APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Seventeen-year-old Antonio Demetrius Adkisson (a.k.a. Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr.) (“the Defendant”) was charged with two counts of first-degree murder for the fatal shooting of two victims. The Gibson County Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) held a transfer hearing and found it appropriate to transfer the Defendant to the Gibson County Circuit Court (“the trial court”) to be prosecuted as an adult. After a jury trial, during which the Defendant’s videotaped statements were admitted into evidence, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. See State v. Adkisson, No. W2022-01009-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1252173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2024). The Defendant requested permission to appeal to this Court, alleging (1) the juvenile court lacked probable cause to believe he committed the charged offenses, as required for transfer by Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(4)(A), and (2) the trial court erred in admitting his confession at trial because he did not validly waive his right to remain silent and his confession was involuntary. We hold that the Defendant was properly transferred to the trial court. We further hold that the Defendant validly waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, but his confession was unlawfully coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause and thus inadmissible at trial. Having found reversible error on that basis, we vacate the Defendant’s convictions of second-degree murder and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Kenneth C. Davis, was convicted by a jury of burglary of a building other than a habitation and received a twelve-year sentence. The Defendant died while his motion for new trial was still pending, which prompted the Defendant’s counsel to file a motion to dismiss on the Defendant’s behalf, arguing that the common law doctrine of abatement ab initio should act to abate the Defendant’s entire case from the inception of the prosecution. The trial court denied the motion, relying on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Al Mutory, 581 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2019). The Defendant’s counsel filed an appeal from that decision pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, the Defendant’s counsel contends that the trial court erred by relying on Al Mutory and declining to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio under these circumstances. Following supplemental briefing, we conclude that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 3 to review the issue as presented. Further, we decline to extend the extraordinary judicial remedy of a writ of certiorari. The appeal is dismissed.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s decision to charge the costs of a conservatorship proceeding against the petitioner under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114. The petitioner sought a conservatorship for the respondent—the petitioner’s 84-year-old father—to protect his father and to prevent him from wasting his assets. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservatorship and that it was in the respondent’s best interest that the petitioner be appointed his conservator. But the court charged the costs of the proceedings to the petitioner rather than the property of the respondent. The court reasoned, inter alia, that the petitioner benefited from the conservatorship and that the respondent’s need for a conservatorship was “borderline” and “not clear cut.” The petitioner appeals. Having reviewed the trial court’s discretionary decisions pursuant to the three-part analysis set forth in Lee Medical Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010), we have determined that the trial court’s decision to charge the costs of the proceedings to the petitioner was based on an erroneous assessment of the relevant facts and a misapplication of the relevant legal principles. Accordingly, we vacate the decision and remand with instructions to assess all the guardian ad litem fees against the property of the respondent, the amount of which has already been approved, and to assess against the property of the respondent the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs the petitioner incurred in the trial court and on appeal, the amount of which is to be determined on remand. The trial court shall also determine the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the attorney ad litem in this appeal and assess those charges against the property of the respondent.

The majority concludes that Antonio Demetrius Adkisson’s confession to law enforcement officers was involuntary and vacates his two convictions for second-degree murder. Whether Adkisson’s confession was voluntary under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions is a close question. But applying the same totality-of-the circumstances test as the majority, I conclude that the confession here was the product of Adkisson’s own free will, not police coercion. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis of that issue and from the Court’s judgment vacating Adkisson’s convictions.

Husband and Wife divorced. In ruling upon contested matters, the trial court awarded Wife transitional alimony and alimony in futuro as well as attorney’s fees. Husband appealed. He argues the trial court’s award of alimony was error because the court miscalculated his income, because it errantly excluded certain evidence, and because it awarded the wrong type of alimony. He also argues that Wife’s attorney’s fees affidavit was insufficient to support an award of attorney’s fees. We affirm.

The Defendant, Roy Gene Nicholson, III, appeals from his Williamson County Circuit Court convictions of reckless aggravated assault, evading arrest, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-204 and that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to continue his trial, during which time the State procured a superseding indictment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of three charges of criminal contempt. The appellant appeals those criminal contempt findings. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Laquala Malone, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one
count of aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the
Defendant’s application for judicial diversion and imposed a three-year sentence to be
served on supervised probation. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred
by denying her request for judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff in this action sought to collaterally attack a child support judgment and raised allegations of constitutional and other violations of law by several named defendants, including Child Support Services, the plaintiff’s former spouse, and the State of Tennessee. The trial court dismissed the complaint, determining, inter alia, that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Nakeavious Milan, entered a guilty plea to one count of voluntary
manslaughter, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211 (Supp. 2022). Pursuant
to his plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to
eight years, with the trial court to determine whether the Defendant would be permitted to
serve his sentence on probation. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the
Defendant’s request for full probation and ordered him to serve his eight-year sentence in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request for full probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

The Defendant, Kyle Baptiste, appeals his Hardeman County Circuit Court conviction of
rape, for which he received a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Discerning
no error, we affirm.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The majority opinion offers a thoughtful examination of the issues before this court.
I agree fully with the majority that the failure to make an offer of proof results in the waiver
of Wife’s challenge to exclusion of the testimony of Anthony Bradley, the drafter of the
trust. Nevertheless, because I do not understand the trust to operate in the same manner as
my colleagues, I respectfully dissent.

The decedent left a will in which he directed the majority of his property into a trust. The
trust named his wife as the trustee. The trust made several specific distributions to wife
effective upon the decedent’s death, including the grant of life estate interests in certain
assets. Several other beneficiaries were designated to receive distributions from the life
estate assets upon wife’s death. The trust directed its remaining assets into a separate
marital trust which provided that all income generated by its property would be distributed
to wife. It also provided that the trustee would be required to distribute as much of the
principal of the marital trust to wife as she requested in writing and granted her a power of
appointment. Several of the remaining trust beneficiaries filed a petition to construe the
trust in the Shelby County probate court. They sought an order declaring that the remainder
interests of assets in which wife had been granted life estates did not pass into the marital
trust. The probate court held that the remainder interests did not pass into the marital trust
and wife could not alter or destroy them. Wife appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.

Petitioner, Kevin Waggoner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing (1) the trial court participated in an ex parte jury proceeding which violated hisright to an impartial jury; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attend the jury proceeding at the local high school; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to remove a juror who admittedduring trial that she knew one of the State’s witnesses; (4) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to request a subpoena duces tecum for a single record from a juror’s Facebook record; (5) the post-conviction court erred in denying a subpoena duces tecum for the juror’s Facebookaccount; and (6) the cumulative errors undermine confidence in the verdict. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported two grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to financially support the child. The trial court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. After thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination relative to the ground of abandonment by failure to support. However, the evidence did not support a finding of abandonment by failure to visit, and we reverse the trial court’s determination as to that ground. We vacate, for insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interest and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a thorough analysis of the best interest factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i).

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court
determined that clear and convincing evidence supported two grounds for termination:
abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to financially support the
child. The trial court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The
mother has appealed. After thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination
relative to the ground of abandonment by failure to support. However, the evidence did
not support a finding of abandonment by failure to visit, and we reverse the trial court’s
determination as to that ground. We vacate, for insufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best
interest and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a thorough
analysis of the best interest factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i).

This appeal involves a grandmother and grandfather’s petition to terminate the parental
rights of a father to two of his children. The petition alleged the following grounds for
termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit, (2) abandonment by failure to support,
and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court
held that each ground was proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also
determined that the termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
The father appeals. We ultimately affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights but
must vacate the trial court’s determination regarding the failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume

Petitioner, James Hudgins, was convicted in 2014 of first degree murder. State v. Hudgins, No. E2015-01363-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4413281, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), perm. app. denied(Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016). His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, including a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that Petitioner’s mother told multiple people she drugged him with Xanax on the day of the shooting.Hudgins v. State, No. E2019-02173-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 7589670, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2020), perm. app. denied(Tenn. Apr. 7, 2021). Petitioner was unsuccessful in pursuingpost-conviction relief. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence existed to show that his mother drugged him on the night of the shooting. In a supplement to the petition, Petitioner acknowledged the petition was untimely but claimed that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. After a hearing, the coram nobis court issued an order denying the petition. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The pro se Defendant has filed an application seeking an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation. Upon preliminary consideration, we determine that the application is procedurally insufficient for this court’s review. Therefore, the State need not file an answer to the application. The Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is DENIED

Defendant, Roderick Darnell Stafford, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in Counts 1 and 2, one count of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony drug offense in Count 3, and one count of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in Count 4. Defendant pleaded guilty as charged in Counts 2 and 3, with the trial court to determine the length, manner, and alignment of service. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to four years’ confinement for Count 2 and five years’ confinement for Count 3, ordering the sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of nine years’ confinement. The remaining counts were dismissed. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) imposing enhanced sentences, (2) ordering consecutive alignment of his sentences, and (3) ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. After review, we remand the matter to the trial court for entry of judgment forms for Counts 1 and 4. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motion to recuse the trial judge.
The trial court deemed the motion repetitive. We agree.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jason O. Miller, of aggravated assault
and domestic assault, for which he received an effective sentence of eight years in
confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his conviction for aggravated assault. The State concedes that the
evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Upon review, we conclude
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault.
However, as there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of assault, we reverse the
judgment for aggravated assault, modify the conviction to assault, and remand for a new
sentencing hearing and entry of an amended judgment.

The appellant, AA/AAA Bonding Company, appeals its suspension from writing bonds in
the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District due to its failure to comply with the applicable statutes.
Based upon the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral argument, we affirm the decision of the
trial court.