APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Albert Bohannon, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  After review, we affirm the dismissal because the Petitioner is no longer imprisoned or restrained of his liberty and the petition fails to comply with the statutory requirements.

Petitioner, Larry J. Bradley, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for evading arrest, attempted carjacking, aggravated burglary, and assault.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel argued that Petitioner was guilty of attempted carjacking without consulting with Petitioner and (2) trial counsel failed to properly determine the felony classification for Petitioner’s Indiana convictions for purposes of sentencing.  He also argues the “Circuit Court erred in denying [Petitioner’s] petition to set aside the sentence on the attempted carjacking conviction due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.”  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Lavino Horne, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court correctly determined that the statute of limitations should be tolled for his untimely petition because he diligently pursued his petition after being abandoned by trial counsel. He further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The State responds that the post-conviction court erred by finding that extraordinary circumstances prevented Petitioner from timely filing his petition and denying the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The State further argues that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we conclude that Petitioner failed to show that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds. Accordingly, Petitioner’s postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred by the statute of limitations and we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely.

This appeal concerns a partial summary judgment order certified as final pursuant to Rule
54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon our review of the record, we
determine that the issue adjudicated in the partial summary judgment order did not dispose
of an entire claim or party, as is required to certify an order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02.
Because we conclude that the trial court improvidently certified the order as final, we
dismiss the appeal and remand for further proceedings.

An Obion County jury convicted the Appellant of second degree murder of Decora Alexander, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ confinement. At the time of the offense, the Appellant was serving a four-year probation sentence for an offense involving the same victim, which was subsequently violated and ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-nine years’ confinement. The Appellant argues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in not charging the jury with self-defense; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the Appellant’s probation officer at trial; (5) the trial court erred in admitting photographs from the crime scene and a life-in-being photograph into evidence; (6) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence without consideration of the Appellant’s mitigation proof; and (7) the trial court’s cumulative errors necessitate a new trial.  Upon our review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua W. Gabehart, of the unlawful sale of fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he knew he was selling fentanyl instead of heroin. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At issue in this appeal is whether an individual, now deceased, lacked the requisite mental capacity when he signed a durable power of attorney for health care. The trial court answered this question in the affirmative, specifically concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decedent was incompetent. As a result of this determination, the trial court further concluded that an arbitration agreement later signed by the decedent’s brother using the power of attorney was invalid, a conclusion which in turn prompted the trial court to deny the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the basis of that agreement. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Denise Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case.

The Defendant, Andre Anthony, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct a clerical mistake pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The Defendant contends that his two consecutive sentences at issue were originally ordered to run in a specific order but that the challenged corrected judgment forms indicate that each sentence runs consecutively to the other, in no particular order, and should once again be corrected. The State responds that the trial court correctly denied the Rule 36 motion because the order of the consecutive sentences is immaterial and because the corrected judgments accurately reflect the Defendant’s sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Cheryl Hanzlik, in the form of attorney’s fees.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection shouldtherefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Alethea Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case

The defendant, Anthony Eugene Barnett, appeals his Lawrence County Circuit Court conviction of theft of services, arguing that his judgment of conviction contains a clerical error by listing the incorrect statute for his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying his oral motion to continue his case, made the day of his trial.  Upon review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the defendant’s conviction for theft of services.  Because the record includes neither a transcript of the defendant’s oral motion to continue his case, the trial court’s ruling thereupon, nor a transcript of the trial, we conclude that the issue is waived and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Rowan Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees.

Tina Batten, Defendant, entered a best interest plea to aggravated assault and possession of a firearm while under the influence in exchange for a total effective sentence of five years with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered Defendant to a sentence of split confinement on the basis that granting diversion would depreciate the severity of the offenses and would have a detrimental effect on deterrence. Because the trial court failed to consider the proper factors in rendering its decision to deny diversion and failed to weigh those factors, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration. On remand, the trial court should utilize the factors set forth in Parker and Electroplating, weigh the factors against each other, and place an explanation of its ruling on the record.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case.

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to set aside a tax sale of unimproved real property. The petitioner had acquired the parcel in 2017 but had failed to update his address with the property assessor and other taxing authorities and had failed to pay taxes associated with the parcel from 2017 through 2021. The taxing authorities, as plaintiffs, commenced a lawsuit to collect the delinquent taxes in 2020. Unable to locate the petitioner for lack of a current address, the taxing authorities sought permission from the trial court to notify the petitioner of the lawsuit through publication in the local newspaper, which the trial court granted. After the time for notice by publication had expired, the taxing authorities sought and were granted default judgment regarding the petitioner’s property, and the taxing authorities sold the real property at a delinquent tax sale. The order confirming the tax sale was entered on April 7, 2021, but was not recorded with the local register of deeds until April 26, 2022, after the one-year statutory redemption period had passed. In July and August 2021, the petitioner contacted the taxing authorities to inquire about taxes he owed on the property and traveled to Crockett County to meet with the city and county officials and pay the delinquent taxes. For unknown reasons, the taxing authorities did not inform the petitioner that the real property had been sold at a tax sale earlier that year. The petitioner did not initiate a redemption action and did not file a petition to have the sale set aside at that time. In June 2022, after the one-year redemption period had elapsed and the statute of limitations period for setting aside the tax sale had expired, the petitioner sued to set aside the tax sale, which action the trial court denied as untimely. The petitioner has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A taxpayer failed to pay property taxes for a number of years. The county began enforcement proceedings and, following the entry of a default judgment against the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s property was ultimately sold at a delinquent tax sale. The purchaser filed a writ of possession to obtain possession of the property from the taxpayer, at which time the taxpayer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and resulting tax sale. The taxpayer alleged lack of notice concerning the underlying delinquent tax proceedings and violation of her due
process and equal protection rights. The trial court denied the taxpayer’s motion to set aside, concluding the taxpayer was properly served with notice of the underlying delinquent tax proceedings. We affirm.

Caprice McLemore, Gary McLemore, Misty Tanner, Barrett Tanner, and McKinley Tanner (together, “Plaintiffs” or “Appellants”) appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their case against the defendant, Knox County (“Appellee” or “the County”). Appellants were injured in a car accident on Clinton Highway after being struck by a vehicle driven by Roy Michael Simmons (“Mr. Simmons”), who was evading a Knox County sheriff’s deputy. Plaintiffs filed suit against the County, alleging that it was liable for their injuries arising from the accident. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the deputy pursuing Mr. Simmons did not act unreasonably under the circumstances and that the County was thus not liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Gary Porter (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the Davidson County Chancery Court (the
“chancery court”), wherein he requested that the chancery court award him certain pre-trial
jail credits which he was already awarded toward a separate sentence that Petitioner
previously served. The chancery court granted summary judgment in favor of Amber
Phillips (“Phillips”), Director of Sentence Management Services for Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Petitioner appeals the judgment of the chancery
court. Having determined that Petitioner’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of
briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issue purportedly raised on appeal is waived.
The appeal is dismissed.

A renal care company retained a broker to locate sites for new dialysis clinics.  The company agreed to pay the broker a commission when leases were signed and “at the renewal or extension of said leases.”  The company later negotiated amendments to the leases without the broker’s participation.  The broker sued the company for breach of contract, alleging that he was due a commission on the lease amendments.  The trial court determined that eight lease amendments were renewals or extensions of the original leases.  And it entered a judgment against the company for the amount of the unpaid commissions.  We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the court’s finding that two of the lease amendments were renewals or extensions.  So we affirm the judgment as modified.

The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed two children from their parents’
custody in May of 2020. After a long period in which DCS did not hear from the children’s
father, and the father made no progress on his permanency plan, DCS filed a petition to
terminate the father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the Juvenile Court for
Overton County (the “juvenile court”) found that DCS proved five statutory grounds for
termination of the father’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile
court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the father’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. The father appeals and, discerning no error, we
affirm.