Workers' Compensation Opinions

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Beryl Jack v. State

01S01-9706-BC-00136
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the evidence preponderates against the commissioner's finding that her claim is barred because of a false statement contained in her employment application. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant has been a certified nursing technician since 1973. She began working for Bethany Health Care, a nursing home, in May of 199 and soon thereafter injured her back while lifting a patient. As a result of that injury, she received two laminectomies at L5-S1. Following those surgeries, she had difficulty standing, bending and sitting for long periods of time. The operating surgeon imposed lifting and bending restrictions. She was awarded permanent partial disability benefits and applied for social security disability benefits. She was terminated from Bethany because that employer did not have work for her within her limitations. On October 1, 1991, she made written application for employment at Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. On that application, she was asked, "Do you have a limiting disability or handicap?" She responded, "No." In response to a question as to her reason for leaving Bethany, she wrote, "Illness in the family." On another document, she denied having any "history of physical defects." On the strength of that application, she was approved for employment by the state. We find in the record no evidence that the employer had any knowledge of her pre-existing disability. It is equally clear in the record that she could not have been employed as she was if the above questions had been accurately answered. The commissioner denied compensation benefits because of the false application. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1996). A false statement in an employee'sapplication for employment will bar recovery of workers' compensation benefits if all three of the following elements exist: first, the employee must have knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition; second, the employer must have relied upon the false representation and such reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring; and third, there must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Federal Copper and Aluminum Company v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463 (Tenn. 1973). The causal 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. William Robert Baker,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 03/02/98
Joey Sweat v. Superior Industries, Inc.

03S01-9701-CH-00006
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I This is a psoriatic arthritis1 case, an on-going debilitating condition, which pre-existed the plaintiff's employment. He alleges that he was asymptomatic prior to his employment by the defendant and that the nature of his job triggered his symptoms and worsened the underlying disease. The defendant says that only the symptoms, i.e., pain and swelling, were exacerbated by employment (as any physical activity would do) but that the disease per se was not worsened. Dr. David Lurie testified by deposition. The precise issue of whether the plaintiff's employment caused a progression of the disease or whether it merely aggravated the symptoms was not sufficiently articulated by Dr. Lurie in the opinion of the trial judge, and he requested that Dr. Lurie elucidate the point either by a supplemental deposition or by letter. Counsel agreed to the latter. He was asked: In your opinion, based on a reasonable medical probability, did Sweat's activities . . . advance and result in an actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis? To which Dr. Lurie responded: "In my opinion, based on reasonable medical probability Sweat's work . . . advanced and resulted in actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis." He testified that the allocation of the progression of the disease from physical activity as contrasted to spontaneous progression was not quantifiable, but that the "repetitive, strenuous, weight-bearing activities resulted in some permanent joint injury." 1A connective tissue arthritis, not curable, and highly debilitating. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 03/02/98
Bruce O. Tibbs, Jr. v. City of Humbodlt, Tn

02S01-9706-CH-00057
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 33 percent vocational impairment for injuries occurring on October 27, 1995. We affirm the judgment. The plaintiff was employed as an officer with the defendant. The plaintiff finished nine years of formal education and subsequently obtained a G.E.D. He was trained and worked as a machine mechanic prior to becoming employed as an officer with the defendant. At the time of trial, the plaintiff was 33 years of age. Prior Injury On October 9, 1994, the plaintiff injured his back in the course of his employment with the defendant. In February 1995, a lumbar laminectomy at L5-S1 was performed. The treating physician, Dr. John W. Neblett, concluded the plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement from this injury on June 14, 1995 and found the plaintiff suffered a ten percent permanent medical impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff was released with restrictions of not repeatedly lifting more than 2 pounds at a time nor ever lifting as much as 4 pounds at a time and that he should not sit more than one hour at a time whether standing or walking. On July 18, 1995, the plaintiff returned to Dr. Neblett and reported he had significantly improved. Dr. Neblett, upon the request of the plaintiff and upon the 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. George R. Ellis,
Gibson County Workers Compensation Panel 03/02/98
John W. Gray, Iii v. Gray and Williams, Inc., et al

02S01-9706-CH-00054
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 6 percent permanent partial disability. The defendants say the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court's award of 6 percent permanent partial disability to the plaintiff's body as a whole as a result of his work related accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Neal Small,
Shelby County Workers Compensation Panel 03/02/98
Douglas Bumpus v. Birmingham-Nashville Express, et al.

01S01-9707-CV-00144
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I This is another gradually-occurring injury case involving physical disability not caused by trauma, specific episode, or `accidental injury' as the term is historically used, that would best be resolved by appropriate legislation. The plaintiff is a career truck driver who developed osteoarthritis in both knees to the extent that full knee replacements were required. The prostheses were successful and after three months the plaintiff resumed his truck driving career. Nevertheless, the trial judge found that the plaintiff suffered a 7 percent vocational disability to both legs. His monetary recovery was limited to 26 weeks because of his age. The employer appeals, insisting that: (1) the plaintiff's arthritic condition is not compensable because non-job related; (2) the award is excessive; and (3) the lump sum order is improper. II The plaintiff was born in August, 1934. While he has held a number of jobs, he is a career over-the-road truck driver. He began working for the defendant in 1984. He is described as a freight peddler, meaning that he delivers and unloads the cargo he transports. Over the years the wear and tear occasioned by lifting and carrying heavy loads began to affect his bodily joints, particularly his knees. In 1987 or 1988, he sought treatment for his knees from Dr. James R. Smith, who diagnosed arthritis, about which nothing could be done. The condition worsened, his legs bowed, and knee replacements were recommended. III 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. James E. Walton,
Montgomery County Workers Compensation Panel 03/02/98
Shannon Forrest v. Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc.

02S01-9705-CV-00050
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff has a 7 percent permanent partial disability to her whole body as a result of a compensable injury she sustained in September 1993, and awarded benefits accordingly, together with medical payments and mileage. The employer appeals, insisting that these findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff is 3 years of age with limited marketable skills. She commenced work for the defendant in 1988 and quit in September 1996. In September 1993 she operated a "top press," and pressed upwards of 2, pairs of trousers each day. She testified that pain and a tingling sensation developed in her right leg and hip for which she sought medical attention, and advised her supervisor of her problems. Her physician was Dr. Lawrence, whom she heard call Jeff Harris, plant manager, to inform him of her condition and request lighter duty. She did not work for "six to eight weeks." Dr. Lawrence referred her to the Jackson Orthopedic Clinic for examination and treatment, and she was later examined and treated at the Semmes Murphey Clinic in Jackson. Various tests were performed, including a CAT scan and MRI. She was eventually referred 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Creed Mcginley
Carroll County Workers Compensation Panel 03/02/98
Toby Hedgecoth v. Harold Moore & Assocs.

01S01-9702-CV-00033
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon.
Maury County Workers Compensation Panel 03/02/98
Stephanie Clinard v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.

01S01-9703-CV-00051
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant here contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury was causally connected to her employment. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Clinard, is approximately 4 years old and has a GED. She has worked as a cashier at a convenience market in Springfield since 1992, having previously worked as a cashier, as a baby sitter, as a production worker in a garment factory and as a homemaker. On March 24, she noticed a pop in her neck and a shooting pain in her left arm, while manually operating a credit card machine at work. She reported the event to her supervisor, who did not refer her to a physician or provide a list from which she could choose one. The claimant went to her own physician, Dr. Robert Ferland, who took her off work and prescribed physical therapy. She also saw two neurosurgeons, both of whom ordered diagnostic testing. One of them expressed doubt as to whether the injury was work-related, but was unable to point to any other possible cause. The other had no opinion as to the cause of injury. The claimant was unable to work from May 2, 1994 until she returned during the last week in July of the same year. She terminated her employment in November of that year after the pain worsened. The employer did not provide any medical benefits. Ultimately, the claimant sought outa Dr. Cantrell, who referred her to Dr. Arthur Cushman, another neurosurgeon. Dr. Cushman diagnosed a herniated disc in her neck and performed corrective surgery. The pain diminished following the surgery. Dr. David Gaw saw her after surgery and prescribed permanent limitations. The claimant took karate after the injury, but we find in the record no evidence that her injury was caused by karate lessons, as the employer's insurer contends. The lay proof supports the claimant's contention that her injury was work related. Dr. Cushman conceded the credit card machine incident and continued use of the arm at work was a possible cause of the injury. He estimated her permanent impairment at seven percent.. Dr. Gaw testified the credit card incident was the most likely cause, in the absence of any other explanation, and assigned a fifteen percent permanent impairment to the whole body. Both of these doctors based their opinions of permanent impairment on approved guidelines. The trial court found the injury to be work related and awarded benefits under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law (the Act). Appellate 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. James E. Walton,
Robertson County Workers Compensation Panel 03/02/98
James Peeler v. Methodis Medical Center

03S01-9704-CH-00045
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant contends the trial court erred (1) in finding a causal relationship between the claimant's employment and his injury and (2) in finding the claimant will retain permanent partial disabilities of forty-five percent to the right arm and thirty percent to the left arm. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant or employee is thirty years old with a GED. He is a certified nursing assistant and had, at the time of his injury, worked for the employer, Methodist Medical Center, since 1991 as an attendant. His duties included turning, bathing, weighing and walking patients and pushing stretchers and wheel chairs of patients. He gradually developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Eugenio Vargas treated the claimant and ultimately performed bilateral carpal tunnel surgery. He testified the injuries were causally related to the claimant's job and that he would retain a ten percent permanent impairment to both arms. Dr. Clifford Posman viewed the claimant's medical records, including the reports of Dr. Vargas, and opined that the claimant's injuries were not work-related. Rodney Caldwell, a vocational consultant, opined the claimant was forty-seven percent vocationally disabled. The trial court found the injuries to be compensable and fixed the claimant's permanent partial disability at thirty-seven and one-half percent to both arms.1 Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). From a careful consideration of the medical and lay proof in this case, the panel is unable to say the evidence preponderates against the trial judge's finding that the injuries are work-related. The first issue is resolved in favor the employee. 1 More precisely, the trial judge awarded benefits on the basis of 45% to the right arm and 3% to the left arm, which equates to 37 1/2% to both arms, a scheduled injury. 2/24/98
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frank V. Williams, III,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/24/98
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Deborah Dunn

01S01-9707-CH-00160
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This declaratory judgment action likely created an interest that otherwise might not have existed or, perhaps, might not have manifested itself. The employer filed the action alleging that its employee reported that she experienced pain in her neck on August 17, 1995, that she was successfully treated and returned to work on September 12, 1995, that her medical expenses had been paid, and that the plaintiff [employer] should be "discharged from responsibility to defendant [employee]." A counter-claim followed in course, with the employee alleging that her neck injury resulted in temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, permanent impairment and disability, together with the incurrence of medical expenses. The trial court found the issues in favor of the employee and awarded her benefits based upon a twelve and one-half percent disability to her whole body, thus entitling her to a recovery of $2,793.5 to be paid in a lump sum. By separate order the employee was awarded $6. discretionary costs. The propriety of these awards is questioned on appeal. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The claimant is 37 years old, with limited marketable skills. She was initially employed in 1991 or 1992, according to her testimony. In 1992 "something happened to my neck" while loading a spool of wire. Two or three
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. J. Richard Mcgregor
Warren County Workers Compensation Panel 02/24/98
Michael Lee Proffit v. Superior Industries, Inc.

03S01-9701-CH-00008.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer has appealed from an adverse judgment, contending the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive. The employee contends the appeal is frivolous. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Proffitt, is 37 years old with a fifth grade education and experience as a mason's helper, a painter, a farm worker and a sawmill operator. He began working for the employer in 1993 as a janitor. On April 25, 1994, he was assisting another worker to empty a heavy trash barrel when he felt a sudden pulling sensation in his back. He continues to have sharp pain in his back and numbness in his back and legs. He no longer works for Superior Industries. Four medical doctors testified at the trial. Dr. Henry J. Williams treated the claimant in the emergency room shortly after the accident and diagnosed lumbar strain. The doctor first assigned no permanent impairment. After further visits, however, he assessed a permanent impairment of one percent to the body as a whole. Dr. Matthew Wood, Jr. examined the claimant and found no permanent impairment. Dr. Fred Killefer agreed with Dr. Wood. Dr. Calvin J. Johnson examined the claimant and found objective evidence of injury in the form of muscle spasm. He diagnosed chronic low back syndrome with facet arthritis and assessed ten percent permanent impairment to the whole body. He restricted the claimant from repetitively bending, stooping, squatting or lifting more than twenty pounds. The trial judge awarded permanent partial disabilitybenefits on the basis of twenty-five percent to the body as a whole. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Once the causation and permanency of an injury have been 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. G. Richard Johnson,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/24/98
Joseph D. Lewis v. The Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co., et al.

01S01-9702-CV-00036
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon.
Lewis County Workers Compensation Panel 02/24/98
Ulyes Williams v. City of Knoxville

03S01-9706-CV-00070
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The City of Knoxville contends (1) the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and (2) the trial court erred in not accepting the opinion testimony of the treating physician. The claimant contends the trial court erred in allowing credit for overpaid temporary total disability benefits. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant, Williams, has less than an eighth grade education, little or no reading or writing skills and no vocational training. He was 39 years old at the time of the trial. He has worked for the city since about 1988, first as a laborer and later as tractor-mower operator. In 1992, he suffered a compensable back injury, was temporarily disabled and returned to work until September 18, 1995, when he re-injured his back at work. Back surgery was performed on or about November 18, 1995 and he returned to work around March 1, 1996 for a few weeks, quit because of post-surgical problems, then returned again around July 1, 1996. He has since been terminated. This civil action was commenced on March 29, 1996. The defendant filed and served its answer on April 26, 1996, but did not aver therein that the claim was barred by any statute of limitations. That a claim is so barred is an affirmative defense and the facts constituting such defense must be set forth in short and plain terms in a defendant's answer. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.3. Moreover, the record fails to establish that the claimant had fair notice of the employer's intention to assert the statute of limitations as a defense. The defense was thus waived. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.8. Additionally, the panel finds the defense to be without merit. The first issue is resolved in favor of the appellee. As the employer insists, citing Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991), the trial judge must choose which of conflicting expert medical opinions to accept. We are aware of no rule which 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Dale C. Workman
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/24/98
Dennis O'Neal Milligan v. Ten-State, Inc .

02S01-9612-CV-00110
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On or about July 9, 1993, while employed by the defendant, the claimant was attempting to move a mobile home with the assistance of fellow employees when his foot slipped and he was caused to twist and fall to his knee. He felt a burning sensation in his lower back shortly thereafter and reported this to his supervisor. The company referred him to a Dr. Howard Thomas, who in turn referred him to Dr. R. J. Hornsby. In the course of his examinations and treatments by these physicians, he underwent not only an MRI, an EMG and nerve conduction study, but also an epidural block and myelogram, which gave him a severe spinal headache. Because he continued to complain of pain in the low back upon examination, he was also evaluated by a physical therapist, who reported, ". . . he was totally inconsistent in every test and no impairment was noted that was consistent." (Notes of Dr. Hornsby). No permanent disability rating was given by either Dr. Hornsby or Dr. Thomas. However, claimant was referred by his attorney on October 4, 1994 to Dr. Robert Barnett, for an evaluation. Dr. Barnett saw him one time. Dr. Barnett said that he "thought that he had some lumbar radiculopathy, probably aggravation of preexisting degenerative changes." Dr. Barnett was also of the opinion that the claimant has a permanent impairment of ten percent (1%) of the whole body. When asked what the opinion was based upon, the doctor replied, Medically documented injury with the pain and stiffness, with some radiculopathy, and some limited motion, [giving a reference to the AMA guides]. (Deposition of Dr. Barnett, page 9). The doctor was then asked whether or not the history of claimant injuring himself in July of 1993 on the job "was consistent" with his diagnosis of lumbar radiculopathy and a ten percent (1%) permanent impairment to the body as a whole. The doctor 2
Authoring Judge: Robert A. Lanier, Circuit Judge
Originating Judge:Lanier, Judge
Hardin County Workers Compensation Panel 02/20/98
Freddie Jane Cook v. Monroe Farmers Coop.

03S01-9707-CV-00090
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has resulted from a decision of the trial court to dismiss the complaint. The Circuit Judge found the employee had failed to establish she had sustained an injury as a result of her work activities on January 12, 1994. Plaintiff, Freddie Jane Cook, age 55 years, had been employed by defendant, Monroe Farmers Cooperation, for about 6 _ years. She worked as a cashier which involved waiting on customers, stocking, etc. On the day in question, she was walking through a door carrying a gasoline can when she stepped on the threshold board of the door and lost her balance causing her to twist her body. She testified her knees buckled but she did not fall to the floor. She reported the incident to her employer and was referred to a doctor who returned her to work. She continued to work until about January 22. On January 28th she was admitted to a hospital for treatment of depression and anxiety. She remained in the hospital for about thirteen days. She testified the incident at work caused her to suffer neck, arm and knee pain. On cross-examination she admitted having prior problems with depression and anxiety. She said she found it stressful waiting on customers and dealing with her boss; that on occasion she became so nervous she would get physically ill at work and have to stay at home a day or two; that she had sexual and emotional abuse during childhood; had been involved in a series of abusive marriages; she was presently dealing with a husband who had been unfaithful and had a drinking problem; she had been subject to a criminal assault by a step-daughter and she had been convicted of an aggravated assault of a prior husband's girlfriend. Plaintiff's psychiatrist, Dr. Jeffrey D. Greenwood, testified by deposition. He had seen her for several years prior to the incident at work. He stated he hospitalized her during January 1994 for recurrent depression and generalized anxiety problems which was the same diagnosis as in previous visits. When asked if the incident at work was the proximate cause of her hospitalization, he declined to say it was but preferred to say it was "related" to her hospitalization. He was of the opinion the marital infidelity was a large part of the reason for hospital treatment. He also felt her problems with other family members, the history of abuse, etc. all related 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Earl Murphy,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/19/98
Gwendolyn Sue Mulkey v. Palm Beach Company

03S01-9706-CV-00069
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has been perfected by the employee, Gwendolyn Sue Mulkey, from a decision of the trial court resulting in a dismissal of the complaint. The Circuit Judge found the employee had failed to establish she had sustained an injury as a result of her work activities on August 13, 1993. Plaintiff, age 42 years, had worked for defendant, Palm Beach Company, for a number of years. She was engaged in sewing work when she said she was lifting a bundle of coats and felt something pull in her neck. Later the same day, she testified she was lifting above her head and felt a pull in her low back. She went to see a doctor furnished by her employer and was returned to light duty work. She continued working until January 31, 1994, when she was terminated because the employer concluded there was no work available under the restrictions imposed by the doctor. She eventually found other employment and was working 2-22 hours a week as a janitor. She testified this type of work caused her neck and back to hurt. The record indicates that she had sustained several work-related injuries in previous years and had been treated for a rib injury, a carpal tunnel syndrome injury and a shoulder injury. All of the expert medical testimony was by deposition. Dr. Jonathan N. Degnan, an orthopedic surgeon, first saw plaintiff on March 17, 1994, which was about seven months after the activities in question. He testified she complained of neck pain on the initial visit but did not complain of low back problems until the September 1994 visit. He found degenerative disc disease which was not work-related. He gave her a 9% impairment to the body as a whole and related the injury to her work duties upon the assumption the history given to him was accurate. In giving the history, she told the doctor she had recovered from all prior injuries and was not suffering from neck and back pain before August 1993. Dr. Robert E. Finelli, a neurosurgeon, testified he had treated plaintiff for some of her prior injuries. He saw her during March 1993 (about 5 months before incident) and she had complaints then of neck and arm pain. He next saw her on 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Harold Wimberly,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/19/98
Freda Pack v. Cigna Property & Casualty Co.

03S01-9706-CV-00066
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because arthritis is not an occupational disease and is normally not caused by trauma but is part of the aging process and thus not within the ambit of the Workers' Compensation Law, this case is not without its difficulties as a matter of law. The plaintiff is 54 years old and at the time of trial had been employed by the defendant in a non-skilled position for 17 years. she has a litany of health problems not relevant to this case, which arises from a job-related accident on October 24, 1991 and a second job-related accident on October 5, 1993, involving injuries to her left knee. The first accident occurred when the plaintiff twisted her left knee in a misstep. She was treated by a panel physician who referred her to an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Bryan Smalley, who diagnosed an internal derangement of hr knee and performed a diagnostic arthroscopy on December 9, 1991. Because her rehabilitation was slow, the plaintiff was referred to Dr. William Hovis, who also performed an arthroscopy which diminished pain and soreness. She returned to work with limitations on climbing or kneeling. On July 9, 1993, Dr. Hovis opined that the plaintiff had a five percent disability to her left leg due to the aggravation of an arthritic condition. As stated, the plaintiff suffered another injury to her left leg on October 5, 1993 when she slipped while pushing a heavy buggy causing her to hyper- extend her left knee in a backward manner. For this injury she was treated by Dr. William K. Bell, an orthopedic surgeon in Maryville. He found that the 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. W. Dale Young,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/19/98
Lavonna Hodosi v. Ckr Industries, Inc., et al.

01S01-9608-CV-00166
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon.
Smith County Workers Compensation Panel 02/18/98
Larry Sizemore v. City of Dickson

01S01-9701-CV-00022
This workers' compensation appeal from the Dickson County Circuit Court has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the plaintiff contends the panel should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. We conclude summary judgment to be appropriate and affirm the trial court. The plaintiff, Larry Sizemore, is a policeman for the City of Dickson. He was on vacation for approximately two weeks when he sustained a heart attack while watching television at home on August 15, 1994. The plaintiff filed suit for worker's compensation benefits specifically relying on the statutory presumption of compensability afforded law enforcement personnel in T.C.A. _7-51- 21, which states: ...there shall be and there is hereby established a presumption that any impairment of health of such law enforcement officers caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in hospitalization, medical treatment or any disability, shall be presumed (unless the contrary is shown by competent medical evidence) to have occurred or to be due to accidental injury suffered in the course of employment.... The defendant answered and denied the plaintiff had sustained a compensable injury. The defendant further filed a motion for summary judgment supported by portions of depositions of the plaintiff and of Dr. Taylor Malone Wray who gave the following testimony: A. My opinion is there is no causal relationship between his work as a police officer and his subsequent heart attack. Q. Do you have an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to what did cause his heart attack? A. Well, the heart attack was caused by coronary atherosclerosis, which is a buildup of fatty plaque in the heart arteries. The plaintiff responded with the counter affidavit of Dr. Marshall Crenshaw which states, in part: Mr. Sizemore's coronary artery disease developed in the setting of several risk 2
Authoring Judge: William Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Allan Wallace,
Dickson County Workers Compensation Panel 02/18/98
Sharon Gail Jones v. Modine Manufacturing Company and Sentry Insurance Company

03S01-9703-CV-00028
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has been perfected by defendants, Modine Manufacturing Company and Sentry Insurance Company, from a decision of the trial court awarding plaintiff, Sharon Gail Jones, 45% permanent partial disability to her right arm. Two issues are being raised by the employer and insurance company. First, it is argued the award is excessive. Second, it is insisted the trial court was in error in holding defendants liable for charges and expenses of Dr. Paul T. Naylor, an orthopedic surgeon. Plaintiff is 42 years of age and a high school graduate. During September 1995 she began to have problems with her hand and arm tingling and being painful. She reported the problem to her employer and was sent to see Dr. R. Alan Rice, a family practitioner. Dr. Rice eventually referred her to Dr. Joseph C. DeFiore, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. DeFiore saw her three times. One visit was during November 1995 and the other two visits were during December of the same year. Plaintiff testified that all he did was to give her a cortisone shot and advised her to return to light duty work. She returned to work but still had the same problems. At her last visit, she said he advised her to change jobs and released her. The doctor testified she had a carpal tunnel syndrome injury and was of the opinion she had no medical impairment. He admitted releasing her and recommending that she should not do repetitive work as she had performed in the past. Plaintiff testified she was laid-off about January 1996 and was never called back to work. During this month, counsel filed a motion requesting her employer to designate a panel of three orthopedic surgeons for treatment. Plaintiff continued to have problems with her injury while off from work and sought treatment from Dr. Paul T. Naylor, another orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Naylor saw her three times also: April 18, 1996, September 19, 1996 and October 14, 1996. He also found she was suffering from a carpal tunnel syndrome injury and told plaintiff that surgery was necessary to relieve some of her problems. The doctor was 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. James B. Scott,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/18/98
Jacqueline Marie Redden v. Synthetic Industries and The Home Insurance Company

03S01-9703-CV-00025
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal has been perfected by plaintiff, Jacqueline Marie Redden, from the trial court's decision in declining to increase an original award of 2% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole after a reconsideration hearing conducted pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(2). Plaintiff contends the evidence preponderates against the finding of the trial court. Defendants, Synthetic Industries and The Home Insurance Company, argue the evidence before the court was insufficient to support an increased award. The facts are not in great dispute. Employee Redden sustained a work- related injury on August 9, 1992, while pushing a dolly loaded with yarn. The injury was to her low back. A final decree was entered in the Circuit Court of Hamilton County on January 19, 1995, approving a settlement agreement providing for a 2% permanent partial disability award to the body as a whole. Since the accident occurred shortly after the effective date of the 1992 amendments to the W orkers' Compensation Act and the employee had returned to work at a wage equal to or greater than that received before the accident, the award was capped at 2 _ times the medical impairment rating of 8%. Upon returning to work, plaintiff was given a job "reeling denies", which she testified involved hooking yarn to a machine and was lighter duty work. However, this job was only of a temporary nature. Later she was asked if she could do office work to which she replied she could perform. A job of this nature never materialized. She was later offered a job "doffing" and was told that this was all the company had to offer. The job involved considerable physical activity and defendant employer sent her to see a physical therapist for the purpose of determining whether she could perform the required duties of bending, lifting, etc. The therapist concluded she was not able to do this type of work because of her injury. Since there was no other job available that she could handle with her restrictions, she was eventually terminated. The record is silent as to the exact termination date but it was sometime during or after February, 1995. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Arnold A. Stulce, Jr.
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/18/98
Carl W. Sides v. Insurance Company of North America

03S01-9703-CV-00031
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff filed this suit and alleged he had sustained permanent impairment to his eyes as the result of an injury in the course of his employment with the defendant. The trial judge awarded the plaintiff a recovery in the amount of 3% permanent partial disability to both eyes. The defendant says the evidence preponderates against the judgment of the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff was age 6 at the time of trial. He had a high school education and was trained as a machinist and welder. The plaintiff alleged he was injured by a welding arc on or about February 5, 1993. The plaintiff did not see a doctor until some three days after the alleged injury, when he was sent by the defendant to Dr. Louis Haun, an ophthalmologist. Dr. Haun was of the opinion the plaintiff had not been injured by a welding arc. Dr. Haun suspected the plaintiff's eye problem was caused by exposure to chemicals and inquired of the plaintiff concerning exposure thereto. From this time, the case was tried by the plaintiff and defendant on the theory that the plaintiff was suffering from a condition known as dry eyes.1 The evidence of whether the injury to the plaintiff's eyes was causally connected to the exposure to chemicals at work is based upon the testimony of the plaintiff and three doctors. The plaintiff testified that after Dr. Haun asked him to remember whether he had been exposed to any chemicals at work, he recalled coming into contact with chemicals specifically in the course of fluidizing a piece of equipment called a bed, which is used in the manufacturing process. 1 The plaintiff never filed an amendment to his petition to aver his injury was caused by chemical exposure. However, both parties tried the case on the theory of whether a chemical exposure did or did not cause the plaintiff's dry eyes. See Rule 15.2 Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/17/98
Karen Farmer v. Zurich-American Insurance Co.

01S01-9706-CV-00135
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that during the course of her employment by Porter Paints she contracted asthma, an occupational disease, which resulted in partial, permanent physical disability, all of which was denied by the defendant. The trial judge found that the plaintiff suffered occupational asthma, causing her to be 5 percent permanently partially disabled and benefits were awarded accordingly. The issue presented for review is whether the finding of job-related asthma is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. I The plaintiff was initially employed by Porter paints in 1991 as a decorator. About one year later, she was transferred to a Broadway store in Nashville, which catered to commercial customers. This store prepared two- part industrial paints, referred to as epoxies, one part of which, hythane, contained a chemical known as hexamethylene diisocyanate [HDI]. an isocyanate. In 1993, the Broadway store compounded a large quantity of hythane for a customer who had contracted with Vanderbilt University to paint its stadium. The plaintiff became ill, attended by coughing and wheezing, shortness of breath and congestion. Her family physician diagnosed bronchitis, prescribed antibiotics, and recommended absence from work for one week. Upon her return, she experienced a severe episode of wheezing and shortness of breath and was instructed to leave the store. She was thereupon referred to a pulmonary specialist, Dr. Eric Dyer, who made a tentative diagnosis of asthma caused by exposure to TDI, an isocyanate commonly found in paints. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ernest Pellegrin,
Davidson County Workers Compensation Panel 02/17/98
William Allen Frazier v. Landair Services, Inc.

03S01-9706-CV-00064
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged in his petition that he was injured while unloading a trailer while in the employment of the defendant.1 The defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported by affidavits, and the plaintiff answered the motion by filing affidavits also. The trial judge granted summary judgment to the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff's petition. We affirm the judgment. The issue raised in this case is whether the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and thus entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits for his injury. The structure of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was derived from the employment of the plaintiff as a driver with a company known as Central Trucking, Inc. Landair Transport, Inc. entered into a contract with Central Trucking whereby Central Trucking would tow the defendant's trailers on shipments to the defendant's customers. The contract provided that the employees of Central Trucking would not be employees of the defendant. The plaintiff contended in his petition and affidavit that he was injured while unloading a trailer for the defendant and that all unloading fees were negotiated between him and a terminal manager of the defendant. The plaintiff claims this created an employer-employee relationship between him and the defendant. One of the owners of Central Trucking filed an affidavit in support of the plaintiff's claim that the amount to be paid for unloading was negotiated between the plaintiff and the defendant. The trial judge considered the affidavits, the contract between the defendant and Central Trucking, and various documents filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. After reviewing the documents and hearing 1 It appears the actual defendant relevant to this case is Landair Transport, Inc. frazier.wc 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. John Mcclellan, III,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 02/13/98
Tommy Freeman v. Madison County Sheriff's Department

02S01-9704-CH-00034
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issues presented by this appeal are whether the trial court erred in finding that the statutory presumption created by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 7-51-21 applied to plaintiff and whether or not the defendant's medical proof overcame the presumption. The panel concludes that the judgment of the trial court awarding benefits should be reversed and the case dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Thomas Freeman ("plaintiff") was employed by the Madison County Sheriff's Department in 1971. He served as a deputy for a year and then was promoted to the rank of Captain. He stayed in the rank of Captain until 1991, when he was appointed Assistant Chief Deputy. He had been appointed to the position of Chief Deputy at the time of trial. In the early days following his promotion to Captain, plaintiff assumed supervisory duties along with his regular duties. However, as the department grew he began to delegate more of the regular duties and moved into a more supervisory role. With the promotion to Assistant Chief Deputy, he assumed even more of a supervisory and administrative position. Since 1991, his job duties have been primarily that of supervisor and he was not required to go out on patrol or do things such as working on accidents as part of his regular job duties. In November, 1994 plaintiff begin to experience symptoms of a heart attack while sitting at his desk at work. Nothing out of the ordinary occurred on the job either on that day or in the time period before that. He was subsequently treated for a heart attack at a local hospital and was diagnosed with coronary artery disease. He underwent quintuple bypass surgery thereafter. He returned to work on a gradual basis and is now working full time in his former position as Chief Deputy. Plaintiff was fifty-one years old at the time of his heart attack. The medical proof consisted of the testimony of several physicians by deposition, which testimony is summarized as follows: Dr. James Crenshaw, a cardiologist, testified that he was called to the emergency room to examine plaintiff, after plaintiff was admitted complaining of chest pains and suffering from an acute myocardial infarction. Following Dr. Crenshaw's examination, 2
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Joe C. Morris,
Madison County Workers Compensation Panel 02/02/98