APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother and a father to their son. The trial court found that three grounds for termination existed as to the parents: (1) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (2) persistent conditions; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that the termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother and the father appeal. We reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of persistent conditions. However, we affirm its findings that the remaining grounds were proven as to both parents and that termination was in the best interest of the child.

This appeal involves a decision by the Town of Louisville Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) that was upheld on review by the Blount County Circuit Court (“trial court”). At its May 5, 2020 hearing, the BZA granted appellee William Mattison’s request for a variance to allow him to construct an accessory, non-attached garage on his improved real property, which structure would purportedly exceed the height limit set by town ordinance. The appellants, Frank and Tina Reed, who own property adjacent to Mr. Mattison’s property and who had opposed Mr. Mattison’s request for a variance, filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court on July 5, 2022, seeking review of the BZA’s decision. The trial court conducted hearings on the Reeds’ petition in January and February 2023. On February 27, 2023, the trial court entered a final order affirming the BZA’s decision to grant a variance to Mr. Mattison. The trial court found that there was a rational basis for the BZA’s decision, which was supported by material evidence, and that the BZA had acted within its scope of authority and discretion. The Reeds timely appealed. Determining that there existed no material evidence of any particular characteristic of the real property warranting the grant of a variance, we reverse the trial court’s judgment affirming the BZA’s decision and vacate the BZA’s grant of a variance to Mr. Mattison as illegal and outside the BZA’s authority.

I agree with many of the points made in Justice Lee’s dissenting opinion. I write separately out of concern about the practical implications of the majority’s decision to leave the law so unsettled in an area that touches so many.

In this lawyer disciplinary case, the lawyer’s conduct compels disbarment. The lawyer sent a series of intimidating, demeaning, embarrassing, and harassing communications to opposing counsel and others. Some targeted family members of opposing counsel, including one family member who was also a former client, and caused well-founded concern for their well-being and safety. In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that the purpose of the communications was to intimidate opposing counsel in order to gain unfair advantage in pending litigation. It concluded inter alia that the lawyer’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, that he failed to respect the rights of third persons, and that he violated his duty to a former client, in violation of Tennessee’s Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearing panel said the presumptive sanction was disbarment, found four aggravating factors, and found no mitigating circumstances. Without explanation, the hearing panel recommended a two-year suspension instead of disbarment. The attorney appealed to the trial court. The trial court indicated that, had the Board of Professional Responsibility filed a separate petition for review, the trial court would have recommended disbarment, but because the Board did not, the trial court affirmed the sanction of suspension. Both parties appeal. Here, the lawyer’s conduct was egregious. Victimizing the families of opposing counsel and causing concern for their well-being and safety is an especially grave offense and a profound dishonor as a lawyer. The hearing panel’s decision to deviate downward from the presumptive sanction of disbarment was arbitrary and capricious, and the lawyer must be disbarred. Accordingly, we modify the judgment of the hearing panel and impose the sanction of disbarment.

While this Court has inherent jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary matters, attorneys must be afforded fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. For the first time, this Court has increased an attorney’s discipline through the exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction outside of the process outlined in Rule 9 by disbarring Brian Philip Manookian without giving fair notice of its intent. I dissent from the Court’s decision to disbar Mr. Manookian and would affirm the hearing panel’s finding of a twenty-four-month suspension. Neither the hearing panel nor the trial court erred.

In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to two of their minor children, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds had been proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and mother have each appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The trial court denied a petition for termination of parental rights as to Mother, despite
finding two grounds for termination, based on petitioner’s failure to establish that
termination was in the best interest of the child. Petitioner appeals the trial court’s
determination that a third ground for termination was not found, as well as the finding that
termination was not in the best interest of the child. Based on the record before us, we (1)
affirm the denial of failure to visit; (2) affirm the finding of failure to support; (3) reverse
the finding of persistence of conditions; and (4) affirm the finding that terminating
Mother’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.

Defendant, Karla Marie Clausell, appeals as of right from her conviction for first degree
premeditated murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant
contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence from Snapchat in violation of
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(a) and by admitting Snapchat and Facebook messages in
violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). She also contends that the cumulative
effect of these errors entitles her to a new trial. After a thorough review of the evidence
and applicable case law, we affirm.

Granville Williams, Jr., died while residing at an assisted-living facility. The central question in this appeal is whether his son’s ensuing wrongful-death action against the facility must be arbitrated. To answer that question, we must resolve two subsidiary issues—first, whether the attorney-in-fact who signed the arbitration agreement as Williams’s representative had authority to do so and, second, whether Williams’s son and other wrongful-death beneficiaries who were not parties to the arbitration agreement nevertheless are bound by it. We hold that signing an optional arbitration agreement—that is, one that is not a condition of admission to a health care facility—is not a “health care decision” within the meaning of the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act. The durable power of attorney that gave Williams’s attorney-in-fact authority to act for him in “all claims and litigation matters” thus provided authority to enter the optional arbitration agreement even though it did not specifically grant authority to make health care decisions. We further hold that Williams’s son is bound by the arbitration agreement because his wrongful-death claims are derivative of his father’s claims. Because we conclude that the claims in this action are subject to arbitration, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remand to the trial court.

To enforce and compel arbitration in this case, the majority rewrites a health care facility admission contract, disregards the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, ignores precedent, and creates confusion in an important area of the law. I respectfully dissent.

The petitioner, Torius Saville Russell, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance
of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant attorney appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to appear pro hac vice on
procedural grounds. We affirm.

The defendant, Michael M. Cook, was convicted of one count of aggravated rape and two
counts of aggravated kidnapping for which he received an effective term of twenty-five
years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) police contamination of the
condom that yielded the defendant’s DNA profile resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial
under State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (2) the trial court erred in not
requiring chain of custody after the police mispackaged the condom in a way that degrades
DNA; (3) the identification of the defendant’s voice based on his testimony at the Momon
hearing resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial; (4) the prosecution commented on the
defendant’s silence by arguing the defendant’s rights prevented a non-suggestive voice
identification; (5) improper argument by the State throughout trial affected the verdict; (6)
the trial court failed to give a full and complete charge of the law by not instructing the
jury on identification and other instructions requested by the defendant; and (7) the
cumulative errors in the case warrant reversal. Following a thorough review of the record,
the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Vicky L. Smith, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by recklessness, and the
trial judge imposed a ten-year sentence of incarceration with the Tennessee Department of
Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her request
to serve her sentence on probation. After reviewing the record and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the sentence of the trial court.

Eric Tyre Patton, Defendant, was convicted of two Class A felony drug offenses committed within the 1000-foot prohibited zone of an elementary school and was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty-five years at 100% service. Defendant filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-432(h). The trial court found that granting a shorter sentence was not in the interests of justice and denied the motion. Defendant filed a petition seeking certiorari and/or extraordinary review. This court denied extraordinary review but granted the petition seeking certiorari and ordered the record to be assembled and transmitted for this court to conduct a review of the trial court’s ruling. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Misty Paul, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her probation and
ordering her to serve her modified six-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of
the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the revocation and disposition
of the defendant’s probation, but remand for the sole determination by the trial court as to
whether to credit the defendant with time successfully spent in compliance with probation
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-310(a).

Brandon R. Richardson, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of two counts of vehicular assault, one count of felony reckless endangerment, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, evading arrest, driving under the influence, driving without a license, and a violation of the open container law. In a motion for new trial, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge to multiple members of the jury pool for cause. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. Defendant sought an untimely appeal; this Court waived the timeliness requirement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to deny Defendant’s challenge for cause to members of the jury pool. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Edward Parnell Porter, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s order: (1) awarding a Toyota 4-Runner to Wife/Appellee; (2) dividing the remaining debt on the vehicle between the parties; and (3) awarding Wife one-half of the attorney’s fees she incurred in the trial court. We reverse the trial court’s conclusion that the 4-Runner was Wife’s separate property and conclude that it was transmuted into marital property. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s order. Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is granted.

This is the third iteration of this action in this court concerning Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant for fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-1-101, et seq. The claims arose out of the purchase of asset-backed securities that were later deemed unmarketable, causing a significant financial loss to Plaintiff. This particular appeal concerns the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Defendant based upon the applicable statute of limitations. We now affirm.

This appeal concerns the validity and enforceability of an oral loan agreement between former business partners. As discussed herein, we discern no error in the trial court’s enforcement of the parties’ agreement. As such, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Charles Timothy Rowden, of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated arson. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not instruct the jury that the Defendant’s girlfriend was an accomplice as a matter of law; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) his attorney was ineffective. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments and remand for entry of an additional judgment form.

Petitioner, Larry Johnson, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that he received an illegal sentence. We conclude Petitioner has failed to timely appeal or to follow procedural requirements, and the interest of justice does not require waiver of the requirements. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Keenan A. Murphy, of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-six years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the proof is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to prove premeditation. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to cross-examine the defense expert about a second shooting the Defendant committed nine days after the offenses in this case. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, William Flynn, of first degree
premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated assault in concert. For
these convictions, the trial court imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, the
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions. After
review, we affirm the judgments.