COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Leonard Blackstock v. State of Tennessee
M2023-00066-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner James A. Haltom, TN Claims Commission

This appeal concerns an order of dismissal entered by the Tennessee Claims Commission. Though Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal, this Court is unable to review any of the issues due to Appellant’s noncompliance with applicable appellate briefing requirements. Because all of Appellant’s issues on appeal have been waived due to his failure to comply with the appellate briefing requirements, we affirm the judgment of the Tennessee Claims Commission.

Court of Appeals

Robin M. McNabb v. Gregory Harrison
E2022-01577-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom McFarland

This case involves an election contest filed by the plaintiff based on the defendant’s residency eligibility for the office of Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant had complied with article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution because the clause required, inter alia, that he be a resident within the judicial district, not necessarily within the city limits, to preside over the municipal court, which has concurrent jurisdiction with a general sessions court. The
plaintiff has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the language of article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requiring a judge elected to an inferior court to have been a resident of the “district or circuit” to which he or she is assigned means, under these circumstances, that the Lenoir City Municipal Judge must have been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the judge’s election because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General
Sessions Court. Accordingly, inasmuch as the defendant had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the election, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s election contest. However, we modify the trial court’s judgment to state that the defendant complied with the residency requirement at issue because he had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year rather than because he had been a resident of the Ninth Judicial District for the prescribed time period.

Loudon Court of Appeals

Nathan A. Wallace v. Blake Ballin ET AL.
W2023-01410-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge, Middle Section, Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge A. Blake Neill

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court
Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. This appeal arises
from a civil action in which the plaintiff has brought claims of fraud and civil conspiracy
against his former counsel in a criminal case that resulted in a conviction and his counsel
in a pending post-conviction case. While this civil action was pending, the trial court
allowed the attorneys who were representing the plaintiff in the post-conviction case to
withdraw. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a recusal motion, contending that the trial
judge should be recused because he showed bias in favor of the plaintiff’s post-conviction
attorneys when he granted their motions to withdraw without a hearing, during which the
plaintiff wished to share his grievances about the attorneys. The trial court denied the
plaintiff’s recusal motion, and this Rule 10B appeal followed. We have concluded that
neither the legal grounds nor the evidence that the plaintiff relies upon in his affidavit in
support of the recusal motion are sufficient to prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to
reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
denying the motion for recusal is affirmed.

Tipton Court of Appeals

Donna Booker v. James Michael Booker
E2022-01228-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey M. Atherton

This is an appeal from a divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”). Donna Booker (“Wife”) and Mike Booker (“Husband”) married for the first time in 1993 and divorced in 1998. They remarried shortly thereafter in February of 1999. The day of their second wedding, Husband and Wife executed a prenuptial agreement addressing Husband’s interest in his family’s steel erection business. Wife filed the current divorce action in the trial court in February of 2020, and a trial was held May 3 and 4, 2022, and July 6, 2022. The trial court ordered the parties divorced, divided the marital estate, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro. Finding that the prenuptial agreement was valid, the trial court determined that Husband’s interest in his family business was separate property. Wife appeals. Following thorough review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

John H. Packard, IV v. Jonathan R. Bentley Et Al.
E2022-00982-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

The plaintiff, John H. Packard, IV (“Plaintiff”) was struck by a vehicle driven by Jonathan
R. Bentley while Plaintiff attempted to walk across a roadway in Gatlinburg, Tennessee.
Plaintiff brought a suit arising in negligence against a number of parties, including the City
of Gatlinburg (“City”). As to City, Plaintiff alleged that it created an unreasonably
dangerous risk of harm to pedestrians attempting to use the crosswalk because it failed to
inspect and maintain LED lights it had previously installed on a nearby crosswalk sign.
The Circuit Court for Sevier County (“trial court”) granted summary judgment in favor of
City, finding that City negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, that City was
entitled to immunity pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act
(“GTLA”), Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101 et seq., and that City was also
immune pursuant to the public duty doctrine. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

Court of Appeals

Jody Higgins v. Corecivic, Inc. Et Al.
E2022-01101-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle E. Hedrick

This appeal concerns an inmate’s lawsuit over injuries he sustained from falling off a top
bunk bed in prison. Jody Higgins (“Plaintiff”) was an inmate at Silverdale Detention
Facility (“Silverdale”). CoreCivic, Inc. operated Silverdale through a contract with
Hamilton County. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC (the two CoreCivic entities together,
“CoreCivic”) employed security at Silverdale. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“CCS”)
provided medical treatment to Silverdale inmates through a contract with CoreCivic.
Plaintiff sued CoreCivic, CCS, and Hamilton County (“Defendants,” collectively) in the
Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) asserting health care liability and
other claims. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court
granted based in part on a lack of expert proof. Plaintiff appeals. He argues among other
things that it is common knowledge that Plaintiff, who suffers from seizures, should have
been given a bottom bunk pass and anti-seizure medication. We hold, inter alia, that
Plaintiff failed to present competent, admissible expert proof in support of his health care
liability claim at the summary judgment stage, and that the issues of this case do not fall
under the common knowledge exception. Plaintiff’s other claims are barred by the statute
of limitations. We affirm.

Court of Appeals

Jason M. Peterson v. Jodi L. Carey
E2022-01656-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. McLellan, III

Jason M. Peterson (“Plaintiff”) was the passenger in a vehicle driven by Jodi L. Carey
(“Defendant”) at the time of a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff filed a personal injury
action against Defendant more than one year after the accident. Plaintiff argues that
Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(a)(2) extends the statute of limitations for his
action to two years because Defendant was cited for the violation of a traffic ordinance
contained in the Kingsport Municipal Code in relation to the accident. The Circuit Court
for Sullivan County (“trial court”) applied the one-year statute of limitations set forth in
section 28-3-104(a)(1) and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Finding no
error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Court of Appeals

In Re Aaliyah P.
M2022-01645-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sheila Calloway

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support; abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We reverse the trial court’s finding on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans because the initial permanency plan does not appear in the record, but we affirm the trial court in all other respects.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Dustin Balch v. Brittanie Cilley
M2022-01100-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Todd Burnett

A mother appeals from the judgment holding her in criminal contempt of court, denying her motion to dissolve an ex parte no-contact order entered against her, and denying her motion to transfer the case to another county. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment. Due to the passage of time and the position taken by the parties and by the trial court when issuing its ruling, we remand for a new evidentiary hearing on the ex parte order suspending the mother’s contact with the children.

Fentress Court of Appeals

Jeffrey Swinghold, et al. v. The Farm at Clovercroft Homeowners Association, Inc., et al.
M2022-01633-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Deanna B. Johnson

The plaintiffs filed this breach of contract action against their homeowners association for failure to rectify alleged violations of the neighborhood restrictions. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment establishing that the issues complained of were actual violations of the restrictions. The trial court dismissed the action in favor of the homeowners association and the plaintiffs’ neighbors who joined as interested parties. We affirm.

Williamson Court of Appeals

James Paul Burkhart v. Kathryn Jean Burkhart
M2023-01390-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Thompson

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Appellant seeks to appeal from the denial of three separate motions to recuse the trial judge. As to the first motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of that motion on the basis of Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. As the second and third recusal motion, we dismiss this appeal, as no effective order denying those motions has yet been entered by the trial court.

Sumner Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. $133,429 In U.S. Currency Seized From Joni Assefa Kilenton, ET AL
W2022-01075-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

This appeal arises from a forfeiture action regarding funds seized during a traffic stop. In
a prior appeal, this Court vacated and remanded for entry of an order that complied with
Rule 58 and Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court entered
an additional order on remand, and the appellant has again appealed. Due to deficiencies
in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of his issue on
appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

Fayette Court of Appeals

Raymond D. Barnes, Jr. v. Marion L. Barnes
M2022-00328-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

After a long-term marriage, the parties divorced. The trial court, which found the husband’s testimony not to be credible, set the value of the marital property, divided the marital property, and awarded alimony in futuro to the wife.  The husband appeals, challenging the credibility finding, the trial court’s valuation of the marital property, the division of property, and the alimony award.  We affirm the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the marital property, but we vacate the trial court’s alimony award, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Meredith Garrett v. Hidden Valley Homes, LLC et al.
M2022-01531-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

In this breach of implied warranty of good workmanship and materials case, the trial court awarded Appellee $77,494.36 in damages. Although the parties agree that the proper measure of damages is the cost to repair the defects, the parties dispute the method of repair and its cost. In determining Appellee’s damages, the trial court relied on testimony from Appellee’s expert contractor. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order. The parties’ respective requests for appellate attorney’s fees are denied.

Williamson Court of Appeals

In Re Lieselotte H. Rogoish Revocable Living Trust
M2022-01464-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ben Dean

This appeal arises from a petition filed by a beneficiary of a trust seeking an accounting and removal of the trustee. The trustee asserted the affirmative defense that the beneficiary violated the no-contest clause in the settlor’s trust. The trustee served the beneficiary with requests for admissions, to which the beneficiary responded with objections to the majority of the requests. After the trial court granted his motion for the requests for admissions to be admitted, the trustee filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the no-contest clauses in the trust and will of the settlor. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the beneficiary’s petition with prejudice. The beneficiary appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Dianne Hamilton, et al. v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals
W2022-00054-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary L. Wagner

This appeal arises from a health care liability action filed in circuit court by a conservator
on behalf of a ward. After a three-week jury trial resulted in a mistrial, the conservator
took a nonsuit. The conservator refiled the complaint against only one defendant hospital,
asserting that it was vicariously liable for the actions of a doctor based on a theory of
apparent agency. The defendant hospital moved for summary judgment on the basis that
the conservator had entered into a consent agreement agreeing not to sue the doctor in the
refiled suit if the doctor agreed to withdraw his motion for discretionary costs. According
to the defendant hospital, this agreement releasing the alleged agent from liability
extinguished the conservator’s right to pursue a vicarious liability claim against the
principal. In response, the conservator took the position that the consent agreement was
not binding because it was never approved by the probate court that appointed her. The
circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant hospital, finding that the order
appointing the conservator authorized her to dispose of property, execute instruments, enter
into contracts, pursue legal causes of action, and manage money, thereby authorizing her
to enter into the consent agreement. The circuit court found nothing in the order of
appointment, the relevant statutes, or caselaw that would impose a mandatory requirement
for approval of the settlement by the probate court. Because the conservator had released
the alleged agent from liability, the circuit court found that the conservator could not pursue
vicarious liability claims against the defendant hospital. The conservator filed a motion to
alter or amend, asking the circuit court to consider an “Advisory Opinion” of the probate
court on the matter. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that it respectfully
disagreed with the Advisory Opinion of the probate court. The conservator appeals. We
affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Akrem Hasan v. Jim Burrow et al.
M2023-01354-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re Preston H.
M2022-00786-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sharon Guffee

Courts in both Florida and Ohio denied petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights in favor of the Prospective Adoptive Parents.  While Florida courts were still exercising jurisdiction over the transition of the child from his Prospective Adoptive Parents to his Mother and Father, the Prospective Adoptive Parents sought for the third time to have a court terminate Father’s parental rights, asserting willful failure to support in Tennessee.  The juvenile court dismissed the petition, finding that Father’s failure to support was not willful because the failure to support was tied to the Prospective Adoptive Parents’ representations that they would no longer pursue custody, to Father’s financial outlays related to preparing his home for a transition of custody, and to the complex, multi-jurisdictional nature of the litigation, in which Florida courts were expressly exercising jurisdiction for many months after the filing of the Tennessee petition and during the entirety of the period of non-payment.  The Prospective Adoptive Parents appeal, asserting that the ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest, and that the court erred in assessing fees for the guardian ad litem.  We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Williamson Court of Appeals

In Re Preston H. (Concurring)
M2022-00786-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sharon Guffee

I concur in the result reached by the Court and in its analysis in all but one respect.  In considering whether the father of Preston H., Christopher W. (“Father”), established an affirmative defense to the claim that he abandoned his child by failure to support, the Court reasons that it is unnecessary to determine “whether willfulness [of Father’s failure to support] presents a question of law, fact, or a mixed question of fact and law.”  In my view, the outcome of the appeal depends on that determination.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Ashley Denson Ex Rel. Bobbie J. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge Et Al.
E2023-00027-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ryan M. Spitzer

This appeal arises from a health care liability action following the death of Ashley Denson
from a cardiac event she suffered after being treated and released from Methodist Medical
Center. Ms. Denson was unmarried and had two minor children at the time of her death.
The statutorily-required pre-suit notice listed Ms. Denson’s mother, Bobbie J. Denson, as
the claimant authorizing notice. The minor children were not identified anywhere in the
notice. The subsequent complaint was filed by “ASHLEY DENSON, Deceased, by and
through her Next Friend and Mother BOBBIE JO DENSON, and BOBBIE JO DENSON,
Individually.” The body of the complaint lists, for the first time, Ashley Denson’s children,
and states that Bobbie Denson “brings this action individually, and on behalf of Plaintiff,
decedent’s surviving minor children … as Grandmother and Legal Guardian.” The
defendants filed motions to dismiss, challenging Bobbie Denson’s standing to bring the
action and contending that the pre-suit notice failed to comply with the requirements of the
Tennessee Health Care Liability Act.1

Court of Appeals

Ashley Denson Ex Rel. Bobbie J. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge Et Al. - DISSENT
E2023-00027-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ryan M. Spitzer

I agree with the majority’s secondary conclusion that Grandmother held standing to
file suit on behalf of the minor children. I write separately to address the majority’s
dispositive holding that failure to identify the minor children in the pre-suit notice defeats
this cause of action, thereby precluding their claim for health care liability for judicial
review on its merits.

Court of Appeals

Virgie Lee Parker v. Paul J. Parker
E2022-00720-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael E. Jenne

In this post-divorce action, the trial court denied the husband’s petition for contempt upon
finding that the wife had satisfied a provision of the parties’ marital dissolution
agreement allowing for the husband to retrieve items of personal property from a home
awarded to the wife. The court initially awarded attorney’s fees to the wife, pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), for her successful defense against the petition.
Upon the husband’s motion to alter or amend and following a hearing and supplemental
briefing, the trial court concluded that the statute did not provide for attorney’s fees in an
action involving enforcement of the distribution of property in a divorce. The trial court
granted the husband’s motion to alter or amend, denying the wife’s request for attorney’s
fees. The wife has appealed. Upon consideration, we hold that Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-5-103(c) provides for attorney’s fees solely in matters involving alimony,
child support, permanent parenting plan provisions, and custody of children. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Bradley Court of Appeals

Jacob Thomas Cook Et Al v. Jefferson County, Tennessee Et Al
E2022-01537-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge James L. Gass

This case involves an accident between a motor vehicle and a school bus that occurred on
Highway 11E on a foggy December morning in Jefferson County, Tennessee. The
automobile was traveling eastbound on Highway 11E when it struck the bus, which was
stopped across the two eastbound lanes of Highway 11E positioned to make a left turn onto
the westbound lanes. The driver of the car, Jacob Cook, sustained serious injuries as a
result of the impact. Mr. Cook, together with his grandfather, Rickey Macari, who owned
the vehicle, brought an action in tort seeking damages against Jefferson County, the
Jefferson County Board of Education, and the driver of the school bus, Harold Moody. In
their complaint, Mr. Cook and Mr. Macari alleged that Mr. Moody's negligence in stopping
the school bus across the eastbound lanes was the proximate cause of Mr. Cook's injuries.
The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that Mr. Cook's negligence, and not Mr.
Moody's, was the proximate cause of the accident because Mr. Cook had been speeding
when the accident occurred. During a bench trial, the defendants' expert witness, an
accident reconstructionist, opined that Mr. Cook had been speeding at the time of the
accident but that Mr. Cook's car would have collided with the stopped school bus even had
he been following the speed limit. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found
that Mr. Cook was indeed speeding at the time of the accident, but that Mr. Moody should
not have attempted to turn left across the eastbound lanes given the traffic and weather
conditions. Accordingly, the trial court determined that Mr. Moody's actions were the
proximate cause of Mr. Cook's injuries and allocated 80% of the fault for the accident to
Mr. Moody, with 20% of the fault assigned to Mr. Cook. The defendants timely appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment with one modification:
we direct the trial court to dismiss Jefferson County as a defendant because the Jefferson
County Board of Education, as the owner of the school bus, is undisputedly the proper
defendant in this action.

Jefferson Court of Appeals

Jeremy Nathaniel Greene v. Laura E. Greene et al.
M2022-01171-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. B. Cox

This is a divorce case. Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation and division of marital property and its award of attorney’s fees as alimony in solido to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s valuation and division of marital property. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to wife as alimony in solido based on the lack of findings in the trial court’s order. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. The case is remanded for findings on the issue of whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under the factors prescribed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121 and, if so, whether the amount of attorney’s fees is reasonable.

Bedford Court of Appeals

Victor Lee Hyatt v. Suzanne Lee Hyatt
M2023-00037-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Matthew Joel Wallace,

This appeal arises from a post-divorce petition for contempt. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order failed to resolve all the issues before the court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Montgomery Court of Appeals