

FILED

October 10, 1996

**Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk**

IN SENATE
(June 11, 1996 Session)

PLAINTIFFS,

Defendants,

vs.

DEFENDANTS,

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS,

Defendants,
Special Judge.

DEFENDANTS,

Plaintiffs:

J. Matthew Brown
Caitlin, Thomas, Moffitt, Williams,
Dorley, Carpenter & Poplitz
Franklin, Tennessee

Defendants:

Shelley L. Miller
Franklin, Tennessee

PLAINTIFFS,

Members of Panel:

Frank E. Dunaway, III, Associate Justice, Supreme Court
Lee A. Green, Jr., Special Judge
William W. Taylor, Jr., Special Judge

PLAINTIFFS

Miller, Judge

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Conn. Code Regs. section 31-4-111(e)(1) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the claimant was injured in the course and scope of his employment. In the alternative, defendant contends that if the injury was work-related the trial court's award was excessive. The panel concludes that the award should be affirmed.

Claimant, Donald Deuch, was an employee of defendant, Driver Power Learning Group, Inc. Claimant had been driving trucks since 1980, and began his employment for defendant in September 1991. Claimant is 66 years old, has a 9 year old son and is married.

Claimant suffered a neck pain on May 10, 1993, and properly notified defendant; however, he did not stop working, or pursue medical treatment. On December 11, 1993, claimant alleges he received disabling injury to his back while working "the flat back and pig tails" of his truck (connecting the trailers). On December 14, 1993, claimant notified Defendant Wright, defendant's person responsible for receiving work injury notices from employees, of his injury. On December 15, 1993, claimant was treated by Dr. Casbaro, a doctor employed by defendant. He told Dr. Casbaro about the December injury and that he had also hurt his back a few months back. The doctor diagnosed the claimant as having a herniated disk and performed surgery in January of 1994. Claimant did not return to work until April. Defendant found the claimant medically incapable of returning to work, and refused to let him drive again. Claimant then secured employment with another company.

Dr. Casbaro assigned Dr. Deuch an eight percent permanent disability in pain to the body as a whole. The case was tried before Judge J. J. Conroy sitting as a special judge for the Honorable Walter C. Davis. The trial judge assigned an eight percent vocational disability rating to Dr. Deuch which will in turn affect his compensation rate of \$11,111.

resulted in an award for pain and mental disability in the amount of \$11,913.00.

Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, except upon a proper plea of correctness of findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. Section 10-6-113(e)(1).

Defendant's primary contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding the injury arose in the course of claimant's employment. The core of defendant's argument is that the medical expert's testimony does not support the finding of a work-related injury. Defendant rejects the expert testimony given by Dr. Cashman because defendant contends that (1) Dr. Cashman was given incorrect facts by the claimant and (2) the claimant's testimony is conflicting both as to the history of a prior injury and also as to the occurrence of the injury in December.

First, defendant asserts that Dr. Cashman was told by claimant that he received an injury to his back prior to the December incident. Consequently, defendant argues that there are three injuries that are causally significant: the May injury, the December injury, and an unreported October injury. Defendant claims that this unreported October injury creates a conflict between the claimant and the history related by Dr. Cashman. Defendant's assertion of an October injury is not supported by Dr. Cashman's deposition testimony. It is clear that the claimant really told the doctor in relating the history of his injury is that a prior injury occurred "a few months back." Moreover, the injury with respect to which Dr. Cashman gave his opinion was the December injury, and whether the prior injury occurred in May or October is irrelevant.

Second, defendant asserts that claimant told Dr. Cashman that the injury occurred while he was connecting a trailer at work. The defendant claims Dr. Cashman based his opinion that the injury was work-related on the fact that the claimant was lifting something

whether he injured his back and that the element of lifting is critical to the doctor's conclusion. Defendant contends that to raise a prima facie case of the injury occurred while he was working the 'plot track.' Since working the plot tracks involves climbing rather than lifting, Defendant argues that the doctor's opinion on causation is based upon incorrect facts and is therefore invalid. The trial court correctly found that it is an inherent part of his job to be working the job logs or plot tracks of his track. Either way, the injury resulted from 'Dr. Leach ... acting within the course and scope of his employment and conducting reasonable duties in relationship to his employment.'

Third, Defendant claims that essential proof regarding causation is missing. Dr. Leach testified that back denigrations can occur spontaneously. Defendant asserts that consequently there was no medical proof of causation for either the May or December injuries. Expert testimony is required to establish the causal relationship between the injury and the employment activity. A causal, however, can be conditionally predicated on expert testimony which says the accident 'could be' the cause, when there is supporting lay testimony. Callahan, Medical Insurance Reorganized, 113 F.3d 381, 391 (10th Cir. 1999). Dr. Leach could testify that a problem such as Dr. Leach's could occur spontaneously; however, the doctor reportedly asserted his opinion that this injury more than likely arose out of the claimant's employment. This testimony that the injury more than likely arose out of claimant's employment is sufficient to meet the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act. After reviewing the record the panel concludes that claimant properly provided expert testimony as to the causal relationship between his injury and his employment.

Finally, the panel concludes that the trial court properly found the percentage of vocational disability in this case. Dr. Leach testified that claimant had an eight percent body area hole in pain out.' In making its determination of eighteen percent vocational disability, the trial court considered such factors as, 'the claimant's age, job skills,

education, training, function of disability, job opportunities for the disabled, and the matter fact in primum? Lucas v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 113 S.Ct. 2111, 111 (Dec. 13, 1993). E. Du Pont was a 66 year old male with E.D. E. Du Pont has been married with a eight year old child disability, and has returned to work, though not doing the same job. Based on the fact that E. Du Pont is working now, but has limited opportunities because of his level of education and vocational training, an eight year period of prime earning is fair. The fact not provided as evidence that this setting is excessive. A trial court should take into account various factors, other than just the medical in primum, when determining vocational disability. The trial court did that in this case. Thus, in accordance with E.O.A. 11-4-111(e)(1), this panel presumes the correctness of the trial court's finding of an eight year period of prime earning partial disability.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the defendant.

FOR THE COURT, I certify, to, Special Judge

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Frank L. Duncanson, III, Associate Justice

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Joe V. Green, Jr., Special Judge