

Supreme Court Appeals
Pending Cases
(01/16/12)

1. Style Rondal Akers et al v. Prime Succession of Tennessee, Inc., et al
 2. Docket Number E2009-02203-SC-R11-CV
 3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/akersropn.pdf>
 4. Lower Court Summary

This case is before us for the second time on appeal. In our first Opinion, *Akers v. Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc.*, we held, *inter alia*, that Rondal D. Akers, Jr. and Lucinda Akers had standing to pursue their claims against T. Ray Brent Marsh; Marsh's former business, Tri-State Crematory ("Tri-State"); and Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc. *Akers v. Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc.*, 270 S.W.3d 67, 73-75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). We remanded the case for trial. The Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury's verdict finding that Marsh had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the Akers, that Marsh had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and that Marsh had violated a bailment responsibility to the Akers. The jury awarded Dr. Akers \$275,000 in damages and Mrs. Akers \$475,000 in damages. Marsh filed a motion for new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Marsh a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict reversing the judgment for the claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and bailment, and denied Marsh's motion as to the remaining claims. Marsh appeals to this Court. The Akers raise an issue on appeal regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismissing their claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and bailment. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.
 5. Status Granted 1/11/12
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1. Style Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diana Lynn Tarrant, et al.
2. Docket Number E2009-02431-SC-R11-CV
3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Allstate%20Insurance%20Co%20vs%20Diana%20Lynn%20Tarran.pdf>
4. Lower Court Summary

Plaintiff insurer brought this declaratory judgment action to determine which of the two policies issued to defendants insured and their corporation, covered a van which had been involved in an accident. Plaintiff named the insureds as defendants, as well as the third party who had filed a tort action against the insureds for personal injuries. The Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the insureds had told the agency plaintiff to keep the van in dispute on the commercial policy, but it had transferred the van to the insureds' personal policy. The Court further ruled that a notice of the transfer was sent to

the insureds by plaintiff, and plaintiff sent at least five bills to the insureds that reflected the van was then insured under the personal policy and not the commercial policy. The Court concluded that the insureds ratified the change and ruled that the van was insured under the insureds personal policy. On appeal, we reverse and dismiss the action.

5.	Status	Heard 8/31/11 in Knoxville
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1.	Style	Gerdau Ameristeel, Inc. V. Steven Ratliff
2.	Docket Number	W2011-00381-WC-R3-WC
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	N/A
4.	Lower Court Summary	Unavailable
5.	Status	Order transferring appeal from Special Workers' Compensation Panel to Supreme Court entered 12/27/11
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1.	Style	BPR v. William S. Lockett
2.	Docket Number	E2011-01170-SC-R3-BP
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	N/A
4.	Lower Court Summary	Unavailable
5.	Status	Heard 01/05/12 in Knoxville
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1.	Style	Shelia Brown v. Rico Roland
2.	Docket Number	No. M2009-01885-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/Sheila%20Brown%20v%20Rico%20Roland%20OPN.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The matters at issue pertain to the rights and responsibilities of the parties under the underinsured motorist provisions of Plaintiff's automobile insurance. Plaintiff, who was involved in a vehicular accident with another motorist, commenced this personal injury action to recover an amount "under \$25,000." The only named defendant is the tortfeasor, however, State Farm is an unnamed party. This is due to the fact that Plaintiff served timely and proper notice on State Farm of the commencement of this action and that she was asserting an underinsured coverage claim pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206. Plaintiff subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with the tortfeasor for the tortfeasor's policy limits of \$25,000, at which time she properly served notice on

State Farm of the proposed settlement and her willingness to enter into binding arbitration with State Farm to settle her claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Thereafter, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss the underinsured claim against it claiming Plaintiff was made whole when she agreed to a settlement with the tortfeasor in an amount in excess of her ad damnum and therefore there was no claim to arbitrate. The court granted the motion to dismiss and Plaintiff appealed. We have determined the trial court did not err in granting State Farm's motion to dismiss the claim against it because Plaintiff sought to recover a judgment in an amount under \$25,000 from the tortfeasor and/or State Farm, and Plaintiff settled her claim against the tortfeasor for an amount in excess of the ad damnum. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of State Farm.

5. Status Heard 06/02/11 in Nashville

1. Style BSG, LLC v. Check Velocity, Inc.

2. Docket Number M2011-00355-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/bsgopn.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary BSG, LLC introduced CheckVelocity to Weight Watchers. In 2005, CheckVelocity and Weight Watchers entered into an agreement whereby CheckVelocity provided check collection services. BSG, in accordance with its agreement with CheckVelocity, was to receive compensation for its introduction of CheckVelocity to Weight Watchers in the form of residual fees during the time of the CheckVelocity - Weight Watchers agreement and any renewal agreements. In 2008, CheckVelocity and Weight Watchers entered into a new agreement in which credit card collection services were added and the check collection services were continued unchanged. CheckVelocity stopped paying the residual fees because it considered the Weight Watchers agreement to be a new agreement, not a renewal of the old one. BSG sued. The trial court considered the 2008 agreement to be a new agreement, not a renewal, and ruled for CheckVelocity. BSG appealed. We reverse.

5. Status Appellant's brief filed 01/03/12

1. Style Donna Clark v. Sputniks, LLC, et al.

2. Docket Number M2010-02163-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/donna_clark_v_sputniks_llc.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary The trial court determined that the insurer of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for the death of a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy.

5. Status To be heard 02/16/12 in Nashville; Consolidated with Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC, et al.

1. Style Joshua Cooper et al. v. Logistics Insight Corp. et al.

2. Docket Number No. M2010-01262-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/joshua_cooper_v_logistics_insight_corp.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary: This appeal arises out of a personal injury lawsuit, wherein plaintiff filed suit for injuries suffered in the course of his employment. Plaintiff's employer was allowed to intervene to assert a subrogation lien to recover workers' compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff settled his claim against the defendants, and an order of voluntary dismissal was entered. The intervenors moved to set the case for trial, asserting that the settlement between plaintiffs and defendants was negotiated without the consent of the intervenors and did not take into account plaintiff's future medical expenses, for which intervenors would be responsible. The trial court granted the intervenors' motion to set the case for trial, but subsequently dismissed the intervening petition, finding that the settlement resolved all claims against the defendants and that the intervening petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finding that dismissal of the intervening petition was error, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded.

5. Status To be heard 02/16/12 in Nashville

1. Style Discover Bank v. Joy A. Mogan

2. Docket Number E2009-01337-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Discover%20Bank%20v%20Joy%20A%20Morgan%20OPN.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary: This lawsuit began as a collection claim filed by Discover Bank ("Discover") against Joy A. Morgan ("Morgan") for \$16,341.52. Discover claimed Morgan owed this amount on a credit card originally issued to Morgan's husband, now deceased. Morgan filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting a claim for libel as well as claims pursuant to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101, *et seq.* Morgan's attorney gave Discover's original attorney an extension of time in which to file an answer to the counterclaim. After this extension of time had run, Morgan's attorney warned Discover's attorney that a motion for default judgment would be filed if an answer was not filed within fourteen days. When Discover failed to file an answer within the fourteen days, Morgan filed a motion for default judgment. Discover's attorney failed to show up for the hearing and a default judgment was awarded to Morgan. Discover filed a Motion to Set Aside

Default Judgment “pursuant to Rule 60.02. . . .” This motion was denied. Following a later hearing on damages, Morgan was awarded compensatory damages totaling \$125,200, which the Trial Court then trebled under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After obtaining new counsel, Discover filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. Discover now appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s Order denying Discover’s motion to alter or amend the judgment and set aside the default judgment. We, however, vacate the award of damages and remand for a new hearing on the amount of damages and also to determine reasonable attorney fees incurred by Morgan on appeal.

5. Status Heard 8/31/11 in Knoxville

1. Style Christopher Furlough v. Spherion Atlantic Workforce, LLC

2. Docket Number M2011-00187-SC-WCM-WC

3. Lower Court Decision Link Unavailable

4. Lower Court Summary Unavailable

5. Status Granted 12/14/11

1. Style Leonard Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC, et al.

2. Docket Number M2010-02145-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/leonard_gamble_v_sputniks_llc.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary The trial court determined that the insurer of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for injuries to a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy.

5. Status To be heard 02/16/12 in Nashville; Consolidated with [Clark v. Sputniks, LLC et al.](#)

1. Style Jerry Garrison, et cl. v. Rita Bickford, et al.

2. Docket Number E2010-02008-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/jerry_garrison_v_andy_e_bickford.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary
 Plaintiffs brought this action for the wrongful death of their son, and also for their damages arising from "negligent infliction of emotional distress". State Farm Mutual Insurance Company filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that its policy afforded no coverage for a negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court overruled the Motion but proposed a Rule 9 appeal, which this Court granted. We reverse the Trial Court on this issue and grant the summary judgment motion.
5. Status
 Appellant's brief filed on 01/04/12
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1. Style
 Cheryl Brown Giggers, et al. v. Memphis Housing Authority et al.,
2. Docket Number
 W2010-00806-SC-R11-CV
3. Lower Court Decision Link
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cheryl_brown_giggers_v_memphis_housing_authority_opn.pdf
4. Lower Court Summary
 This is the second appeal of this wrongful death action, arising from a fatal shooting of a tenant at a Memphis public housing property. This Court granted Appellant, Memphis Housing Authority's, Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal to address the trial court's denial of summary judgment in favor of the Appellant. Finding that Appellees' "failure to evict" claim is preempted by 47 U.S.C. §1437, and that Appellant retains its sovereign community under the discretionary function exception to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, we reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant. Reversed and remanded.
5. Status
 Heard in Jackson 11/2/11
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1. Style
 Christian Heyne and Parents, William and Robin Heyne v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education
2. Docket Number
 M2010-00237-SC-R11-CV
3. Lower Court Decision Link
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/christian_heyne_v_metropolitan_nashville_board_of_public_education_opn.pdf
4. Lower Court Summary
 This is a common law writ of certiorari review of a student's ten-day suspension for a violation of the Student-Parent Code of Conduct for reckless endangerment. The student was suspended by the school principal following an incident where he drove his vehicle toward a group of students resulting in injury to one student. The suspension was appealed to a disciplinary panel, then to a discipline administrator, and lastly to the school board. The suspension was upheld at each level. Thereafter, this petition for common law writ of certiorari

was filed. The trial court found that the suspended student's due process rights were violated by the failure to provide an impartial panel and that the decision was arbitrary as it was not supported by the evidence. The court also awarded the petitioners their attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse finding the student's due process rights were not violated and that the decision was not arbitrary because it is supported by material evidence.

5. Status To be heard 02/16/12 in Nashville; Motion to File Amicus by Tennessee School Boards Association filed on 01/12/12

1. Style Elliot H. Himmelfarb, M.D., et al. V. Tracy R. Allain

2. Docket Number M2010-02401-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/elliott_h_himmelfarb_md_v_tracy_r_allain.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary Two physicians filed this malicious prosecution action against a former patient after she voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, a medical malpractice action she filed against them. The defendant, the former patient, moved for summary judgment asserting that the plaintiffs could not prove the essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim: that the medical malpractice suit was brought without probable cause, that it was brought with malice, and that it was terminated in the physicians' favor. The trial court denied the motion. We have determined that the issue of favorable termination in this case involves questions of fact and law, and that fact questions concerning the circumstances surrounding the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the medical malpractice action are in dispute. We have also determined that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the other essential elements. Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

5. Status To be heard 02/16/12 in Nashville

1. Style Tina Marie Hodge v. Chad Craig

2. Docket Number M2009-00930-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Tina%20Marie%20Hodge%20v%20Chadwick%20Craig.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary This is a fraud claim between ex-spouses. While the petitioner mother and the respondent were dating, the mother became pregnant, and she told the respondent that the child was his. Consequently, she and the respondent married, and the child was born during the marriage. Years later, the parties divorced, and the respondent paid child support to the mother. After several years, the respondent obtained a DNA test, which revealed that he is not the child's biological father. After he told the mother of the test results, she filed a

petition requesting a court-ordered paternity test and modification of the parenting plan. The respondent filed a counter-petition, alleging negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation by the mother for falsely representing that he was the child's biological father. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the respondent compensatory damages for past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums paid for the child, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and attorney fees. The mother now appeals. We conclude that under Tennessee statutes, the respondent cannot recover the past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums, as this would be a retroactive modification of a valid child support order. We find that the remaining damages for emotional distress cannot be awarded for the tort of fraud and misrepresentation, because such damages are non-pecuniary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

5.	Status	Heard 11/02/11 in Jackson
1.	Style	R. Douglas Hughes, et al. v. New Life Development Corporation, et al.
2.	Docket Number	M2010-00579-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/r_douglas_hughes_v_new_life_development_corporation.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	In this dispute concerning the use of real property located in a common interest community, we have concluded that summary judgment based on the amendments to the restrictive covenants was not appropriate. We also find that the new owner has the authority to act as developer.
5.	Status	To be heard 02/15/12 in Nashville
1.	Style	In Re: Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg, Deceased
2.	Docket Number	M2009-02107-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/in_re_trigg_opinion.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Bureau of TennCare filed a claim against a decedent's estate to recover the cost of medical assistance provided to the decedent. The Estate filed an exception to the claim. The probate court sustained the claim, and the Estate appealed the probate court's ruling to the circuit court which heard the matter de novo. The circuit court reversed the probate court and disallowed the claim of TennCare. TennCare appeals; we hold that the circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to review the probate court's order. We vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case.
5.	Status	Heard 10/06/11 in Nashville

1.	Style	Jeanette Rae Jackson v. Bradley Kent Smith
2.	Docket Number	W2011-00194-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/jacksonjopn.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>This is a grandparent visitation case. Following the death of her daughter (the minor child's mother), the Appellant grandmother petitioned the trial court for visitation rights with her granddaughter pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306. The trial court denied visitation based upon its finding that Appellant had not carried her burden to demonstrate a danger of substantial harm to the child. No appeal was taken from this order. Subsequently, the Legislature amended Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306 to create a rebuttable presumption of substantial harm based upon the cessation of the relationship between the child and grandparent. After the law was changed, Appellant filed a second petition for visitation with her granddaughter, citing the amended statute as grounds for re-visiting the issue of visitation. The trial court granted Appellee father's Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion to dismiss the second petition on the ground of <i>res judicata</i>. We conclude that the doctrine of <i>res judicata</i> may apply even though there has been an intervening change in the substantive law. However, because the prior order, upon which the trial court based its <i>res judicata</i> finding, is not in the appellate record, this Court cannot review the question of whether the motion to dismiss was properly granted. Affirmed.</p>
5.	Status	Appellee's brief filed on 01/09/12

1.	Style	Davey Mann et al v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity et al.
2.	Docket Number	W20101-02316-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/davey_mann_and_wife_teresa_mann_v_alpha_tau_omega_fraternity.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>Plaintiffs sued Defendants in an amended complaint following the expiration of the statute of limitations. Defendants moved for summary judgment/judgment on the pleadings based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. Subsequently, co-defendants alleged Defendants' comparative fault in an amended answer. Defendants' motions for summary judgment and for judgment on the pleadings were granted, but were not made final. Based on co-defendants' answer, Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to name Defendants pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. However, Defendants claimed that section 20-1-119 could not be utilized as they were already parties to the lawsuit, and they moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The trial court granted said motions, and we affirm.</p>

5.	Status	Appellant's brief filed on 01/11/12
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1.	Style	Calvin Gray Mills, Jr., and Wife, Linda Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc.
2.	Docket Number	W2010-00933-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/calvin_gray_mills_jr_linda_mills_v_fulmarque_inc_opn.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>Plaintiffs initially filed suit against Royal Group, among others. In its answer, Royal Group alleged the comparative fault of Aaron Rents, Inc. Because the one-year statute of limitations had run, Plaintiffs utilized Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119's ninety-day window to amend their complaint to add Aaron Rents as a defendant. However, in its answer, Aaron Rents then identified Fulmarque, Inc. as a comparative tortfeasor. Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to add Fulmarque as a defendant, but summary judgment was granted to Fulmarque based upon the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the parties disagree as to whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 authorizes successive ninety-day windows in which additional defendants may be named. We are asked to interpret whether the term "applicable statute of limitations" as used in the statute, and appearing in the phrase "or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations," refers only to the one-year limitation period for personal injury or to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. We find that the term does not simply refer to the one year limitation period for personal injury, but also to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. Therefore, because Aaron Rents was "named in an a amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations[.]" and because Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Fulmarque within ninety days from Aaron Rents' identification of Fulmarque in its answer, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Fulmarque.</p>
5.	Status	Heard 11/02/11 in Jackson
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1.	Style	Troy Mitchell v. Fayetteville Public Utilities
2.	Docket Number	M2011-00410-SC-R3-WC
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	None Available
4.	Lower Court Summary	None Available
5.	Status	To be heard 02/15/12 in Nashville
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1.	Style	<u>Curtis Myers v. Amisub (SFH), d/b/a St. Francis Hospital, et al.</u>
2.	Docket Number	W2010-00837-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/curtis_myers_v_amisub_sfh_inc_dbast_francis_hospital_opn.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The trial court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss in a medical malpractice action initially filed prior to the effective date of the notice and certificate of good faith provisions subsequently codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 29-26-122, and nonsuited and re-commenced after the effective date of the provisions despite Plaintiff's failure to fulfill the statutory requisites. We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse and remand for dismissal.
5.	Status	Granted 08/23/11; Appellant's brief filed 9/22/11; Appellee's responsive brief filed 10/24/11

1.	Style	Porsha Perkins v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
2.	Docket Number	M2010-02021-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/perkinspopn.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	A social worker employed by an agency of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County was discharged from her job following an allegation that she had pinched a child attending a Head Start program. She then filed a discrimination and wrongful termination claim with the Metro Civil Service Commission. After the allegations against her proved to be baseless, she settled her claim with Metro for \$45,000 and agreed not to be reinstated in her former job. She subsequently filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Davidson County for retaliatory discharge and for employment discrimination. The discrimination claim was eventually dismissed by agreed order. Metro filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim for wrongful discharge. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning among other things that because of the settlement of her claim and her agreement not to be reinstated, she could not prove, as a matter of law, that she was "adversely affected" in any material way by the termination of her employment. We affirm the trial court.
5.	Status	Granted 1/11/12

1.	Style	Eddie C. Pratcher, Jr. v. Consultants in Anesthesia, Inc. et al.
2.	Docket Number	W2011-01576-SC-S09-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	None Available

4.	Lower Court Summary	None Available
5.	Status	Granted 12/13/11
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1.	Style	Ready Mix, USA v. Jefferson County
2.	Docket Number	E2010-00547-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/ready_mix_usa_llc_v_jefferson_county_tennessee.pdf and http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/ready_mix_usa_llc_v_jefferson_county_tennessee_dis.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	Defendant issued a stop work order against plaintiff to cease mining activities on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff brought suit in Chancery Court seeking a declaratory judgment on the issue. A bench trial was held and the Trial Court adopted the doctrine of diminishing assets and that Ready Mix had established a pre-existing and non-conforming use on its property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 (b)(1). Defendant has appealed and we hold on this record that plaintiff was required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing an action in Chancery Court.
5.	Status	Granted 10/18/11; Appellant's brief due 01/17/12 after extension.
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1.	Style	Norman Redwing v. The Roman Catholic Diocese Of Memphis
2.	Docket Number	No. W2009-00986-SC-R10-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Norman%20Redwing%20v%20Catholic%20Diocese%20Memphis%20OPN.pdf http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Norman%20Redwing%20v%20Catholic%20Diocese%20Memphis%20DIS.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	Plaintiff filed an action against the Catholic Bishop for The Diocese of Memphis, asserting the Diocese was liable for damages arising from the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of a priest, who Plaintiff alleged abused him when he was a child. The Diocese moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on the grounds that the statute of limitations prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104 had expired. The trial court denied the motions. It also denied the Diocese's motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the Diocese's motion for extraordinary appeal

under Rule 10. We affirm the trial court's judgment with respect to subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim of negligent supervision, but hold that Plaintiff's claims of negligent hiring and negligent retention are barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. We reverse the trial court's judgment with respect to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

5.	Status	Heard 04/07/11 in Jackson
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1.	Style	Betty Saint Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., et al.
2.	Docket Number	E2010-00991-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/betty_saint_rogers_v_louisville_land_company.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	Betty Saint Rogers ("Plaintiff") sued Louisville Land Company and Joe I V. Williams, III ("Defendants") alleging claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the Tennessee statutes governing cemeteries, outrageous conduct, and breach of contract, among other things. After a non-jury trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment awarding Plaintiff a judgment of \$250.00 for breach of contract, \$45,000.00 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, \$250,000.00 in punitive damages, \$37,306.25 in attorney's fees, and \$556.42 in discretionary costs. Defendants appeal to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff did not prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, and we, therefore, reverse the judgments for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. We also find and hold that because Plaintiff abandoned her statutory claim, she was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the statute, and we reverse the award of attorney's fees. We further find and hold that Plaintiff did prove breach of contract, and we affirm the award of damages for breach of contract, and the remainder of the Trial Court's final judgment.
5.	Status	Heard 01/05/12 in Knoxville
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1.	Style	SNPCO, Inc. d/b/a Salvage Unlimited v. City of Jefferson, et al.
2.	Docket Number	E2009-02355-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/SNPCO%20Inc%20dba%20Salvage%20Unlimited%20vs%20Jefferson%20City%20opn.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The question before this Court is whether the grandfather clause of Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208(b)(1) protects the owner of newly annexed city property from the enforcement of a citywide ordinance prohibiting the sale and storage of fireworks. Interpreting section 13-7-208(b)(1) strictly against the landowner, we hold that the grandfather clause does not apply because the

ordinance is not a “zoning” restriction or regulation, i.e., the ordinance does not regulate the use of property within distinct districts or zones pursuant to a comprehensive zoning plan. Accepting the facts alleged in the landowner’s amended complaint as true, the landowner is not entitled to an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance against its preexisting fireworks business. We accordingly affirm the dismissal of the landowner’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

5. Status Heard 8/31/11 in Knoxville

1. Style State v. Lonnie L. Cross

2. Docket Number E2008-02792-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/102/State%20vs%20Lonnie%20L%20Cross.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary
 After the appellant, Lonnie L. Cross, led police on a high-speed chase, a Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted him on two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, felony evading arrest with risk to others, driving on a revoked license, and speeding. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years in custody. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support two of his convictions: the evading arrest conviction and one of the reckless endangerment convictions. The appellant also challenges the trial court’s reliance on two sentencing enhancement factors. Upon review, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the appellant’s convictions. We also conclude that, although the trial court erred in its application of one of the enhancement factors, the error was harmless. However, our review of the record reveals that the trial court committed plain error. The appellant’s conviction on the reckless endangerment in count three violates constitutional double jeopardy protections. We therefore affirm the judgements of the trial court as to count one, reckless endangerment, and count two, evading arrest. The judgment of conviction in count three is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for merger of the conviction in count three with the evading arrest conviction in count two.

5. Status Reargued 11/01/11 in Nashville

1. Style State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bise

2. Docket Number E2011-00005-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/bisesusanopn.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary
 The defendant, Susan Renee Bise, was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of

property in an amount greater than \$1000 but less than \$10,000, all Class D felonies, and was sentenced to an effective term of three years as a Range I offender. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of her theft convictions and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the defendant's convictions, but we conclude that the trial court inappropriately enhanced the defendant's sentences. Therefore, we modify the defendant's sentences to the minimum in the range of two years.

5.	Status	Granted 1/11/12
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1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Travis Kinte Echols
2.	Docket Number	E2009-01697-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_travis_kinte_echols.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Travis Kinte Echols, of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues, including that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Finding no errors that warrant reversal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
5.	Status	Granted 10/21/11; Appellant's brief filed 11/21/11; After extension granted, appellee's brief due 01/20/12

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Michael Farmer and Anthony Clark
2.	Docket Number	W2009-02281-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link:	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_michael_farmer_and_anthony_clark.pdf
	And	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_michael_farmer_and_anthony_clark_-_concurring_dissenting.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The defendants Michael Farmer and Anthony Clark, were convicted of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. They were each sentenced to fifteen years for the especially aggravated robbery and to a concurrent eight years for aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, both defendants claim that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions, asserting that no evidence put forth at their trial established that they actually took money from either victim. Defendant Clark further claims that the straight, pass-through bullet wound inflicted on one victim's left thigh failed to pose a substantial enough risk of death to qualify as a serious bodily injury of the type necessary

to sustain a conviction for especially aggravated robbery. Defendant Farmer further claims that the trial court erred by failing to sentence him as an especially mitigated offender. After carefully reviewing the defendants' arguments and the record evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

5.	Status	Appellant's brief filed 01/03/12
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1.	Style	David Keen v. State
2.	Docket Number	W2011-00789-SC-R11-PC
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	Unavailable
4.	Lower Court Summary	Unavailable
5.	Status	Granted 12/14/11; After extension granted, appellant's brief due on 02/13/12
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1.	Style	Roy E. Keough v. State
2.	Docket Number	W2008-01916-SC-R11-PD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/102/Roy%20E%20Keough%20v%20State.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>Petitioner Roy E. Keough appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 9, 1997, a jury found the Petitioner guilty of the premeditated murder of his wife, Betty Keough, and the attempted first degree murder of Kevin Berry. For the murder conviction, the jury found that the Petitioner had previously been convicted of one or more felonies for which the statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2). The jury further found that this aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then sentenced the Petitioner to death. The trial court imposed a forty-year sentence for the attempted murder conviction to be served consecutive to his sentence of death. The Petitioner's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175 (Tenn. 2000). On December 12, 2000, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. An amendment was filed on February 14, 2003, and an addendum to the amended petition was filed on November 6, 2007. The post-conviction court held hearings on various dates in September, October, and November 2007. On July 23, 2008, the post-conviction court entered an order denying relief. On appeal to this Court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following categories: (1) the Petitioner's trial counsel were ineffective, (2) the Petitioner's appellate counsel were ineffective; (3) the Petitioner was denied a fair trial and (4) Tennessee's death penalty statutory</p>

scheme is unconstitutional. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

5.	Status	Opinion filed 12/09/11 reversing the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals; Petition to Rehear denied on 01/06/12
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1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. John Anthony Lethco
2.	Docket Number	E2010-00058-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_john_anthony_lethco.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	Sevier County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, John Anthony Lethco, of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403; possession of burglary tools, see id. § 39-14-701; theft of property valued at \$60,000 or more, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(5); and theft of property valued at more than \$500 but less than \$1,000, see id. § 39-13-103, -105(2). At sentencing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of 27 years' incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by denying his motion to sever offenses, (2) by allowing hearsay testimony from witnesses other than the victim concerning ownership of stolen items at trial, (3) by denying him the opportunity to confront his accuser at trial, (4) by denying his motion for new trial, and (5) by allowing argument by the State at trial concerning his reputation as a drug dealer. Because the defendant filed his notice of appeal prior to filing his motion for new trial, the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion for new trial. Thus, any issues raised therein are waived. We discern, however, an anomaly in the judgment of theft of property valued at more than \$500 but less than \$1,000 that requires correction on remand. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
5.	Status	Order filed 12/15/11 dismissing the appeal due to Mr. Lethco's death and designating the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals "Not for Citation"
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1.	Style	State v. Florinda Lopez
2.	Docket Number	No. M2008-02737-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/103/State%20vs%20Nelson%20Aguilar%20Gomez%20and%20Florinda%20Lopez.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Defendants, Nelson Aguilar Gomez and Florinda Lopez, were charged with: Count One, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse; Count Two, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect; Counts Three and Four, aggravated child abuse occurring on or about March 3, 2007; and Count Five, aggravated child abuse occurring in February 2007. Aggravated child abuse is a Class A

felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402(b). The Defendants were tried jointly before a jury. Defendant Gomez was convicted of both counts of felony murder, Count One merging into Count Two, and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. He was also convicted of all three counts of aggravated child abuse and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each conviction. The trial court ordered him to serve his Count Three and Count Four aggravated child abuse sentences concurrently with each other and his life sentence, and ordered him to serve his Count Five aggravated child abuse sentence consecutively to his other sentences, for a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On her felony murder charges, Defendant Lopez was convicted of two counts of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403, -13-204(a). Count One was merged into Count Two. Defendant Lopez was also convicted of aggravated child abuse under Counts Three and Four. She was acquitted of aggravated child abuse as charged in Count Five. She was sentenced as a Range 1, standard offender to twenty-five years for her facilitation of first degree murder conviction and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of her two aggravated child abuse convictions. The trial court ordered her to serve these sentences concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, Defendant Gomez contends that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of certain prior bad acts, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Lopez contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her pre-trial motion to include non-citizens on the jury; (2) the trial court erred in preventing her from introducing an entire statement she made to police after the State impeached her using part of that statement; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant Gomez's prior bad acts; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict her; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence for each of her convictions. After our review, we reverse and dismiss Defendant Gomez's Count Five conviction of aggravated child abuse. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

5.	Status	Heard 06/03/11 in Nashville
1.	Style	State v. Charlers E. Lowe-Kelley
2.	Docket Number	M2010-00500-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_charles_e_lowe-kelley.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Charles E. Lowe-Kelley, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. At sentencing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life with the

possibility of parole for each first degree premeditated murder conviction, merged the first degree felony murder convictions into the first degree premeditated murder convictions, and imposed concurrent sentences of 15 years' incarceration for each attempted first degree murder conviction to be served concurrently with the life sentences. On appeal, in addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a continuance, (2) allowing a juror to remain on the jury who expressed an opinion about the case, (3) admitting evidence without establishing a proper chain of custody, (4) admitting a taperecorded conversation between the defendant and a separately-tried co-defendant, and (5) imposing consecutive sentences. Because the defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial, all issues except the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing are waived. Furthermore, the untimely motion for new trial rendered the notice of appeal untimely. In the interest of justice, however, we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal and review the remaining issues. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

5.	Status	Appellee's brief filed on 01/09/12; To be heard in Nashville on 02/15/12
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1.	Style	Brandon Mobley v. State of Tennessee
2.	Docket Number	E2010-00379-SC-R11-PC
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/mobleybrandonopn.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The petitioner, Brandon Mobley, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2005 convictions of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and setting fire to personal property for which he is now serving two consecutive life sentences plus 19 years in the custody of the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief based upon allegations that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and other constitutional deprivations. Because we determine that the petitioner is entitled to relief on the issue of the ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the use of expert testimony, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.
5.	Status	Granted 1/10/12
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1.	Style	State v. Corinio Pruitt
2.	Docket Number	W2009-01255-SC-R3-DD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state of tennessee v corinio pruit.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary
 Capital Appellant, Corinio Pruitt, appeals as of right from his conviction for first degree felony murder and his sentence of death resulting from the August 2005 death of Lawrence Guidroz. On February 29, 2008, a Shelby County jury found the Appellant guilty of one count of second degree murder and one count of first degree felony murder, and the trial court merged the conviction for second degree murder with the first degree murder conviction. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously found the presence of three statutory aggravating circumstances; specifically, (1) the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies involving the use of violence, (2) the murder was knowingly committed while the defendant had a substantial role in committing a robbery, and (3) the victim was seventy (70) years of age or older. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (7), (14). The jury further determined that these three aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. On appeal, the Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to find the Appellant intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty, (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for first degree felony murder, (3) whether the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of the autopsy photographs of the victim, (4) whether application of the (i)(7) aggravating circumstance is constitutional, (5) whether the evidence is sufficient to support application of the (i)(7) aggravator, and (6) whether the sentence of death is proportionate in the present case. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

5. Status State’s brief filed on 01/06/12

1. Style State v. Heather Richardson

2. Docket Number M2010-01360-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Link http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_vs_heather_richardson.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary
 In this interlocutory appeal, the Appellant, Heather Richardson, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s order denying her relief from the prosecutor’s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. The State concedes that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying the application. Upon review, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for the trial court to order the prosecutor to grant the Appellant pretrial diversion.

5. Status Heard 11/02/11 in Jackson

1. Style State v. Wanda Russell

2. Docket Number M2010-00852-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Link http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_wanda_f_russe

[ll.pdf](#)

4. Lower Court Summary
A Rutherford County jury convicted Appellant, Wanda F. Russell, of three counts of theft over \$1,000. Prior to trial, the State filed a notice that it was intending to introduce Appellant's prior convictions to impeach her testimony. At the conclusion of a jury-out hearing during trial, the trial court concluded that the State could use Appellant's prior convictions for passing worthless checks pursuant to Rule 609(a)(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence to impeach Appellant. Appellant elected not to testify. She now appeals to this Court arguing that the trial court erred in determining that her prior convictions were admissible for impeachment. We have reviewed the record on appeal. We have concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling that the prior convictions were appropriate for impeachment of Appellant. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
5. Status
Appellant's brief filed on 12/16/11.
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1. Style
State v. Hubert Glenn Sexton
2. Docket Number
E2008-00292-SC-DDT-DD
3. Lower Court Decision Link
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_vs_hubert_glenn_sexton.pdf
4. Lower Court Summary
In the late evening of May 20, 2000, Stanley Goodman and Terry Sue Goodman were shot and killed in their home in Scott County, Tennessee. This occurred shortly after B.G., the Appellant's minor stepdaughter, had reported to authorities that the Appellant had sexually abused her. Stanley Goodman, one of the victims, was B.G.'s biological father. The Appellant denied the allegations of sexual abuse and believed that Stanley Goodman was responsible for B.G. falsely accusing him of sexual abuse. The proof at trial showed that the Appellant shot and killed both victims while they were in their bedroom. The Appellant admitted his actions to several witnesses who testified at trial.*1 A Scott County jury found the Appellant Hubert Glenn Sexton guilty of two counts of first degree murder arising from the deaths of Stanley and Terry Goodman. Following penalty phase, the jury found the presence of one statutory aggravating circumstance, that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, and that this aggravator outweighed any mitigating factors. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6). The jury imposed sentences of death. Appellant Sexton seeks review by this court of both his convictions for first degree murder and his sentences of death. He raises the following issues for our review:
- I. Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for change of venue;
 - II. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly admonish the jury before and during trial;
 - III. Whether the trial court erred in failing to adequately voir dire the jury regarding extrajudicial information;
 - IV. Whether the trial court erred in failing to excuse certain jurors for cause;
 - V. Whether the trial court erred in admitting allegations of child sexual abuse;

VI. Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the Appellant's willingness and later refusal to take a polygraph examination;
 VII. Whether the trial court erred in admitting statements made by the Appellant's wife;
 VIII. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that was similar to the murder weapon;

IX. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an unrelated speeding arrest;
 X. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Appellant alleges was unlawfully obtained from his vehicle;
 XI. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence relating to the preparation of Appellant's IRS tax forms;
 XII. Whether individual and cumulative instances of prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial;
 XIII. Whether the convicting evidence was sufficient to support his convictions;
 XIV. Whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence;
 XV. Whether Tennessee's death penalty scheme is constitutional; and
 XVI. Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on cumulative error.

Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

5.	Status	To be heard 02/15/12 in Nashville
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1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Steven Q. Stafford
2.	Docket Number	E2010-01917-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_steven_q_stanford.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The defendant, Steven Q. Stanford, was convicted by a Campbell County jury of one count of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced, as a Range III offender, to serve thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we find that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the convictions, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
5.	Status	Appellant's brief filed on 01/04/12
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1.	Style	<u>State v. Brian David Thomason</u>
2.	Docket Number	W2007-02910-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/093/State%20v%20Brian%20D%20Thomason.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant-Appellant, Brian David Thomason (“Thomason”), appeals from the denial of his application for pretrial diversion to the Gibson County District Attorney General’s office, which was upheld by the trial court. Upon review of the record and applicable authority, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court to grant Thomason pretrial diversion under such terms and conditions as are deemed appropriate under all circumstances.

5. Status Heard 11/02/11 in Jackson

1. Style State v. Nigel Kavic Watkins

2. Docket Number M2009-00348-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_v_nigel_kavic_watkins.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary The Defendant, Nigel Kavic Watkins, was charged with one count of first degree felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and one count of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-215(b), -15-402(b). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years for reckless homicide and, as a violent offender, to twenty-five years for aggravated child abuse. The trial court ordered him to serve these sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of certain autopsy photographs; (3) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of aggravated child abuse; and (4) the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentence and in ordering consecutive service. We notice as plain error that the Defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s double jeopardy clause were violated by his dual convictions. After our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated child abuse. We merge the Defendant’s reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated child abuse conviction and remand for resentencing.

5. Status Reargued in Nashville 11/01/11

1. Style State of Tennessee v. Jason Lee White

2. Docket Number M2009-00941-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Link http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/jason_lee_white_vs_state.pdf

4. Lower Court Summary
 The Defendant, Jason Lee White, was convicted by a jury of one count of burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. In this direct appeal, he contends that the trial court erred: (1) in denying his motion to set aside his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping; and (2) in upholding the State's use of a peremptory challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After our review, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant's especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

5. Status Reargued in Nashville 11/01/11

1. Style State of Tennessee v. Guy Alvin Williamson

2. Docket Number W2011-00049-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/williamsonguyopn.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary
 The defendant, Guy Alvin Williamson, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun and possession of a firearm while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. He was sentenced to an effective term of three years, suspended to probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss the indictment and that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for convicted felon in possession of a handgun. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

5. Status Granted 1/11/12

1. Style Stephen Bernard Wlodarz v. State

2. Docket Number E2008-02179-SC-R11-CO

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/102/Stephen%20Wlodarz%20v%20State.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary
 After entering "best interest" guilty pleas in order to avoid a potential death penalty conviction, Petitioner, Stephen Wlodarz, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Hawkins County Criminal Court denied the petition.. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in finding there was no newly discovered evidence and that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm.

5. Status Heard 05/11/11 in Knoxville

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Carl J. Wagner
2.	Docket Number	M2010-00992-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_carl_j_wagner.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Carl J. Wagner, of second degree murder, <i>see</i> T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2006); first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated robbery, <i>see id.</i> § 39-13-202(a)(2); and especially aggravated robbery, <i>see id.</i> § 39-13-403. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 22 years' incarceration, life imprisonment, and 22 years' incarceration, respectively, and merged the conviction of second degree murder into the conviction of first degree murder. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. We determine that there is insufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery. We also determine, however, that there is sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of second degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's conviction in count one and remand that count for resentencing, and we reverse and dismiss the charges in counts two and three.
5.	Status	Granted 1/11/12

1.	Style	Cyrus Deville Wilson v. State of Tennessee
2.	Docket Number	M2009-02241-SC-R11-CO
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cyrus_deville_wilson_vs_state.pdf http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cyrus_deville_wilson_vs_state_dis.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Petitioner, Cyrus Deville Wilson, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court and remand the Petitioner's case for an evidentiary hearing.
5.	Status	To be heard 02/16/12 in Nashville

1.	Style	State of Tennessee, by and through Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter of the State of Tennessee v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Company
2.	Docket Number	M2010-01955-SC-R11-CV

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| 3. | Lower Court
Decision Link | http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_by_and_through_robert_e_cooper_jr_attorney_general_and_reporter_for_the_state_of_tennessee_v_nv_sumatra_tobacco_trading_company.pdf |
| 4. | Lower Court
Summary | This appeal involves <i>in personam</i> jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Appellant State of Tennessee brought suit against Appellee tobacco product manufacturer, under the Tobacco Escrow Fund Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 47-31-101 <i>et seq.</i> , alleging that Appellee had failed to make escrow deposits, as required under the Act, for cigarettes sold in Tennessee. Based upon the trial court’s finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Appellee, it entered summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. The State appeals. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the facts of this case show that the manufacturer intentionally used a distribution system with the desired result of selling its product in all fifty states, including Tennessee, so as to support a finding that the manufacturer had minimum contacts with the State necessary to invoke the exercise of personal jurisdiction; (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction, under the facts of this case, is reasonable and fair; (3) the manufacturer is subject to regulation under the Act; and (4) the Act is not unconstitutional. Moreover, we conclude that: (1) Appellee is a tobacco products manufacturer, as defined by the Escrow Fund Act; (2) Appellee’s cigarettes were sold in Tennessee; and (3) Appellee is, therefore, liable for escrow payments under the Escrow Fund Act. Consequently, we grant the State’s motion for summary judgment. The order of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant State and for calculation of the escrow amount owed by Appellee and entry of judgment thereon. |
| 5. | Status | Granted 1/11/12 |

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| 1. | Style | Danny A. Stewart v. Gayle Ray, Commissioner |
| 2. | Docket Number | M2010-01808-SC-R11-CV |
| 3. | Lower Court
Decision Link | http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/danny_a_stewart_v_gayle_ray_tdoc_commissioner.pdf |
| 4. | Lower Court
Summary | Danny A. Stewart, a prisoner serving multiple sentences, some concurrently and some consecutively, filed a petition for certiorari naming as respondents the Commissioner of the Department of Correction and heads of various other agencies allegedly responsible for determining his eligibility for parole (collectively referred to as “TDOC”). He alleges TDOC is incorrectly calculating his eligibility for parole in that it is basing its calculation on the aggregate consecutive sentences of 42 years, whereas the correct method is to calculate eligibility on each separate sentence so that he would start serving his next consecutive sentence as an “in custody” parolee of his earliest consecutive sentence. The trial court dismissed the case based on Stewart’s failure “to exhaust his administrative remedies,” i.e., by seeking a “declaratory order from TDOC before filing the present action.” Stewart appeals. We vacate the order |

of dismissal and remand for further proceedings

5.	Status	Appellee's brief filed on 01/04/12; To be heard in Nashville 02/16/12
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1.	Style	<u>Earlene Waddle v. Lorene B. Elrod</u>
2.	Docket Number	M2009-02142-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/earlene_waddle_v_lorene_b_elrod_opn.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The trial court's enforcement of a settlement agreement between the parties' attorneys is appealed on the sole basis that the Statute of Frauds precludes enforcement since the parties never signed any agreement and the settlement pertained to real property. Because the Statute of Frauds concerns the sale of real property interests and not settlement agreements touching upon real property interests, it is not a bar to enforcement of a settlement agreement. The trial court is affirmed on that issue. The trial court's assessment of court costs, however, is reversed as it differs from the parties' agreement.
5.	Status	To be heard 02/15/12 in Nashville
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1.	Style	<u>Roger Dale Williamson v. Baptist Hospital of Cocke County, Inc.</u>
2.	Docket Number	M2010-01282-SC-WCM-WC
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	Hyperlink unavailable
4.	Lower Court Summary	The employee sustained a compensable injury on May 16, 2008. Due to medical restrictions resulting from the injury, he was unable to return to his previous job. His employer offered him a different job at the same or higher rate of pay. Employee trained for two weeks, then he resigned because he found the new job to be too stressful. The trial court held that he did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded benefits in excess of the one and one-half times impairment cap contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 2010). His employer appealed, arguing that the employee had a meaningful return to work and that his voluntary resignation was not reasonably related to his injury. We agree that the award is limited to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment and modify the judgment accordingly.
5.	Status	Heard 01/05/12 in Knoxville
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