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the		
36	admissibility of expert testimony, the validity of arson as an		
37	aggravating circumstance, and the comparative proportionality		
38	review. <sup>1</sup>		
39			
40	Any error with regard to mitigating circumstances was		
41	not prejudicial.		

 $<sup>^{</sup>l}\mathrm{No}$  issue is made regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstances or the finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (Supp. 1996).

As discussed in the lead opinion, the testimony of Dr. Roger Meyer as an expert witness was not excluded by the court. When the court advised counsel that any evidence "going towards state of mind that would create a defense or an excuse for this killing" would be allowed, counsel, without explanation, did not call Dr. Meyer as a witness. The error, if any, was not a legal error committed by the court.

I also agree that arson is a valid aggravating circumstance in this case, in which the defendant was convicted of premeditated murder. I would argue that the principle on which Middlebrooks is based would preclude the establishment of more than one aggravating circumstance with the same evidence, but that is not the situation in this case. Here, the facts that established arson of the vehicle were relevant and admissible evidence concerning the offense, not proof of another aggravating circumstance or an element of premeditated murder.

Although I think the procedure for conducting comparative proportionality review set forth in <a href="State v. Bland">State v. Bland</a> can be further developed, <a href="State v. Bland">State v. Bland</a>, <a href="State v. Bland">S.W.2d</a> (Tenn. 1997) (Reid, J., dissenting), application of that procedure to the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant does not show the sentence of death to be disproportionate. Some of the cases in which the sentence of death was affirmed relied upon in the lead opinion are similar to

 $<sup>^2\</sup>underline{\text{State v. Middlebrooks}},~840~\text{S.W.2d}~317,~352~\text{(Tenn. 1992)}$  ("the constitutional deficiency is that the aggravating circumstance does not narrow the class, not that it duplicates the elements of the offense").

1	this case. The absence of similar cases in which the defendant	
2	was sentenced to life imprisonment may be explained by the	
3	egregious means whereby the murder was accomplished in this case.	
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5	Consequently, I concur.	
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8	Reid, J.	
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