

Supreme Court Appeals  
Pending Cases  
(9-27-11)

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1.	Style	Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diana Lynn Tarrant, et al.
2.	Docket Number	E2009-02431-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Allstate%20Insurance%20Co%20vs%20Diana%20Lynn%20Tarran.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Allstate%20Insurance%20Co%20vs%20Diana%20Lynn%20Tarran.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	Plaintiff insurer brought this declaratory judgment action to determine which of the two policies issued to defendants insured and their corporation, covered a van which had been involved in an accident. Plaintiff named the insureds as defendants, as well as the third party who had filed a tort action against the insureds for personal injuries. The Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the insureds had told the agency plaintiff to keep the van in dispute on the commercial policy, but it had transferred the van to the insureds' personal policy. The Court further ruled that a notice of the transfer was sent to the insureds by plaintiff, and plaintiff sent at least five bills to the insureds that reflected the van was then insured under the personal policy and not the commercial policy. The Court concluded that the insureds ratified the change and ruled that the van was insured under the insureds personal policy. On appeal, we reverse and dismiss the action.
5.	Status	Heard 8/31/11 in Knoxville

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1.	Style	Barbara Sims Arthur v. BPR
2.	Docket Number	E2011-00717-SC-R3-BP
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	N/A
4.	Lower Court Summary	Unavailable
5.	Status	Order filed 08/24/11 dismissing appeal based on <u>Cawood v. BPR</u> ; Order denying petition to rehear filed 09/12/11

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1.	Style	BPR v. William S. Lockett
2.	Docket Number	E2011-01170-SC-R3-BP
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	N/A

4.	Lower Court Summary	Unavailable
5.	Status	Notice of Appeal filed 05/26/11; Record filed 07/28/11; Appellee brief filed 09/23/11

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1.	Style	Board of Professional Responsibility v. Mark Talley
2.	Docket Number	W2010-02072-SC-R3-BP
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	None available/Direct Appeal
4.	Lower Court Summary	None Available/Direct Appeal
5.	Status	Heard in Jackson on 04/06/11

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1.	Style	Shelia Brown v. Rico Roland
2.	Docket Number	No. M2009-01885-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/Sheila%20Brown%20v%20Rico%20Roland%20OPN.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/Sheila%20Brown%20v%20Rico%20Roland%20OPN.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>The matters at issue pertain to the rights and responsibilities of the parties under the underinsured motorist provisions of Plaintiff's automobile insurance. Plaintiff, who was involved in a vehicular accident with another motorist, commenced this personal injury action to recover an amount "under \$25,000." The only named defendant is the tortfeasor, however, State Farm is an unnamed party. This is due to the fact that Plaintiff served timely and proper notice on State Farm of the commencement of this action and that she was asserting an underinsured coverage claim pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206. Plaintiff subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with the tortfeasor for the tortfeasor's policy limits of \$25,000, at which time she properly served notice on State Farm of the proposed settlement and her willingness to enter into binding arbitration with State Farm to settle her claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Thereafter, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss the underinsured claim against it claiming Plaintiff was made whole when she agreed to a settlement with the tortfeasor in an amount in excess of her ad damnum and therefore there was no claim to arbitrate. The court granted the motion to dismiss and Plaintiff appealed. We have determined the trial court did not err in granting State Farm's motion to dismiss the claim against it because Plaintiff sought to recover a judgment in an amount under \$25,000 from the tortfeasor and/or State Farm, and Plaintiff settled her claim against the tortfeasor for an amount in excess of the ad damnum. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of State Farm.</p>
5.	Status	Heard 06/02/11 in Nashville

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1. Style Dave Brundage et al., v. Cumberland County et al.,  
2. Docket Number E2010-00089-SC-R11-CV  
3. Lower Court Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/Dave%20Brundage%20vs%20Cumberland%20Co%20Opn.pdf>  
4. Lower Court Summary Petitioners filed a Statutory Writ of Certiorari, seeking the review of respondents' action in granting the right to develop a landfill to Smith Mountain Solutions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §68-211-704. Petitioners did not timely verify their petitions and the Trial Judge dismissed the action on the ground he did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. On appeal, we affirm.  
5. Status Heard 06/01/11 in Nashville

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1. Style Donna Clark v. Sputniks, LLC, et al.  
2. Docket Number M2010-02163-SC-R11-CV  
3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/donna\\_clark\\_v\\_sputniks\\_llc.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/donna_clark_v_sputniks_llc.pdf)  
4. Lower Court Summary The trial court determined that the insurer of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for the death of a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy.  
5. Status Granted 09/22/11

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1. Style Scott Craig v. David Mills, Warden  
2. Docket Number E2010-00487-SC-R11-HC  
3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/103/Scott%20M.%20Craig%20vs%20Warden%20David%20Mills.pdf>  
4. Lower Court Summary The Petitioner, Scott M. Craig, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State's motion is well-taken, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.  
5. Status Heard on 8/31/11 in Knoxville

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1.	Style	Discover Bank v. Joy A. Mogan
2.	Docket Number	E2009-01337-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Discover%20Bank%20v%20Joy%20A%20Morgan%20OPN.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Discover%20Bank%20v%20Joy%20A%20Morgan%20OPN.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>This lawsuit began as a collection claim filed by Discover Bank (“Discover”) against Joy A. Morgan (“Morgan”) for \$16,341.52. Discover claimed Morgan owed this amount on a credit card originally issued to Morgan’s husband, now deceased. Morgan filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting a claim for libel as well as claims pursuant to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101, <i>et seq.</i> Morgan’s attorney gave Discover’s original attorney an extension of time in which to file an answer to the counterclaim. After this extension of time had run, Morgan’s attorney warned Discover’s attorney that a motion for default judgment would be filed if an answer was not filed within fourteen days. When Discover failed to file an answer within the fourteen days, Morgan filed a motion for default judgment. Discover’s attorney failed to show up for the hearing and a default judgment was awarded to Morgan. Discover filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment “pursuant to Rule 60.02. . . .” This motion was denied. Following a later hearing on damages, Morgan was awarded compensatory damages totaling \$125,200, which the Trial Court then trebled under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After obtaining new counsel, Discover filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. Discover now appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s Order denying Discover’s motion to alter or amend the judgment and set aside the default judgment. We, however, vacate the award of damages and remand for a new hearing on the amount of damages and also to determine reasonable attorney fees incurred by Morgan on appeal.</p>
5.	Status	Heard 8/31/11 in Knoxville

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1.	Style	Federal Insurance Co., a/s/o Robert and Joanie Emerson v. Martin Winters, d/b/a Winters Roofing Co.,
2.	Docket Number	E2009-02065-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Federal%20Insurance%20Company%20ASO%20Robert%20&amp;%20Joanie%20Emerson%20vs%20Martin%20Edward%20Winters%20DBA%20Winters%20Roofing%20Co%20opn.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Federal%20Insurance%20Company%20ASO%20Robert%20&amp;%20Joanie%20Emerson%20vs%20Martin%20Edward%20Winters%20DBA%20Winters%20Roofing%20Co%20opn.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>Plaintiff insurer of insured brought this action as a subrogee of the insureds, who had been paid under plaintiff's policy for a fire loss to their home. The insureds had employed a roofer to replace their roof, whose subcontractor caused the fire which destroyed the home. Plaintiff brought this action to recover from defendant roofer who filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the Trial Court</p>

ruled defendant could not be held liable in tort for the negligent acts of his subcontractor under the facts of this case, and plaintiff could not recover under the theory of contract, because plaintiff could not show that the loss was caused by the contractual services or foreseeable. On appeal, we hold that summary judgment was inappropriate, because under contract law the defendant had a non-delegable duty to see that the work he was contractually obligated to perform was done in a careful, skillful and workmanlike manner. The case is remanded with instructions to proceed in accordance with this Opinion.

5. Status Heard 9/01/11 in Knoxville

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1. Style Leonard Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC, et al.

2. Docket Number M2010-02145-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/leonard\\_gamble\\_v\\_sputniks\\_llc.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/leonard_gamble_v_sputniks_llc.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary The trial court determined that the insurer of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for injuries to a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy.

5. Status Granted 09/22/11

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1. Style Cheryl Brown Giggers, et al. v. Memphis Housing Authority et al.,

2. Docket Number W2010-00806-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cheryl\\_brown\\_giggers\\_v\\_memphis\\_housing\\_authority\\_opn.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cheryl_brown_giggers_v_memphis_housing_authority_opn.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary This is the second appeal of this wrongful death action, arising from a fatal shooting of a tenant at a Memphis public housing property. This Court granted Appellant, Memphis Housing Authority's, Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal to address the trial court's denial of summary judgment in favor of the Appellant. Finding that Appellees' "failure to evict" claim is preempted by 47 U.S.C. §1437, and that Appellant retains its sovereign community under the discretionary function exception to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, we reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant. Reversed and remanded.

5. Status Appellant's brief filed 7/28/11; Appellee's brief filed 08/29/11; To be heard in Jackson on 11/02/11

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1.	Style	Johanna L. Gonsewski v. Craig W. Gonsewski
2.	Docket Number	M2009-00894-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/courts/court-appeals/opinions/2010/02/17/johanna-l-gonsewski-v-craig-w-gonsewski-m2009-00894-coa-r3">http://www.tncourts.gov/courts/court-appeals/opinions/2010/02/17/johanna-l-gonsewski-v-craig-w-gonsewski-m2009-00894-coa-r3</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	The wife in this divorce action contends the trial court erred in the division of the marital property, in denying her request for alimony, and in denying her request to recover her attorney's fees. We have determined the wife is in need of and the husband has the ability to pay alimony in futuro, in the amount of \$1,250 per month, and that she is entitled to recover attorney's fees. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court regarding alimony in futuro and remand the issue of attorney's fees, leaving it to the discretion of the trial court to determine an amount that is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.
5.	Status	Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed on 09/16/11

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1.	Style	Dr. William P. Harman v. University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
2.	Docket Number	E2009-02139-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Dr%20William%20P%20Harman%20vs%20%20Univ%20of%20TN%20opn.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Dr%20William%20P%20Harman%20vs%20%20Univ%20of%20TN%20opn.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	This appeal involves the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The plaintiff professor was a department head at the defendant university. As the department head, the plaintiff evaluated a subordinate professor. The dean of the university instructed the plaintiff to remove negative information from the evaluation; the plaintiff refused. The plaintiff was then removed from his position as department head. He continued at the university as a tenured professor. The plaintiff sued the university asserting a claim under the Public Protection Act, alleging that he was discharged or terminated for refusing to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities. The trial court granted the university's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis, <i>inter alia</i> , that the plaintiff was neither terminated nor discharged. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the removal of the plaintiff from his position as department head, when he remained employed as a professor, is not a termination or discharge under the Public Protection Act.
5.	Status	Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed on 09/16/11

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1.	Style	Christian Heyne and Parents, William and Robin Heyne v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education
2.	Docket Number	M2010-00237-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/christian_heyne_v_metropolitan_nashville_board_of_public_education_opn.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/christian_heyne_v_metropolitan_nashville_board_of_public_education_opn.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	This is a common law writ of certiorari review of a student's ten-day suspension for a violation of the Student-Parent Code of Conduct for reckless endangerment. The student was suspended by the school principal following an incident where he drove his vehicle toward a group of students resulting in injury to one student. The suspension was appealed to a disciplinary panel, then to a discipline administrator, and lastly to the school board. The suspension was upheld at each level. Thereafter, this petition for common law writ of certiorari was filed. The trial court found that the suspended student's due process rights were violated by the failure to provide an impartial panel and that the decision was arbitrary as it was not supported by the evidence. The court also awarded the petitioners their attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse finding the student's due process rights were not violated and that the decision was not arbitrary because it is supported by material evidence.
5.	Status	Granted 09/21/11

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1.	Style	Elliot H. Himmelfarb, M.D., et al. V. Tracy R. Allain
2.	Docket Number	M2010-02401-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/elliott_h_himmelfarb_md_v_tracy_r_allain.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/elliott_h_himmelfarb_md_v_tracy_r_allain.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	Two physicians filed this malicious prosecution action against a former patient after she voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, a medical malpractice action she filed against them. The defendant, the former patient, moved for summary judgment asserting that the plaintiffs could not prove the essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim: that the medical malpractice suit was brought without probable cause, that it was brought with malice, and that it was terminated in the physicians' favor. The trial court denied the motion. We have determined that the issue of favorable termination in this case involves questions of fact and law, and that fact questions concerning the circumstances surrounding the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the medical malpractice action are in dispute. We have also determined that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the other essential elements. Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly denied.
5.	Status	Granted 09/21/11

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1.	Style	Tina Marie Hodge v. Chad Craig
2.	Docket Number	M2009-00930-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Tina%20Marie%20Hodge%20v%20Chadwick%20Craig.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Tina%20Marie%20Hodge%20v%20Chadwick%20Craig.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>This is a fraud claim between ex-spouses. While the petitioner mother and the respondent were dating, the mother became pregnant, and she told the respondent that the child was his. Consequently, she and the respondent married, and the child was born during the marriage. Years later, the parties divorced, and the respondent paid child support to the mother. After several years, the respondent obtained a DNA test, which revealed that he is not the child's biological father. After he told the mother of the test results, she filed a petition requesting a court-ordered paternity test and modification of the parenting plan. The respondent filed a counter-petition, alleging negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation by the mother for falsely representing that he was the child's biological father. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the respondent compensatory damages for past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums paid for the child, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and attorney fees. The mother now appeals. We conclude that under Tennessee statutes, the respondent cannot recover the past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums, as this would be a retroactive modification of a valid child support order. We find that the remaining damages for emotional distress cannot be awarded for the tort of fraud and misrepresentation, because such damages are non-pecuniary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court.</p>
5.	Status	To be heard in Jackson on 11/02/11

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1.	Style	Holder et al. v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd.
2.	Docket Number	E2009-01312-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/James%20Q%20Holder%20vs%20Westgate%20Resorts%20Ltd%20dba%20Westgate%20Smoky%20Mountain%20Resort%20at%20Gatlinburg.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/James%20Q%20Holder%20vs%20Westgate%20Resorts%20Ltd%20dba%20Westgate%20Smoky%20Mountain%20Resort%20at%20Gatlinburg.pdf</a> <a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/James%20Q%20Holder%20vs%20Westgate%20Resorts%20Ltd%20dba%20Westgate%20Smoky%20Mountain%20Resort%20at%20Gatlinburg%20CON%20opn.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/James%20Q%20Holder%20vs%20Westgate%20Resorts%20Ltd%20dba%20Westgate%20Smoky%20Mountain%20Resort%20at%20Gatlinburg%20CON%20opn.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>Plaintiff sustained personal injuries resulting from a fall on defendant's premises and brought this action for damages, which resulted in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff for damages against defendant. Defendant appealed, and asserted that the Trial Judge erred when he refused to allow defendant's expert to testify to his</p>



conversation with a third party. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow the proffered testimony, but the error was harmless. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

5.	Status	Heard 05/11/11 in Knoxville
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1.	Style	R. Douglas Hughes, et al. v. New Life Development Corporation, et al.
2.	Docket Number	M2010-00579-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/r_douglas_hughes_v_new_life_development_corporation.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/r_douglas_hughes_v_new_life_development_corporation.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	In this dispute concerning the use of real property located in a common interest community, we have concluded that summary judgment based on the amendments to the restrictive covenants was not appropriate. We also find that the new owner has the authority to act as developer.
5.	Status	Granted 09/22/11
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1.	Style	In Re: Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg, Deceased
2.	Docket Number	M2009-02107-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/in_re_trigg_opinion.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/in_re_trigg_opinion.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Bureau of TennCare filed a claim against a decedent's estate to recover the cost of medical assistance provided to the decedent. The Estate filed an exception to the claim. The probate court sustained the claim, and the Estate appealed the probate court's ruling to the circuit court which heard the matter de novo. The circuit court reversed the probate court and disallowed the claim of TennCare. TennCare appeals; we hold that the circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to review the probate court's order. We vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case.
5.	Status	To be heard 10/06/11 in Nashville; Appellant's brief filed 8/15/11; Appellee's brief filed on 09/20/11
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1.	Style	Dorothy King, R.N., et al. v. Virginia Betts, Commissioner of the TN Dept. of Mental Health and Development Disabilities, in her individual capacity, et al.
2.	Docket Number	M2009-00117-SC-R11-CV

3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/courts/court-appeals/opinions/2009/12/18/dorothy-king-rn-and-patricia-battle-rn-et-al-v-virginia">http://www.tncourts.gov/courts/court-appeals/opinions/2009/12/18/dorothy-king-rn-and-patricia-battle-rn-et-al-v-virginia</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on alleged retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Appellant claims that Appellees retaliated against her in her employment for speaking out against a hospital policy. Appellees assert the defense of qualified immunity. Appellant appeals from the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings to the Appellees. Finding that there are material issues of fact in dispute, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Further, we find that Appellant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, reverse the trial court's decision to grant Appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
5.	Status	Heard 02/02/11 in Nashville
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1.	Style	Michael Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc.
2.	Docket Number	M2010-01680-SC-R09-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	No lower court decision
4.	Lower Court Summary	No lower court decision
5.	Status	Heard on 09/01/11 in Knoxville
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1.	Style	Calvin Gray Mills, Jr., and Wife, Linda Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc.
2.	Docket Number	W2010-00933-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/calvin_gray_mills_jr_linda_mills_v_fulmarque_inc_opn.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/calvin_gray_mills_jr_linda_mills_v_fulmarque_inc_opn.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	Plaintiffs initially filed suit against Royal Group, among others. In its answer, Royal Group alleged the comparative fault of Aaron Rents, Inc. Because the one-year statute of limitations had run, Plaintiffs utilized Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119's ninety-day window to amend their complaint to add Aaron Rents as a defendant. However, in its answer, Aaron Rents then identified Fulmarque, Inc. as a comparative tortfeasor. Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to add Fulmarque as a defendant, but summary judgment was granted to Fulmarque based upon the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the parties disagree as to whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 authorizes successive ninety-day windows in which additional defendants may be named. We are asked to interpret whether the term "applicable statute of limitations" as used in the statute, and appearing in the

phrase “or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations,” refers only to the one-year limitation period for personal injury or to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. We find that the term does not simply refer to the one year limitation period for personal injury, but also to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. Therefore, because Aaron Rents was “named in an a amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations[,]” and because Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Fulmarque within ninety days from Aaron Rents’ identification of Fulmarque in its answer, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Fulmarque.

5. Status To be heard 11/02/11 in Jackson

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1. Style Curtis Myers v. Amisub (SFH), d/b/a St. Francis Hospital, et al.

2. Docket Number W2010-00837-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/curtis\\_myers\\_v\\_amisub\\_sfh\\_inc\\_dbast\\_francis\\_hospital\\_opn.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/curtis_myers_v_amisub_sfh_inc_dbast_francis_hospital_opn.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary The trial court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss in a medical malpractice action initially filed prior to the effective date of the notice and certificate of good faith provisions subsequently codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 29-26-122, and nonsuited and re-commenced after the effective date of the provisions despite Plaintiff’s failure to fulfill the statutory requisites. We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse and remand for dismissal.

5. Status Granted 08/23/11

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1. Style Ray Bell Construction Co. Inc. v Tennessee Dep’t of Transportation

2. Docket Number E2009-01803-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Ray%20Bell%20Construction%20Co%20vs%20TDOT%20opn.pdf>

<http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/Ray%20Bell%20Construction%20Co%20vs%20TDOT%20DIS%20opn.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary This case concerns an alleged breach of contract involving the incentive clause of a Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) road construction contract. Before the Claims Commission, TDOT argued that the contract language was clear in prohibiting an extension, alteration, or amendment of the incentive clause. The Claims Commission agreed with the position of Ray Bell Construction Company (“RBCC”) that it was entitled to a modification of the

incentive provision. To so find, the Commission held that “a definite latent ambiguity exists for which parol evidence not only is admissible, but frankly, absolutely necessary in both understanding and deciding the issues in this case.” TDOT has appealed. We affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

5.	Status	Heard on 9/01/11 in Knoxville
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1.	Style	Norman Redwing v. The Roman Catholic Diocese Of Memphis
2.	Docket Number	No. W2009-00986-SC-R10-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Norman%20Redwing%20v%20Catholic%20Diocese%20Memphis%20OPN.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Norman%20Redwing%20v%20Catholic%20Diocese%20Memphis%20OPN.pdf</a> <a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Norman%20Redwing%20v%20Catholic%20Diocese%20Memphis%20DIS.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/102/Norman%20Redwing%20v%20Catholic%20Diocese%20Memphis%20DIS.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	Plaintiff filed an action against the Catholic Bishop for The Diocese of Memphis, asserting the Diocese was liable for damages arising from the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of a priest, who Plaintiff alleged abused him when he was a child. The Diocese moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on the grounds that the statute of limitations prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104 had expired. The trial court denied the motions. It also denied the Diocese’s motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the Diocese’s motion for extraordinary appeal under Rule 10. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with respect to subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim of negligent supervision, but hold that Plaintiff’s claims of negligent hiring and negligent retention are barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. We reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
5.	Status	Heard 04/07/11 in Jackson
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1.	Style	Joseph E. Rich, M.D. v. TN Bd. of Med. Examiners
2.	Docket Number	M2009-00813-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/RichJosephOPN.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/103/RichJosephOPN.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	This is an administrative appeal arising from the suspension of a doctor’s medical license by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners. The appellant’s medical license was suspended by the Board following its finding that he violated four provisions of the Tennessee Medical Practice Act, three state regulations, and one provision of the United States Code. The violations related

to his use of chelation therapy and intravenous hydrogen peroxide therapy, and his use of methadone to treat patients. Following the Board’s decision, the appellant filed a petition for judicial review before the chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the Board. The appellant raises numerous issues on appeal, inter alia, that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the finding that Dr. Rich was in violation of subsections (1), (4) and (12) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(b) because the Board did not articulate the applicable standard of care, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(g), to demonstrate his violations of that standard. We affirm the chancery court on all other issues including the findings that Dr. Rich violated of subsection (14) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(b), Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0880-2-.14(6)(c), Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. § 0880-2-.14(6)(e)(3)(ii) and 21 U.S.C.A § 823(g)(1). Due to our reversal of the Board’s finding on three of the seven charges against Dr. Rich, we remand this action for the reconsideration of the sanctions against him.

5. Status Heard 06/03/11 in Nashville

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1. Style Betty Saint Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., et al.

2. Docket Number E2010-00991-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/betty\\_saint\\_rogers\\_v\\_louisville\\_land\\_company.pdf](http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/betty_saint_rogers_v_louisville_land_company.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary Betty Saint Rogers (“Plaintiff”) sued Louisville Land Company and Joe I V. Williams, III (“Defendants”) alleging claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the Tennessee statutes governing cemeteries, outrageous conduct, and breach of contract, among other things. After a non-jury trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment awarding Plaintiff a judgment of \$250.00 for breach of contract, \$45,000.00 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, \$250,000.00 in punitive damages, \$37,306.25 in attorney’s fees, and \$556.42 in discretionary costs. Defendants appeal to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff did not prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, and we, therefore, reverse the judgments for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. We also find and hold that because Plaintiff abandoned her statutory claim, she was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the statute, and we reverse the award of attorney’s fees. We further find and hold that Plaintiff did prove breach of contract, and we affirm the award of damages for breach of contract, and the remainder of the Trial Court’s final judgment.

5. Status Granted 09/21/11

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1. Style SNPCO, Inc. d/b/a Salvage Unlimited v. City of Jefferson, et al.

2. Docket Number E2009-02355-SC-R11-CV

3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/SNPCO%20Inc%20dba%20Salvage%20Unlimited%20vs%20Jefferson%20City%20opn.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/SNPCO%20Inc%20dba%20Salvage%20Unlimited%20vs%20Jefferson%20City%20opn.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>The question before this Court is whether the grandfather clause of Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208(b)(1) protects the owner of newly annexed city property from the enforcement of a citywide ordinance prohibiting the sale and storage of fireworks. Interpreting section 13-7-208(b)(1) strictly against the landowner, we hold that the grandfather clause does not apply because the ordinance is not a “zoning” restriction or regulation, i.e., the ordinance does not regulate the use of property within distinct districts or zones pursuant to a comprehensive zoning plan. Accepting the facts alleged in the landowner’s amended complaint as true, the landowner is not entitled to an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance against its preexisting fireworks business. We accordingly affirm the dismissal of the landowner’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.</p>
5.	Status	Heard 8/31/11 in Knoxville

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1.	Style	State v. Lonnie L. Cross
2.	Docket Number	E2008-02792-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/102/State%20vs%20Lonnie%20L%20Cross.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/102/State%20vs%20Lonnie%20L%20Cross.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>After the appellant, Lonnie L. Cross, led police on a high-speed chase, a Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted him on two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, felony evading arrest with risk to others, driving on a revoked license, and speeding. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years in custody. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support two of his convictions: the evading arrest conviction and one of the reckless endangerment convictions. The appellant also challenges the trial court’s reliance on two sentencing enhancement factors. Upon review, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the appellant’s convictions. We also conclude that, although the trial court erred in its application of one of the enhancement factors, the error was harmless. However, our review of the record reveals that the trial court committed plain error. The appellant’s conviction on the reckless endangerment in count three violates constitutional double jeopardy protections. We therefore affirm the judgements of the trial court as to count one, reckless endangerment, and count two, evading arrest. The judgment of conviction in count three is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for merger of the conviction in count three with the evading arrest conviction in count two.</p>

5. Status Order filed 8/23/11 directing re-briefing of certain issues and setting re-argument for 11/1/11 in Nashville; Appellant's supplemental brief filed on 09/20/11

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1. Style State v. Christopher L. Davis

2. Docket Number M2008-01216-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/102/State%20v%20Christopher%20Lee%20Davis.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary Following a jury trial, Defendant, Christopher Lee Davis, was found guilty of aggravated robbery, carjacking, attempt to commit especially aggravated kidnapping, all Class B felonies, and attempt to commit premeditated first degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years for each Class B felony conviction and twenty-five years for his attempted premeditated first degree murder conviction. The trial court imposed a combination of consecutive and concurrent sentencing for an effective sentence of forty-nine years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of attempted premeditated first degree murder; (3) the trial court erred in determining the length of his sentences; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm Defendant's convictions and the length of his sentences. We remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing solely for the purpose of determining whether consecutive sentencing is appropriate under the Sentencing Act and State v. Allen, 259 S.W.3d 671 (Tenn. 2008).

5. Status Heard 06/03/11 in Nashville

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1. Style Henry Zillon Felts v. State

2. Docket Number M2009-00639-SC-R11-PC

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/102/Henry%20Zillon%20Felts%20v%20State.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Henry Zillon Felts, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See State v. Henry Zillon Felts, No. M2005-01215-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2563374 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug. 25, 2006). He subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief. The Criminal Court of Sumner County found that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because: (1) trial counsel failed to fulfill his promise to the jury that the Petitioner would testify; and (2) trial counsel failed to argue attempted voluntary manslaughter as a defense. The post-conviction court thus set aside the Petitioner's convictions and granted him a new trial. In this appeal, the State

contends that the post-conviction court erred in granting the Petitioner relief. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

5. Status Heard 06/02/11 in Nashville

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1. Style Roy E. Keough v. State

2. Docket Number W2008-01916-SC-R11-PD

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/102/Roy%20E%20Keough%20v%20State.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary  
Petitioner Roy E. Keough appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 9, 1997, a jury found the Petitioner guilty of the premeditated murder of his wife, Betty Keough, and the attempted first degree murder of Kevin Berry. For the murder conviction, the jury found that the Petitioner had previously been convicted of one or more felonies for which the statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2). The jury further found that this aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then sentenced the Petitioner to death. The trial court imposed a forty-year sentence for the attempted murder conviction to be served consecutive to his sentence of death. The Petitioner's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See *State v. Keough*, 18 S.W.3d 175 (Tenn. 2000). On December 12, 2000, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. An amendment was filed on February 14, 2003, and an addendum to the amended petition was filed on November 6, 2007. The post-conviction court held hearings on various dates in September, October, and November 2007. On July 23, 2008, the post-conviction court entered an order denying relief. On appeal to this Court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following categories: (1) the Petitioner's trial counsel were ineffective, (2) the Petitioner's appellate counsel were ineffective; (3) the Petitioner was denied a fair trial and (4) Tennessee's death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

5. Status To be heard 10/06/11 in Nashville

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1. Style State of Tennessee v. John Anthony Lethco

2. Docket Number E2010-00058-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/state\\_of\\_tennessee\\_v\\_john\\_anthony\\_lethco.pdf](http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_john_anthony_lethco.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary  
Sevier County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, John Anthony Lethco,



of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403; possession of burglary tools, see id. § 39-14-701; theft of property valued at \$60,000 or more, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(5); and theft of property valued at more than \$500 but less than \$1,000, see id. § 39-13-103, -105(2). At sentencing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of 27 years' incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by denying his motion to sever offenses, (2) by allowing hearsay testimony from witnesses other than the victim concerning ownership of stolen items at trial, (3) by denying him the opportunity to confront his accuser at trial, (4) by denying his motion for new trial, and (5) by allowing argument by the State at trial concerning his reputation as a drug dealer. Because the defendant filed his notice of appeal prior to filing his motion for new trial, the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion for new trial. Thus, any issues raised therein are waived. We discern, however, an anomaly in the judgment of theft of property valued at more than \$500 but less than \$1,000 that requires correction on remand. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

5. Status Granted 09/22/11

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1. Style State v. Florinda Lopez

2. Docket Number No. M2008-02737-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/103/State%20vs%20Nelson%20Aguilar%20Gomez%20and%20Florinda%20Lopez.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary  
 The Defendants, Nelson Aguilar Gomez and Florinda Lopez, were charged with: Count One, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse; Count Two, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect; Counts Three and Four, aggravated child abuse occurring on or about March 3, 2007; and Count Five, aggravated child abuse occurring in February 2007. Aggravated child abuse is a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402(b). The Defendants were tried jointly before a jury. Defendant Gomez was convicted of both counts of felony murder, Count One merging into Count Two, and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. He was also convicted of all three counts of aggravated child abuse and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each conviction. The trial court ordered him to serve his Count Three and Count Four aggravated child abuse sentences concurrently with each other and his life sentence, and ordered him to serve his Count Five aggravated child abuse sentence consecutively to his other sentences, for a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On her felony murder charges, Defendant Lopez was convicted of two counts of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403, -13-204(a). Count One was merged into Count Two. Defendant Lopez was also convicted of aggravated child abuse under Counts Three and Four. She was acquitted of aggravated child abuse as charged in Count Five. She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for her facilitation of first degree murder conviction and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of her two aggravated child abuse convictions. The trial court ordered her to serve these sentences concurrently, for

a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, Defendant Gomez contends that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of certain prior bad acts, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Lopez contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her pre-trial motion to include non-citizens on the jury; (2) the trial court erred in preventing her from introducing an entire statement she made to police after the State impeached her using part of that statement; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant Gomez's prior bad acts; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict her; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence for each of her convictions. After our review, we reverse and dismiss Defendant Gomez's Count Five conviction of aggravated child abuse. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

5.	Status	Heard 06/03/11 in Nashville
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1.	Style	State v. Charlers E. Lowe-Kelley
2.	Docket Number	M2010-00500-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_charles_e_lowe-kelley.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_charles_e_lowe-kelley.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Charles E. Lowe-Kelley, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. At sentencing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for each first degree premeditated murder conviction, merged the first degree felony murder convictions into the first degree premeditated murder convictions, and imposed concurrent sentences of 15 years' incarceration for each attempted first degree murder conviction to be served concurrently with the life sentences. On appeal, in addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a continuance, (2) allowing a juror to remain on the jury who expressed an opinion about the case, (3) admitting evidence without establishing a proper chain of custody, (4) admitting a taperecorded conversation between the defendant and a separately-tried co-defendant, and (5) imposing consecutive sentences. Because the defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial, all issues except the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing are waived. Furthermore, the untimely motion for new trial rendered the notice of appeal untimely. In the interest of justice, however, we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal and review the remaining issues. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
5.	Status	Order filed 08/18/11 granting appellant's request for an extension of time. Appellant's brief due 11/17/11

1.	Style	State v. Mark Anthony McNack
2.	Docket Number	No. W2010-00471-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_vs_mark_anthony_mcnack.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_vs_mark_anthony_mcnack.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Defendant, Mark Anthony McNack, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court's revocation of his community correction sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in calculating his credit for time served. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's revocation of the Defendant's community corrections sentence but conclude that the Defendant is entitled to credit for time served until the violation warrant was issued. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for the correction of the judgment.
5.	Status	To be heard 11/02/11 in Jackson
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1.	Style	State v. Joshua Lynn Parker
2.	Docket Number	No. E2008-02541-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/103/State%20vs%20Joshua%20Lynn%20Parker.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/103/State%20vs%20Joshua%20Lynn%20Parker.pdf</a>  <a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/103/State%20vs%20Joshua%20Lynn%20Parker%20DIS.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/103/State%20vs%20Joshua%20Lynn%20Parker%20DIS.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Defendant, Joshua Lynn Parker, was convicted by a Coker County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and attempted rape, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (1997) (amended 2006) (second degree murder); 39-12-101 (2006) (criminal attempt); 39-13-503 (2006) (rape). The Defendant was sentenced to serve thirty-five years at 100 percent for second degree murder conviction and eight years at thirty-five percent for attempted rape conviction. The sentences were imposed to run consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the admission of hearsay statements by the victim violated his Confrontation Clause rights; and (3) testimony regarding his service on the "can crew," a work group of jail inmates, prejudiced him at his trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
5.	Status	Heard 5/11/11 in Knoxville; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part on 09/23/11

1.	Style	State v. Corinio Pruitt
2.	Docket Number	W2009-01255-SC-R3-DD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_corinio_pruitt.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_of_tennessee_v_corinio_pruitt.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>Capital Appellant, Corinio Pruitt, appeals as of right from his conviction for first degree felony murder and his sentence of death resulting from the August 2005 death of Lawrence Guidroz. On February 29, 2008, a Shelby County jury found the Appellant guilty of one count of second degree murder and one count of first degree felony murder, and the trial court merged the conviction for second degree murder with the first degree murder conviction. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously found the presence of three statutory aggravating circumstances; specifically, (1) the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies involving the use of violence, (2) the murder was knowingly committed while the defendant had a substantial role in committing a robbery, and (3) the victim was seventy (70) years of age or older. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (7), (14). The jury further determined that these three aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. On appeal, the Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to find the Appellant intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty, (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for first degree felony murder, (3) whether the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of the autopsy photographs of the victim, (4) whether application of the (i)(7) aggravating circumstance is constitutional, (5) whether the evidence is sufficient to support application of the (i)(7) aggravator, and (6) whether the sentence of death is proportionate in the present case. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.</p>
5.	Status	Docketed 07/11/11; After granting an extension of time to file brief, appellant's initial brief now due 10/14/11;

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1.	Style	State v. Heather Richardson
2.	Docket Number	M2010-01360-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_vs_heather_richardson.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_vs_heather_richardson.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>In this interlocutory appeal, the Appellant, Heather Richardson, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court's order denying her relief from the prosecutor's denial of her application for pretrial diversion. The State concedes that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying the application. Upon review, we reverse the circuit court's order and remand for the trial court to order the prosecutor to grant the Appellant pretrial diversion.</p>

5. Status Granted 08/24/11; To be heard 11/02/11 in Jackson: Appellant's brief filed on 09/21/11

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1. Style State v. Hubert Glenn Sexton

2. Docket Number E2008-00292-SC-DDT-DD

3. Lower Court Decision Link

[http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state\\_vs\\_hubert\\_glenn\\_sexton.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_vs_hubert_glenn_sexton.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary

In the late evening of May 20, 2000, Stanley Goodman and Terry Sue Goodman were shot and killed in their home in Scott County, Tennessee. This occurred shortly after B.G., the Appellant's minor stepdaughter, had reported to authorities that the Appellant had sexually abused her. Stanley Goodman, one of the victims, was B.G.'s biological father. The Appellant denied the allegations of sexual abuse and believed that Stanley Goodman was responsible for B.G. falsely accusing him of sexual abuse. The proof at trial showed that the Appellant shot and killed both victims while they were in their bedroom. The Appellant admitted his actions to several witnesses who testified at trial.\*1 A Scott County jury found the Appellant Hubert Glenn Sexton guilty of two counts of first degree murder arising from the deaths of Stanley and Terry Goodman. Following penalty phase, the jury found the presence of one statutory aggravating circumstance, that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, and that this aggravator outweighed any mitigating factors. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6). The jury imposed sentences of death. Appellant Sexton seeks review by this court of both his convictions for first degree murder and his sentences of death. He raises the following issues for our review:

- I. Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for change of venue;
- II. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly admonish the jury before and during trial;
- III. Whether the trial court erred in failing to adequately voir dire the jury regarding extrajudicial information;
- IV. Whether the trial court erred in failing to excuse certain jurors for cause;
- V. Whether the trial court erred in admitting allegations of child sexual abuse;
- VI. Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the Appellant's willingness and later refusal to take a polygraph examination;
- VII. Whether the trial court erred in admitting statements made by the Appellant's wife;
- VIII. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that was similar to the murder weapon;
- IX. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an unrelated speeding arrest;
- X. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Appellant alleges was unlawfully obtained from his vehicle;
- XI. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence relating to the preparation of Appellant's IRS tax forms;
- XII. Whether individual and cumulative instances of prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial;
- XIII. Whether the convicting evidence was sufficient to support his convictions;

XIV. Whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence;  
XV. Whether Tennessee's death penalty scheme is constitutional; and  
XVI. Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on cumulative error.

Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

5.	Status	State's responsive brief filed July 18, 2011
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1.	Style	Leonard Edward Smith v. State
2.	Docket Number	E2007-00719-SC-R11-PD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/103/SmithLeonardRevised8-27-10.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/103/SmithLeonardRevised8-27-10.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2004 and March 2, 2007 orders of the Hamblen County Circuit Court denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 sentence of death for the murder of Novella Webb. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief relative to the Petitioner's conviction and life sentence for the murder of John Pierce and the Petitioner's conviction for the murder of Novella Webb, but we reverse the denial of post-conviction relief relative to the Petitioner's death sentence for the Webb murder and remand for a new sentencing hearing in that case. We do so based upon the conclusion that the post-conviction court erred in denying the Petitioner's claim that his trial attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in their investigation and presentation of available evidence in support of their motion to recuse the 1995 resentencing judge.
5.	Status	Heard 08/31/11 in Knoxville.
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1.	Style	<u>State v. Brian David Thomason</u>
2.	Docket Number	W2007-02910-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/093/State%20v%20Brian%20D%20Thomason.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/093/State%20v%20Brian%20D%20Thomason.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant-Appellant, Brian David Thomason ("Thomason"), appeals from the

denial of his application for pretrial diversion to the Gibson County District Attorney General's office, which was upheld by the trial court. Upon review of the record and applicable authority, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court to grant Thomason pretrial diversion under such terms and conditions as are deemed appropriate under all circumstances.

5. Status Granted 08/24/11; To be heard 11/02/11 in Jackson: Appellant's brief filed on 09/23/11

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1. Style State of Tennessee v. Alfred Turner

2. Docket Number No. W2007-00891-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Links <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/102/State%20vs%20Alfred%20Turner.pdf>

<http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCCA/PDF/102/State%20vs%20Alfred%20Turner%20DIS.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary The defendant, Alfred Turner, was found guilty by a jury of the lesser included offenses of facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony, and facilitation of second degree murder. After merging the convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years of incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that: insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction; a proper chain of custody for the introduction of DNA evidence was not established; the trial court erred in allowing into evidence that two other individuals had been acquitted of this murder; and the trial court erred in both jury instructions and sentencing. After careful review, we conclude that even though sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions, the defendant's sentence ran afoul of Blakely and the prior acquittals of two other individuals deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Therefore, the error requires a remand for a new trial.

5. Status Heard 04/07/11 in Jackson

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1. Style State v. Nigel Kavic Watkins

2. Docket Number M2009-00348-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state\\_v\\_nigel\\_kavic\\_watkins.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/state_v_nigel_kavic_watkins.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary The Defendant, Nigel Kavic Watkins, was charged with one count of first degree felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and one count of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-215(b), -15-402(b). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to

four years for reckless homicide and, as a violent offender, to twenty-five years for aggravated child abuse. The trial court ordered him to serve these sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of certain autopsy photographs; (3) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of aggravated child abuse; and (4) the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentence and in ordering consecutive service. We notice as plain error that the Defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution's double jeopardy clause were violated by his dual convictions. After our review, we affirm the Defendant's conviction for aggravated child abuse. We merge the Defendant's reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated child abuse conviction and remand for resentencing.

5. Status Heard 02/03/11; Order filed 08/23/11 directing supplemental briefing and setting re-argument on 11/01/11; Appellant's supplemental brief due on 09/30/11

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1. Style State of Tennessee v. Jason Lee White

2. Docket Number M2009-00941-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/jason\\_lee\\_white\\_vs\\_state.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/jason_lee_white_vs_state.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary The Defendant, Jason Lee White, was convicted by a jury of one count of burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. In this direct appeal, he contends that the trial court erred: (1) in denying his motion to set aside his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping; and (2) in upholding the State's use of a peremptory challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After our review, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant's especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

5. Status Heard 02/02/11; Order filed 08/23/11 directing supplemental briefing and setting re-argument on 11/01/11; Appellant's supplemental brief due on 09/20/11

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1. Style Cyrus Deville Wilson v. State of Tennessee

2. Docket Number M2009-02241-SC-R11-CO

3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cyrus\\_deville\\_wilson\\_vs\\_state.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cyrus_deville_wilson_vs_state.pdf)  
[http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cyrus\\_deville\\_wilson\\_vs\\_state\\_dis.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cyrus_deville_wilson_vs_state_dis.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary The Petitioner, Cyrus Deville Wilson, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis.



The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court and remand the Petitioner's case for an evidentiary hearing.

5. Status Granted 09/22/11

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1. Style Stephen Bernard Wlodarz v. State

2. Docket Number E2008-02179-SC-R11-CO

3. Lower Court Decision Link <http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/102/Stephen%20Wlodarz%20v%20State.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary After entering "best interest" guilty pleas in order to avoid a potential death penalty conviction, Petitioner, Stephen Wlodarz, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Hawkins County Criminal Court denied the petition.. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in finding there was no newly discovered evidence and that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm.

5. Status Heard 05/11/11 in Knoxville

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1. Style Danny A. Stewart v. Gayle Ray, Commissioner

2. Docket Number M2010-01808-SC-R11-CV

3. Lower Court Decision Link [http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/danny\\_a\\_stewart\\_v\\_gayle\\_ray\\_tdoc\\_commissioner.pdf](http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/danny_a_stewart_v_gayle_ray_tdoc_commissioner.pdf)

4. Lower Court Summary Danny A. Stewart, a prisoner serving multiple sentences, some concurrently and some consecutively, filed a petition for certiorari naming as respondents the Commissioner of the Department of Correction and heads of various other agencies allegedly responsible for determining his eligibility for parole (collectively referred to as "TDOC"). He alleges TDOC is incorrectly calculating his eligibility for parole in that it is basing its calculation on the aggregate consecutive sentences of 42 years, whereas the correct method is to calculate eligibility on each separate sentence so that he would start serving his next consecutive sentence as an "in custody" parolee of his earliest consecutive sentence. The trial court dismissed the case based on Stewart's failure "to exhaust his administrative remedies," i.e., by seeking a "declaratory order from TDOC before filing the present action." Stewart appeals. We vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings

5. Status Granted 09/26/11

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1.	Style	<u>Earlene Waddle v. Lorene B. Elrod</u>
2.	Docket Number	M2009-02142-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/earlene_waddle_v_lorene_b_elrod_opn.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/earlene_waddle_v_lorene_b_elrod_opn.pdf</a>
4.	Lower Court Summary	The trial court's enforcement of a settlement agreement between the parties' attorneys is appealed on the sole basis that the Statute of Frauds precludes enforcement since the parties never signed any agreement and the settlement pertained to real property. Because the Statute of Frauds concerns the sale of real property interests and not settlement agreements touching upon real property interests, it is not a bar to enforcement of a settlement agreement. The trial court is affirmed on that issue. The trial court's assessment of court costs, however, is reversed as it differs from the parties' agreement.
5.	Status	Granted 08/25/11; Appellant's brief filed on 09/22/11

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1.	Style	<u>Roger Dale Williamson v. Baptist Hospital of Coker County, Inc.</u>
2.	Docket Number	M2010-01282-SC-WCM-WC
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	Hyperlink unavailable
4.	Lower Court Summary	The employee sustained a compensable injury on May 16, 2008. Due to medical restrictions resulting from the injury, he was unable to return to his previous job. His employer offered him a different job at the same or higher rate of pay. Employee trained for two weeks, then he resigned because he found the new job to be too stressful. The trial court held that he did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded benefits in excess of the one and one-half times impairment cap contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 2010). His employer appealed, arguing that the employee had a meaningful return to work and that his voluntary resignation was not reasonably related to his injury. We agree that the award is limited to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment and modify the judgment accordingly.
5.	Status	Order filed 08/24/11 granting the motion for full Court review; Appellant's initial brief filed on 09/09/11

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1.	Style	84 Lumber Company v. R. Bryan Smith, et al.
2.	Docket Number	E2010-00292-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Link	<a href="http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/84%20Lumber%20Company%20vs%20R%20Bryan%20Smith%20opn.pdf">http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/84%20Lumber%20Company%20vs%20R%20Bryan%20Smith%20opn.pdf</a>

<http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/104/84%20Lumber%20Company%20vs%20R%20Bryan%20Smith%20opn%20CON.pdf>

4. Lower Court  
Summary

84 Lumber Company (“84 Lumber”) sued R. Bryan Smith (“Smith”) and Allstates Building Systems, LLC (“Allstates”) for a balance owed on an open account. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court granted 84 Lumber summary judgment, and entered a judgment against Smith and Allstates in the amount of \$27,611.31 plus attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of \$6,500.00. Smith appeals to this Court. We find that Smith did not sign the credit application in his personal capacity and, therefore, did not guarantee Allstates’ debt. We reverse the grant of summary judgment against Smith, and grant summary judgment to Smith. We affirm the grant of summary judgment against Allstates.

5. Status

Heard 09/01/11 in Knoxville

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