COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Sheila Roberts on Behalf of Thomas Sam Edwards v. Nathan Hinkle, M.D.
W2022-01714-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cedrick D. Wooten

This case involves a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process and for
expiration of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed this health care liability suit
against a defendant physician. A process server went to the defendant’s office to serve
him, and after the process server was unable to locate the defendant, he served the summons
and complaint on an employee of the hospital where the defendant’s office was located.
The defendant answered the complaint and raised the defense that there was insufficient
service of process. More than a year after the complaint was filed, the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that the plaintiff
failed to properly serve the defendant and that the statute of limitations had run on the
health care liability action. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Victor Daniel Medina-Tratel v. Christopher Holloway, Et Al.
M2022-01640-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles C.K. Smith

The dispositive issue on appeal concerns a forum selection clause in the LLC Agreement of Catch22Nashville, LLC (“the LLC Agreement”). Catch22Nashville, LLC initially had four members who owned equal membership interests. The principal business of the LLC was a restaurant operating under the name Catch22 Gastropub. A dispute arose when one of the four members, Christopher Holloway (“Mr. Holloway”), purchased the membership interests of two other members, Richard Miley (“Mr. Miley”) and Justin Kamishlian (“Mr. Kamishlian”), resulting in Mr. Holloway owning three-fourths of the membership interests in the LLC. The fourth member, Victor Daniel Medina-Tratel (“Mr. Medina”), claims that Mr. Holloway promised to transfer the interest portion belonging to Mr. Kamishlian to Mr. Medina upon his payment of $40,000, so that Mr. Holloway and Mr. Medina would own Catch22Nashville, LLC in equal interests. Instead, Mr. Holloway transferred a one-fourth membership interest in the LLC to his wife Melanie Holloway (“Ms. Holloway”). Two years later, the landlord of Catch22 Gastropub terminated its lease and evicted the restaurant from the premises, forcing it to cease business. On the day of the eviction, Mr. Medina obtained a cashier’s check in the amount of $100,000 from the LLC’s bank account that was made payable to the Clerk and Master of Wilson County. Mr. Medina then filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Wilson County against Mr. Holloway and Ms. Holloway (hereinafter “the Holloways”) for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and conversion related to the transfer of Mr. Kamishlian’s membership interest in the LLC. Mr. Medina also filed a motion to interplead into court the $100,000 that he withdrew from the LLC’s corporate account. The LLC then motioned to intervene as a party with a vested interest in the interpleaded funds. The trial court granted both Mr. Medina’s motion for interpleader and the LLC’s motion to intervene. The LLC and the Holloways (hereinafter “Defendants”) then filed motions to dismiss based on the forum selection clause in the LLC Agreement. Section 1.09 of the LLC Agreement states “[v]enue for any dispute arising under this LLC Agreement or any disputes among any Members or the Company will be in the county of the Company’s Registered Office.” The trial court ruled that, under the forum selection clause in the LLC Agreement, exclusive venue for Mr. Medina’s claims was in Oconee County, Georgia, the county of the company’s registered office, and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of proper venue. Mr. Medina filed a timely appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

In Re Lila F.
E2023-01112-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W .Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Mitchell Manuel

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one of her children. On the day of trial, her appointed counsel orally moved for leave to withdraw. The court granted the motion, and the trial proceeded with the mother representing herself. Ultimately, the court found clear and convincing evidence of six grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in permitting her appointed counsel to withdraw. Because we agree, we vacate the judgment terminating her parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

Murali Ponnapula v. Immanuel Wright
W2023-00703-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith

Following a motor vehicle accident, Appellant/the insured brought a breach of contract
claim against Appellee/the automobile insurer. In a motion for summary judgment,
Appellee argued that Appellant materially breached the duty to cooperate clause of the
insurance policy, which barred his recovery. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Appellee, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Appellant
materially breached the insurance policy by failing to submit to an examination under oath.
The trial court concluded that the material breach barred Appellant from recovery under
the policy. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Nedra R. Hastings v. Larry M. Hastings Jr.
W2020-01225-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement
Trial Court Judge: Judge Nancy Percer Kessler

This protracted and contentious child support action began on April 15, 2005, with the
filing of a petition for child support filed by the State of Tennessee (“the State”) on behalf
of the mother, Nedra R. Hastings (“Mother”) in the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby
County, Tennessee seeking support from the father, Larry M. Hastings (“Father”), for
Mother and Father’s only child, born in 2004. The petition sought child support
enforcement assistance pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 651, et seq. (“Title IV-D”). In July 2005, the trial court entered an order
establishing child support, which ordered that Father pay support, that Father provide
medical insurance for the child, and that each parent pay half of any medical expenses not
covered by insurance. Over the years that followed, the State, acting on behalf of Mother,
or Mother acting pro se and independent of the State, filed numerous motions and/or
petitions, including petitions to modify the child support amount, petitions for contempt
for Father’s failure to pay medical and other expenses, objections to the appointment of
special judges and magistrates by the juvenile court judge, objections to the court hearing
motions virtually via Zoom, and requests for the court to rehear motions and petitions. On
September 24, 2020, an appointed special judge, who heard only Title IV-D matters,
disposed of all matters remaining in the Title IV-D case and continued the pending
contempt and child-support modification matters to be heard by a judge who handled non-
Title IV-D matters. This appeal, which is the second of Mother’s four appeals that arise
from this case, followed. The numerous issues Mother raises in this appeal principally
relate to the appointment of a special judge, recusal issues, and issues that led up to the
final order entered on September 24, 2020. Following a thorough review of the record and
the issues raised in this appeal for which Mother presents arguments as required by
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7), we affirm the decisions of the trial court.

Augustina C. Durunna v. Nelson I. Durunna
M2022-00415-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phillip R. Robinson

This is a divorce case where the wife has raised several discrete issues on appeal. Although certain of her assertions are without merit, we agree with the wife that the trial court erred in failing to account for certain real property located in Nigeria. Thus, the marital estate division is vacated, and the matter is remanded so that the trial court can account for the Nigerian real property highlighted herein. As a result of our disposition on that issue, as well as other concerns, we also vacate the trial court’s award of alimony to the husband.

Morgan Ashlee Hood v. State of Tennessee
E2023-00773-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: William A. Young, Commissioner

In Re Estate of Janice N. Smith
W2023-00364-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathleen N. Gomes

This appeal concerns a partial summary judgment order certified as final pursuant to Rule
54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon our review of the record, we
determine that the issue adjudicated in the partial summary judgment order did not dispose
of an entire claim or party, as is required to certify an order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02.
Because we conclude that the trial court improvidently certified the order as final, we
dismiss the appeal and remand for further proceedings.

James A. Welch, et al. v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center, LLC d/b/a Christian Care Centers of Memphis, et al.
W2020-00917-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jerry Stokes

At issue in this appeal is whether an individual, now deceased, lacked the requisite mental capacity when he signed a durable power of attorney for health care. The trial court answered this question in the affirmative, specifically concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decedent was incompetent. As a result of this determination, the trial court further concluded that an arbitration agreement later signed by the decedent’s brother using the power of attorney was invalid, a conclusion which in turn prompted the trial court to deny the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the basis of that agreement. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tina Batten
M2023-00323-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bradley Sherman

Tina Batten, Defendant, entered a best interest plea to aggravated assault and possession of a firearm while under the influence in exchange for a total effective sentence of five years with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered Defendant to a sentence of split confinement on the basis that granting diversion would depreciate the severity of the offenses and would have a detrimental effect on deterrence. Because the trial court failed to consider the proper factors in rendering its decision to deny diversion and failed to weigh those factors, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration. On remand, the trial court should utilize the factors set forth in Parker and Electroplating, weigh the factors against each other, and place an explanation of its ruling on the record.

Crockett County v. Farhad Motamedi v. Michael Moore
W2023-00553-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Michael L. Mansfield

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to set aside a tax sale of unimproved real property. The petitioner had acquired the parcel in 2017 but had failed to update his address with the property assessor and other taxing authorities and had failed to pay taxes associated with the parcel from 2017 through 2021. The taxing authorities, as plaintiffs, commenced a lawsuit to collect the delinquent taxes in 2020. Unable to locate the petitioner for lack of a current address, the taxing authorities sought permission from the trial court to notify the petitioner of the lawsuit through publication in the local newspaper, which the trial court granted. After the time for notice by publication had expired, the taxing authorities sought and were granted default judgment regarding the petitioner’s property, and the taxing authorities sold the real property at a delinquent tax sale. The order confirming the tax sale was entered on April 7, 2021, but was not recorded with the local register of deeds until April 26, 2022, after the one-year statutory redemption period had passed. In July and August 2021, the petitioner contacted the taxing authorities to inquire about taxes he owed on the property and traveled to Crockett County to meet with the city and county officials and pay the delinquent taxes. For unknown reasons, the taxing authorities did not inform the petitioner that the real property had been sold at a tax sale earlier that year. The petitioner did not initiate a redemption action and did not file a petition to have the sale set aside at that time. In June 2022, after the one-year redemption period had elapsed and the statute of limitations period for setting aside the tax sale had expired, the petitioner sued to set aside the tax sale, which action the trial court denied as untimely. The petitioner has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Alethea Skeen
E2023-00457-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge William K. Rogers

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case.

Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Alethea Skeen
E2023-00457-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge William K. Rogers

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection shouldtherefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Alethea Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees.

Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Rowan Skeen
E2023-00458-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge William K. Rogers

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case

Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Rowan Skeen
E2023-00458-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge William K. Rogers

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Rowan Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees.

Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Denise Skeen
E2023-00459-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge William K. Rogers

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case.

Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Denise Skeen
E2023-00459-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge William K. Rogers

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Denise Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees.

Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Cheryl Hanzlik
E2023-00455-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge William K. Rogers

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case.

Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Cheryl Hanzlik
E2023-00455-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge William K. Rogers

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Cheryl Hanzlik, in the form of attorney’s fees.

Michael Tomlin, Individually, and d/b/a The Tomlin Company v. Nephrology Associates, P.C. Et Al.
M2022-00937-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

A renal care company retained a broker to locate sites for new dialysis clinics.  The company agreed to pay the broker a commission when leases were signed and “at the renewal or extension of said leases.”  The company later negotiated amendments to the leases without the broker’s participation.  The broker sued the company for breach of contract, alleging that he was due a commission on the lease amendments.  The trial court determined that eight lease amendments were renewals or extensions of the original leases.  And it entered a judgment against the company for the amount of the unpaid commissions.  We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the court’s finding that two of the lease amendments were renewals or extensions.  So we affirm the judgment as modified.

In Re: Katelyn R. et al.
M2023-00354-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Daryl A. Colson

The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed two children from their parents’
custody in May of 2020. After a long period in which DCS did not hear from the children’s
father, and the father made no progress on his permanency plan, DCS filed a petition to
terminate the father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the Juvenile Court for
Overton County (the “juvenile court”) found that DCS proved five statutory grounds for
termination of the father’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile
court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the father’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. The father appeals and, discerning no error, we
affirm.

Kari Dale Remus v. Brandon Joseph Nunn
M2023-00589-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ben Dean

In this post-divorce case, the husband filed a petition for declaratory judgment on the issue of whether a provision of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement concerning military retirement was modifiable.  The trial court dismissed the husband’s petition on the ground of failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and ruled that the provision at issue was not modifiable.  While we find that the trial court erred in granting the wife’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we affirm the result reached by the trial court on the merits of the dispute.  Further, we have determined that the wife was not entitled to an additional award of attorney fees at trial and is not entitled to her attorney fees on appeal.

State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Sullivan County Tennessee Et Al. v. Amy S. Tochev Et Al.
E2023-00072-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. McLellan, III

A taxpayer failed to pay property taxes for a number of years. The county began enforcement proceedings and, following the entry of a default judgment against the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s property was ultimately sold at a delinquent tax sale. The purchaser filed a writ of possession to obtain possession of the property from the taxpayer, at which time the taxpayer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and resulting tax sale. The taxpayer alleged lack of notice concerning the underlying delinquent tax proceedings and violation of her due
process and equal protection rights. The trial court denied the taxpayer’s motion to set aside, concluding the taxpayer was properly served with notice of the underlying delinquent tax proceedings. We affirm.

Caprice McLemore Et Al. v. Knox County, Tennessee
E2022-01754-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge William T. Ailor

Caprice McLemore, Gary McLemore, Misty Tanner, Barrett Tanner, and McKinley Tanner (together, “Plaintiffs” or “Appellants”) appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their case against the defendant, Knox County (“Appellee” or “the County”). Appellants were injured in a car accident on Clinton Highway after being struck by a vehicle driven by Roy Michael Simmons (“Mr. Simmons”), who was evading a Knox County sheriff’s deputy. Plaintiffs filed suit against the County, alleging that it was liable for their injuries arising from the accident. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the deputy pursuing Mr. Simmons did not act unreasonably under the circumstances and that the County was thus not liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Gary Porter v. Amber Phillips, Director of Sentence Management Services, Tennessee Department of Correction
M2023-00412-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

Gary Porter (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the Davidson County Chancery Court (the
“chancery court”), wherein he requested that the chancery court award him certain pre-trial
jail credits which he was already awarded toward a separate sentence that Petitioner
previously served. The chancery court granted summary judgment in favor of Amber
Phillips (“Phillips”), Director of Sentence Management Services for Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Petitioner appeals the judgment of the chancery
court. Having determined that Petitioner’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of
briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issue purportedly raised on appeal is waived.
The appeal is dismissed.