Loren Probst Et Al. v. Liberty Mutual Group, Inc. Et Al.
This appeal challenges the enforceability of a purported settlement agreement among homeowners, their insurance provider, and a service provider. The plaintiffs originally brought claims against their insurance provider and a service provider after efforts to repair water damage resulted in further damage to their home. The dispute progressed to settlement negotiations, and it seemed an agreement was reached; however, the plaintiffs stopped short of executing the written agreement. The defendants filed a joint motion to enforce the settlement agreement, which the plaintiffs opposed in the trial court, claiming that “counsel was not provided with express authorization to accept” the defendants’ counteroffer. The trial court deemed it a case of “buyers’ remorse” and granted the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On appeal, the plaintiffs raise the sole issue of whether a condition subsequent made the agreement unenforceable. Defendants contend that this issue was waived because it was not raised in the trial court. We have determined that the plaintiffs waived their only issue on appeal by failing to raise it in the trial court. We have also determined, as the defendants contend, that the trial court correctly ruled that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. Thus, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Baron Construction, LLC v. 4J Construction Company, Inc. et al.
A general contractor sued two business entities and their sole owner for breach of contract. The defendants denied liability and filed a counter-complaint. Four years later, the contractor moved for sanctions under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 16.06. The trial court entered a default judgment against the defendants and dismissed their counterclaims with prejudice due to their repeated failure to comply with pretrial orders. The defendants moved to set aside the final judgment. The trial court granted the owner relief from the judgment. But it refused to set aside the judgment against his two companies. And it granted the contractor summary judgment against the owner on the remaining claims. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Debbie Lynn Simmons, et al. v. Deborah Matlock Bass, et al.
Appellees, a married couple at the time, purchased two properties. Appellants, Husband’s adult daughters from a previous relationship, sought imposition of resulting trusts on the respective properties. Appellants, each of whom lived in one of the properties, maintained that they had agreements with their father whereby they would own the properties so long as they paid all expenses thereon. Appellee/Wife disputed such arrangement and maintained that the disputed properties were marital properties. Because of the suspect circumstances surrounding the purchases of the properties and the disputed testimony regarding any agreements by and between Husband and Appellants, Wife argued that the properties were not subject to the imposition of the equitable remedy of resulting trusts. The trial court denied Appellants’ respective petitions to establish resulting trusts, and they appeal. Because Appellants failed to meet the burden of proof to establish resulting trusts, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Ella Mae Haire et al. v. Shelby J. Webster et al.
Decedent’s son, individually and as personal representative of his mother’s estate, sued several of his siblings and decedent mother’s bank. Among other things, the son alleged that the bank breached its duties to the decedent by disbursing funds out of her checking and savings accounts following her death. Eventually, the bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not negligent in its handling of the decedent’s accounts, nor did it breach any contractual duty to either the decedent or her son. The son appeals and, discerning no error by the trial court, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Kamdyn H. et al.
This is an appeal of a termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Tara C. (“Mother”)to two of her children, Kamdyn H. and Bentyn H. upon finding that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was mentally incompetent and that it was in the best interest of Kamdyn and Bentyn for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother has appealed. Upon our review, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Anika Berryhill v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board
A former Shelby County employee alleges that she was wrongfully terminated by the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Catina Hope Kestner Lusk v. Brandon Burl Lusk
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee from a circuit court judge’s denial of a motion to recuse. The Appellant moved for recusal based on the judge’s setting a trial date, based on the judge’s having filed a complaint with the Board of Professional Responsibility against the Appellant’s attorney in an unrelated case, and based on criticism of the attorney in an |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy C. Coram Et Al v. Jimmy C. Brasfield, M.D. Et Al
Plaintiffs filed a health care liability action against several defendants. Following a hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) and that the action was untimely. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court and, following our review, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Ben Smith et al. v. William A. White et al.
The appellees sold a portion of their property to the appellants. The appellees sued the appellants seeking an easement by necessity. The appellants maintained that Tenn. Code Ann § 54-14-102 and its associated statutes prohibited such an easement. The trial court granted a common law easement by necessity. We agree with the trial court’s determination that the 2020 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann § 54-14-102 and its associated statutes did not change the common law regarding easements by necessity. However, due to the lack of a hearing and the corresponding lack of evidence, the improper use of the trial judge’s visit to the property as a fact-finding mission, and the uncertain procedures used to decide the case, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Pandora G.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant/Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and on its finding that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Father appeals. Because Appellee abandoned the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brandi Michelle Rose v. Timothy Elvin Rose
Appellants, Rose Sawmill, Inc. and Shiloh Golf Course, Inc., have appealed an order of the |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Tassi Williams v. Rodney Wayne Williams, Jr.
This appeal arises from the issuance of an order of protection against the appellant, Rodney Williams, Jr. We, however, have determined that the appellant’s brief is profoundly deficient for it fails to comply with Rule 27(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee in several material respects. Based on the appellant’s failure to substantially comply with Rule 27(a)(6)–(7) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, the appellant has waived his right to an appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Evandor C.
This appeal arises from a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother and a father to their son. The trial court found that three grounds for termination existed as to the parents: (1) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (2) persistent conditions; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that the termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother and the father appeal. We reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of persistent conditions. However, we affirm its findings that the remaining grounds were proven as to both parents and that termination was in the best interest of the child. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Frank Reed Et Al. v. Town of Louisville, Tennessee Et Al.
This appeal involves a decision by the Town of Louisville Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) that was upheld on review by the Blount County Circuit Court (“trial court”). At its May 5, 2020 hearing, the BZA granted appellee William Mattison’s request for a variance to allow him to construct an accessory, non-attached garage on his improved real property, which structure would purportedly exceed the height limit set by town ordinance. The appellants, Frank and Tina Reed, who own property adjacent to Mr. Mattison’s property and who had opposed Mr. Mattison’s request for a variance, filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court on July 5, 2022, seeking review of the BZA’s decision. The trial court conducted hearings on the Reeds’ petition in January and February 2023. On February 27, 2023, the trial court entered a final order affirming the BZA’s decision to grant a variance to Mr. Mattison. The trial court found that there was a rational basis for the BZA’s decision, which was supported by material evidence, and that the BZA had acted within its scope of authority and discretion. The Reeds timely appealed. Determining that there existed no material evidence of any particular characteristic of the real property warranting the grant of a variance, we reverse the trial court’s judgment affirming the BZA’s decision and vacate the BZA’s grant of a variance to Mr. Mattison as illegal and outside the BZA’s authority. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Kendall Collier Ex Rel. Chayce C. v. Periculis Roussis, M.D. Et Al.
This appeal concerns juror misconduct. Chayce Collier (“Chayce”), a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, Kendall Collier (“Plaintiff”), sued Periclis Roussis, M.D. (“Dr. Roussis”), Fort Sanders Perinatal Center, and Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (“the Hospital”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) alleging health care liability in Chayce’s delivery. A major issue at trial was whether Dr. Roussis fell below the standard of care by failing to administer epinephrine to Plaintiff when she had an anaphylactic reaction during labor. The jury found for Defendants. However, it emerged that a juror had gone home and looked at the warning on an epipen which said that epinephrine should only be used when the potential benefit justifies the potential risk to the fetus. The juror shared this information with the rest of the jury. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the Trial Court first granted and then denied. Plaintiff appeals. Under Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b), jurors may not be asked what effect, if any, that extraneous information had on them. Instead, courts look to the extraneous information itself to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that it altered the verdict. We hold that there is a reasonable possibility that the extraneous information shared with the jury in this case altered the verdict, and Defendants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice. The Trial Court applied an incorrect legal standard and thereby abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Macee M.
The father and stepmother of Macee M. filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights on three grounds. The trial court found that one ground had been proven, abandonment for failure to support, and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in Macee’s best interest. Based on these findings, the mother’s parental rights were terminated. The mother appeals. We affirm the termination of her parental rights. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Azalea B. et al.
In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to two of their minor children, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds had been proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and mother have each appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Freddy P.
The trial court denied a petition for termination of parental rights as to Mother, despite |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Burrell v. Tipton County Election Commission, et al.
Appellant attorney appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to appear pro hac vice on |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Jessica M. Amarino v. Jarone Amarino
In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s order: (1) awarding a Toyota 4-Runner to Wife/Appellee; (2) dividing the remaining debt on the vehicle between the parties; and (3) awarding Wife one-half of the attorney’s fees she incurred in the trial court. We reverse the trial court’s conclusion that the 4-Runner was Wife’s separate property and conclude that it was transmuted into marital property. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s order. Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is granted. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
First Community Bank, N.A. v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., et al.
This is the third iteration of this action in this court concerning Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant for fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-1-101, et seq. The claims arose out of the purchase of asset-backed securities that were later deemed unmarketable, causing a significant financial loss to Plaintiff. This particular appeal concerns the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Defendant based upon the applicable statute of limitations. We now affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Julie Danielson v. Kimberly Armstrong
This appeal concerns the validity and enforceability of an oral loan agreement between former business partners. As discussed herein, we discern no error in the trial court’s enforcement of the parties’ agreement. As such, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tinsley Properties, LLC et al. v. Grundy County, Tennessee
This case concerns the validity of a county resolution prohibiting quarries and rock crushers “within five thousand (5,000) feet of a residence, school, licensed daycare facility, park, recreation center, church, retail, commercial, professional or industrial establishment.” The plaintiff landowners argued that the county failed to comply with the requirements in Tennessee’s county zoning statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 to -115. In the alternative, they argued that state law expressly preempted local regulation of quarries. However, the county argued that it was exercising its authority to protect its citizens’ health, safety, and welfare under the county powers statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-118. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county on the ground that it had no comprehensive zoning plan. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
Russell W. Rivers Et Al v. Travis Brooks Et Al.
This case concerns a “Declaration of Additional Restrictive Covenants” applicable to an unimproved tract in a residential subdivision. In relevant part, the Declaration provides that, if a construction agreement could not be reached, the buyer is required to either (1) obtain a waiver of the exclusive builder provision, or (2) re-convey the property to seller at the original purchase price, excluding fees and costs. Here, Appellant/seller and Appellees/buyers could not agree on the building costs. The trial court determined that Appellant breached the Declaration and waived the right to enforce it when he failed to grant Appellees’ request for waiver of the exclusive builder provision and also refused to re-purchase the lot. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Liam M.
Mother and Father divorced and Mother was given custody of their child. Mother remarried and eventually she and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights and allow Stepfather to adopt the child. The trial court found that Father had not visited the child within four months of the filing of the petition and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals |
