SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

01S01-9511-CC-00219
01S01-9511-CC-00219

03S01-9601-CH-00002
03S01-9601-CH-00002
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples

02S01-9512-CH-00131
02S01-9512-CH-00131
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

01S01-9510-CV-00185
01S01-9510-CV-00185

02S01-9509-CV-00083
02S01-9509-CV-00083

02S01-9511-CC-00121
02S01-9511-CC-00121

03S01-9509--CV-00112
03S01-9509--CV-00112

03S01-9511-CH-00122
03S01-9511-CH-00122
Trial Court Judge: John K. Byers

Charles M. Cary, Jr., v. Cathy Ann Cary
02S01-9505-CV-00035
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

Upon consideration of the appellant’s motion to amend the judgment to delete the award of attorney fees, the Court concludes that the motion is without merit and should be denied. It is so ORDERED.
 

State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom, A/K/A Otis Smith
02S01-9502-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

The State has requested a rehearing in this case. The Court has considered the petition and finds it to be without merit. The petition to rehear is denied. The Members of the Court adhere to the positions stated in the original Opinions in this cause.  It is so ORDERED.

Frank L. White v. Hubert A. McBride, Executor - Cocurring
02S01-9510-PB-00104
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leonard Pierotti

This case presents the question of whether the plaintiff, attorney Frank White,may recover attorney’s fees from the estate of Kasper McGrory. This broad question may, in turn, be divided into two specific subissues: (1) whether the contingency fee contract between White and McGrory is “clearly excessive” under Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professiona Responsibility, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, and is, thus, unenforceable; and (2) if the contingency fee contract is unenforceable, whether White may, nevertheless, recover attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the contract is unenforceable and that White is not entitled to recover under the theory of quantum meruit. Because the probate court and the Court of Appeals held that White could not recover under the contract, but could recover on a quantum meruit basis, we reverse the latter part of the judgment.

Eli Mike and James A. Schrampfer and Jane N. Forbes, as Trustee in Bankruptcy for the Estate of David L. Osborn v. PO Group, Inc. a Tennessee Corp., James W. (Bill) Anderson III, and the Estate of Harold L. Jenkins - Concurring
01S01-9508-CH-00137
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. Allen High

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming an award of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs' suit charging the breach by a  majority shareh older of a fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders is barred by the o ne year statute of limitations. This Cou rt concludes that the applicable period of limitations is three years and remands the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiffs' action was time-barred.

Blanche Bilbrey and Cecil Asberry v. Vestel Smithers - Concurring
01S01-9509-CH-00168
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Vernon Neal

This case presents for review the right of a child born out of wedlock to  inherit from his natural father who died prior to the amendment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1995) in 1978. The record supports the finding of paternity, but the claimant failed to establish the right to inherit as required by the statute; however, the appellant is estopped to deny the claimant's asserted interest in the decedent father's real property.

Geneva Coffey v. Fayette Tubular Products Corporation
01S01-9601-CV-00003
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge John J. Maddux, Jr.

In this retaliatory discharge action, the plaintiff, Geneva Coffey, appeals fromtwo aspects of the Court of Appeals’ judgment: (1) its suggested remittance of the punitive damage award from $500,000 to $150,000; and (2) its disallowance of the $20,000 in “front pay” awarded by the trial court. After a careful consideration of the law and the record in this case, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects. Therefore, we reverse that court’s judgment, and reinstate, in its entirety, the judgment rendered by the trial court.
 

02A01-9503-CV-00036
02A01-9503-CV-00036
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn

01A01-9502-CH-00037
01A01-9502-CH-00037

01S01-9507-CV-103
01S01-9507-CV-103

Scarlett J. Love v. College Assessment Services Inc. and Nursing Careers, Inc.
03S01-9510-CV-00118
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Conrad E. Troutman, Jr.

The plaintiff, Scarlett Lay Love, appeals from the denial of her motion to dismiss, the motion being predicated upon the alleged failure of the defendants, College Level Career Services, Inc., and Nursing Careers, Inc., to perfect an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court within the ten-day period provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108. The sole issue for our determination is as follows: whether a facsimile (fax) transmission of a notice of appeal and appeal bond, sent by the defendants to the clerk of the general sessions court on the final day on which an appeal could be taken, is sufficient to perfect the appeal. For the following reasons, we conclude that the facsimile transmission was not sufficient to perfect the appeal; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
 

02S01-9511-CV-00114
02S01-9511-CV-00114
Trial Court Judge: James E. Swearengen

03S01-9507-CR-00075
03S01-9507-CR-00075

01S01-9501-FD-00011
01S01-9501-FD-00011

01S01-9510-CV-00188
01S01-9510-CV-00188
Trial Court Judge: Thomas Goodall

State of Tennessee ex. rel, John Jay Hooker, v. Brook Thompson, et. al., et al., State of Tennessee ex. rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson
01A01-9606-CH-00259
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William D. Fones

These cases are before the Court upon a Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief filed by Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General for the Twentieth Judicial District, and Appellant John Jay Hooker's Supplemental Petition to Rehear. The Court having considered these matters, it is ORDERED: 1. The Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief is DENIED. 2. Appellant John Jay Hooker's Supplemental Petition to Rehear is DENIED.
 

State of Tennessee, ex rel. John Jay Hooker v. Brooke Thompson. State of Tennessee, ex rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson, State of Tennessee, ex rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson
01A01-9606-CH-00259
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William H. D. Fones

The matters currently pending before this Court are a Petition to Rehear filed by Appellant Hooker, Appellees' Motion for Clarification and Appellees' Motion to Supplement the Record filed by the Attorney General, Petition on behalf of Holly K. Lillard and Jerry L. Smith to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Responding to Appellees' Motion for Clarification, Petition for Rehearing and Motion to Supplement the Record filed by appellant Laska, Appellees' Petition to Rehear filed by the Attorney General and Motion of Penny J. White to Intervene.

State of Tennessee, ex rel. John Jay Hooker v. Brook Thompson, et al. State of Tennessee , ex rel. Lewis Laska
01A01-9606-CH-00259
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William H. D. Fones

At the oral argument in this matter on July 5, 1996, an amicus curiae brief was filed by John King, who purports to be the Tennessee Republican party's nominee for the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in these cases. Verbal permission was granted by the Court at the July 5 hearing for the filing of additional briefs no later than Monday, July 8, 1996. Yesterday, in accordance with the Court's deadline, Mr. King filed a supplemental amicus curiae brief in this matter, asserting that this Court had erred in denying him the equitable relief granted to Justice Penny White and Appellant Lewis Laska. Mr. King does not assert that it was inappropriate for this Court to fashion the equitable relief granted; he “. . . simply asserts that, under the circumstances he is also entitled to an equitable remedy in the form of an extension of the qualifying deadline for nominees of a party to the same extent extended for Justice White and Mr. Laska.” (Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief of John K. King, page 5.) Because of the pressing nature of this matter, the Court made its ruling and entered an Order on July 5, 1996 within a few hours after oral argument, to be followed by an opinion. Although none of the parties had called T.C.A. § 17-1-301 to the Court's attention, in the course of researching the law and preparing to write its opinion over the weekend, the Court reviewed the provisions of T.C.A. § 17-1-301, which make it clear that the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in this case must be filled from the Eastern Grand Division of Tennessee. This effectively mooted the issue of Appellant Laska's residence in the Western Grand Division. On Monday, July 8, 1996, this Court issued its Order vacating its remand to the Chancellor for a ruling as to Mr. Laska's residence vel non in the Western District and denying Mr. Laska’s request for mandamus on grounds that he lacked standing to become a candidate.