Lee Ardrey Harris v. Alena Marie Allen
The appellant is the Mayor of Shelby County. He filed a complaint for divorce, and the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabrella T.
Syeda C. (“Mother”) and Hosea T. (“Father”) (Mother and Father collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of Gabrella T. (the “Child”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) petitioned the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County (the “Juvenile Court”) for an adjudication that the Child was dependent and neglected in the care of Parents and for an award of temporary legal custody of the Child to DCS. The Juvenile Court granted DCS’s petition, adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected, and awarded temporary legal custody of the Child to DCS. Mother appealed the Juvenile Court order to the Shelby County Circuit Court (the “Circuit Court”). Mother failed to appear at the hearing in the Circuit Court on her appeal; upon oral motion made by DCS, the Circuit Court dismissed Mother’s appeal. Mother now appeals to this Court. Upon thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Laron Matthews
Christopher Laron Matthews, Defendant, appeals the trial court’s consecutive alignment of twelve-year sentences for sale of methamphetamine in Case No. 27504 and Case No. 27505 for an effective twenty-four-year sentence. The trial court based the consecutive sentencing on its finding that Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Erica Wayne Barton v. Mechelle Scholmer Barton
This is an appeal of a trial court’s valuation of a marital asset, division of a marital estate, and award of alimony in solido as a result of the divorce of Eric Wayne Barton (“Husband”) and Mechelle Scholmer Barton (“Wife”). In its 2018 Final Judgment of Divorce (“2018 Judgment”), the Chancery Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) found that Husband’s 100% interest in Vanquish Worldwide, LLC, (“Vanquish Worldwide”) was marital property and that Vanquish Worldwide’s outstanding claim for potentially $32 million against the U.S. Government (“Government Claim”) was marital property. The Trial Court accordingly awarded to Wife a portion of the Government Claim. In Husband’s first appeal, this Court reversed the Trial Court’s finding that the Government Claim was marital property and its awarded portion to Wife. This Court, concluding that the Government Claim was nevertheless relevant to an accurate valuation of Vanquish Worldwide and the total value of the parties’ marital business interests, instructed the Trial Court on remand to revalue Vanquish Worldwide, and in doing so, to consider the Government Claim. On remand, the Trial Court found that Husband had dissipated $12.375 million of the Government Claim proceeds by using the funds to satisfy a personal judgment against him. The Trial Court accordingly added the dissipated $12.375 million to its $4 million valuation of Vanquish Worldwide. Husband has appealed, contesting the Trial Court’s consideration of the Government Claim proceeds in its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide, as well as its overall division of the marital estate, award of alimony in solido, and placement of a lien and an assignment in trust to Wife on Husband’s ownership interests in his numerous LLCs, including Vanquish Worldwide. We affirm the Trial Court’s finding that Husband dissipated marital property and its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide but modify the Trial Court’s judgment to the extent it awarded interest on Wife’s award of alimony in solido. The balance of the Trial Court’s judgment is affirmed, including its division of the marital estate and award of alimony in solido to Wife. We further decline to award Wife attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Sebastian O.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Education, et al.
This appeal concerns a lawsuit challenging the Tennessee Education Savings Account Pilot Program, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2601, et seq. (“the ESA Act”). A group of parents and taxpayers from Davidson and Shelby Counties (“Plaintiffs”) sued state officials (“State Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). In their operative amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the ESA Act violates the Tennessee Constitution and state law by diverting taxpayer funds appropriated for public schools in Davidson and Shelby Counties to private schools, resulting in unique harm to these localities. A group of parents with children eligible for the ESA Act (“Bah Defendants”) and another group (“Greater Praise Defendants”) (all defendants collectively, “Defendants”) intervened in defense of the ESA Act. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted on grounds that Plaintiffs lack standing and their claims are not ripe for judicial review. In reaching its decision, the Trial Court found that the ESA Act has not caused the affected counties any unequal hardship. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their first, second, and sixth causes of action only. We conclude that the Trial Court erred by deciding factual disputes over the impact of the ESA Act on Plaintiffs at the motion to dismiss stage. Plaintiffs alleged enough in their amended complaint to establish standing both as parents and taxpayers. Plaintiffs’ claims also are ripe for judicial review. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court as to Plaintiffs’ first, second, and sixth causes of action and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Maryclair McDonald v. Kaleb Coffel
In this action initiated by the mother to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan for their minor child, the trial court limited the father’s co-parenting time to include no overnight visitation with the child after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the father had committed domestic abuse against two women whom he had previously dated. The trial court relied on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406 to restrict the father’s parenting time based on its determination that the father’s acts of domestic violence and hostility toward women had a negative effect on his ability to effectively parent the minor child. The father appealed, but this Court dismissed that appeal because the trial court’s order was not a final judgment. See McDonald v. Coffel, No. E2021-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4958475 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2021). On remand, the trial court addressed all pending matters and entered a final judgment, keeping in place the residential co-parenting schedule limiting the father’s parenting time to exclude overnight visitation. The father has again appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him overnight co-parenting time and by relying on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Elizabeth Parker v. Kenton Stone Parker
In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s classification of real estate as marital property. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Ronny Arnold v. Allstate Insurance Company
While a prior lawsuit was still pending on appeal, the Plaintiff filed a nearly identical lawsuit. The trial court dismissed this second suit based on res judicata. Although the second suit was not barred by res judicata because the first suit was not final for res judicata purposes, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal on the basis of the prior suit pending doctrine. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hamid Houbbadi v. Kennedy Law Firm, PLLC et al.
The plaintiff filed an action for breach of contract and fraud against his former attorneys and the attorneys’ law firm. The defendants moved for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and that the action was untimely. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion, and, having determined that the plaintiff’s action is untimely under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(c)(1), we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Salas v. John David Rosdeutscher et al.
Plaintiff’s attorneys appeal the trial court’s imposition of sanctions against them in the amount of $68,617.28 and the denial of their second motion to disqualify the trial court judge. We affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to impose sanctions, but we vacate the amount of sanctions awarded and remand for the trial court to calculate the reasonable amount of monetary sanctions in keeping with the procedures and considerations outlined in this opinion. We have determined that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ issue regarding the trial court’s denial of their second motion to recuse is moot. Finally, we decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lyrik L.
This appeal arises from a pending petition for termination of parental rights and adoption. Two weeks after the maternal grandparents commenced their action to terminate the parental rights of the mother of their grandchild (the father being deceased), the paternal grandparents (“the Intervenors”) filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of filing a competing petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; they also sought to set aside an order granting permanent guardianship over the child to the maternal grandparents previously issued by the juvenile court in a separate proceeding. The Intervenors also filed a motion for leave to intervene for the purpose of filing a petition for grandparent visitation. The maternal grandparents opposed all relief sought by the Intervenors. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the juvenile court’s order of permanent guardianship for lack of jurisdiction, and it denied the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption on the ground that the Intervenors lacked standing because they did not meet the definition of prospective adoptive parents under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(44). However, the court granted their motion to intervene for the purpose of grandparent visitation. The Intervenors appeal the denial of the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption, and the maternal grandparents appeal the order granting the Intervenors leave to intervene for the purpose of grandparent visitation. We have determined that the Intervenors have standing to file a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; thus, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on that issue. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
John Schmeeckle v. Brittany Dekreek et al.
This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 19, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until September 7, 2023, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Larry King, et al. v. Town of Selmer, Tennessee
In this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal, we address whether |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Roger Noble Et Al. v. Jerry Gray Et Al.
Five easement holders filed suit against two other easement holders and the servient estate owners seeking a declaratory judgment regarding whether the easements could be used for commercial logging activities. The trial court concluded that commercial logging activities were not a permissible use of the easements and entered an order restraining and enjoining use of the easements for such activities. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brooklyn M.
A father and stepmother appeal from an order dismissing their petition to adopt a child and to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court held that the evidence presented supported termination of the mother’s parental rights based on her failure to support and failure to visit the child. However, the trial court found that the alleged ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the child had not been proven. The court also found that termination of the mother’s rights was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Plofchan v. James Hughey Et. Al.
A man sued his arresting officers and others. He claimed he was neither drunk nor violent when he was arrested and charged with public intoxication, resisting arrest, and assault on an officer. During discovery, the man claimed to have no communications between him and a companion that were not protected by attorney-client privilege or as work product. When such communications were uncovered, the defendants moved for sanctions and attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants and the companion. And it dismissed the case as a sanction. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Flexibility Capital, Inc. v. Sabatino Cupelli, Et Al.
This is a breach of contract case involving the defendants’ purported failure to pay amounts |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Unifirst Corp. v. Indus. Fabrication & Repair, Inc. et al.
This appeal arises from confirmation of an arbitration award. The appellants objected to confirmation, arguing that they lacked notice of the arbitration. One of the appellants also claimed that it never agreed to arbitrate. The winning party submitted that the objections were untimely and did not state a cognizable ground for vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act. We vacate and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anderson Poured Walls, Inc. v. Gilbert Clark et al.
This appeal concerns a subcontractor’s claims for non-payment. The trial court dismissed the claim for unjust enrichment against defendant Clark, the home owner, as not ripe because the plaintiff subcontractor had not exhausted its remedies against the party with whom it had contracted. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Masquerade Fundraising Inc. v. Patrick Horne et al.
The plaintiff corporation filed this action against the defendant independent contractors, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants violated their contracts and covenants not to compete. We granted this interlocutory appeal in which the defendants request review of the trial court’s denial of their motion in limine to exclude an email sent to defense counsel that contains privileged information. The email was inadvertently attached as an exhibit on two separate briefs filed with the court by defense counsel and then repeatedly referenced by defendants in later briefs in response to a motion to disqualify counsel and for sanctions. The trial court held that the repeated disclosure of the email operated as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. We affirm the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Diane Mauriello v. Branch Banking and Trust Company
The plaintiff in this action, alleging mutual mistake, sought rescission and nullification of a promissory note and deed of trust related to the plaintiff’s 2005 purchase of multiple parcels of unimproved real property. Upon the defendant bank’s counterclaim and motion for summary judgment, and following a hearing in which the plaintiff participated pro se after the court denied her motion for continuance, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice and awarded a judgment to the bank in the amount of $306,392.14, inclusive of the principal owed on the promissory note, accrued interest at the time of the hearing, reasonable attorney’s fees, and expenses. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Taylor Brocato (now Dunn) v. Kyle Young
This is a post-divorce partition action in which the ex-wife asked the trial court to order the sale of the former marital residence and to award her, as specified in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”), half of the equity resulting from the sale. The ex-wife relied on the provision in the MDA, which provides that she is entitled to fifty percent of any equity in the former marital residence “when the house sells.” The ex-husband opposed the partition action, arguing that he was awarded the former marital residence pursuant to the MDA and that the ex-wife was only entitled to half of the equity valued as of the date of their divorce in 2019. The ex-husband also contended that the ex-wife’s claims were barred under the doctrine of equitable estoppel because he had remitted $6,600.00 in monthly payments toward the ex-wife’s equity pursuant to an oral agreement that set her equity interest at $9,750.00. The court granted the partition petition and ordered that the property be sold. The court also found that the MDA was a contract in contemplation of divorce; therefore, acting pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A) (“the Distribution of Marital Property Statute”), the court valued the ex-wife’s equity in the former marital residence based on an appraisal near the date of the final divorce decree. The trial court refused to credit the ex-husband for the payments he made to the ex-wife according to their alleged oral agreement, finding that to do so would be a violation of the statute of frauds. Both parties appeal. For the reasons explained below, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Wanda Sue Averwater v. James Paul Averwater
In this divorce, the trial court evenly divided the marital estate and denied the wife’s request for alimony. It also ordered wife to pay the attorney’s fees and costs of a third party. On appeal, the wife challenges the court’s decisions on multiple grounds. After a thorough review, we find that the court erred in not dividing the profit from a business the husband created during the pendency of the divorce as marital property. And the court erred in ordering the wife to pay attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm in all other respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Adams v. Shavetta Conner, et al.
This case originated in general sessions court with the filing of a pro se civil warrant. The |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
