Greg Gonzales v. Orion Federal Credit Union et al.
M2022-00796-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Patricia Head Moskal

A federally chartered credit union agreed to purchase substantially all assets of a Tennessee-chartered bank. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions objected. He contended that the transaction was prohibited by the Tennessee Banking Act because the credit union was not a bank holding company. So he sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the transaction. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the sale of substantially all of the assets of a bank was not prohibited by the Act. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Lewana Castillo Webb v. Gregory Ryan Webb
E2023-00378-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Caroline E. Knight

This case involves the respondent’s pro se appeal from an order of protection granted by
the trial court in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner initially obtained an order of
protection for one year from the general sessions court, which the respondent appealed to
the circuit court. After a de novo hearing, the trial court extended the order of protection
for three years, to expire on January 24, 2026. The respondent timely appealed to this
Court. Because the respondent’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the
appeal.

Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Webster Malone
M2023-00058-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James A. Turner

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Webster Malone, of two counts of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court denied his request for community corrections and sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Rutherford Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Duane R. Doxtater
E2023-00261-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James F. Goodwin, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson

The Defendant, Duane R. Doxtater, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective tenyear
probationary sentence for multiple convictions stemming from two separate global
guilty plea agreements. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by fully revoking his
probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement.
Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sullivan Court of Criminal Appeals

Sara Beth Schwab v. Alfred C. Schwab, III
M2022-00590-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Deana C. Hood

This is a post-divorce dispute in which the former husband seeks to terminate alimony in futuro based on the fact that a third party, not related by blood, resided with the former wife for several months. It is undisputed that the girlfriend of the parties’ son had previously resided in the former wife’s home, but that the girlfriend had moved out before the husband filed his petition to terminate alimony. The parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) provides that “alimony shall terminate upon the death of Husband or Wife, the remarriage of Wife, o[r] Wife’s cohabitation with someone to whom she is not related by blood pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. [§] 36-5-121(f).” The trial court held that the reference to § 36-5-121(f) evinced an intent to rely on the so-called “cohabitation statute” in subsection (f)(2)(B), which creates a rebuttable presumption that an alimony recipient does not need the same level of support when they are living with a third person. However, because the son’s girlfriend was no longer residing in the wife’s home, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition. The trial court relied on a line of cases, including Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) and Wiser v. Wiser, No. M2013-02510-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1955367 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015), which stand for the proposition that “[a]n obligor spouse cannot rely on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(f)(2)(B) to terminate or suspend alimony payments if the alleged cohabitation ceased before the modification petition was tried.” We affirm the trial court in all respects. The MDA also contains a mandatory attorney fee provision entitling the wife, as the prevailing party, to recover her reasonable expenses incurred in defending this appeal, including attorney’s fees and court costs. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court shall make the appropriate award.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Clata Renee Brewer et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County et al.
M2023-00788-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor I’Ashea L. Myles

This action involves various requests directed to the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) for the release of records, pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”), related to a school shooting that occurred at a private school in Nashville. Before making a determination concerning release of the records, the trial court allowed certain interested parties to intervene in the action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.02. The parties requesting the records have appealed that ruling pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.05.1 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

JTM Enterprises v. Oddello Industries, LLC
E2022-00855-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

The parties’ dispute centers upon whether a tenant is required to pay rent for a particular ten-month period. The landlord asserts that it delayed but did not waive payment. The tenant counters that the landlord’s agent waived rent and that the tenant forbore terminating the lease based on the agent’s representations. The trial court, after setting aside a default judgment, concluded that the landlord’s agent did not have the authority to waive rent but had the authority to modify the lease to reduce rent for three of the ten months. The tenant
appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination as to the agent’s authority, the issue of estoppel, and the issue of waiver. The landlord asserts that the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment and in reducing the rent for the three-month period. After a review of the record, we affirm the setting aside of the default judgment but reverse the trial court’s ruling on the agent’s authority and remand for further proceedings.

Hamblen Court of Appeals

In Re Justin N. et al.
E2022-01603-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Michael Sharp

Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to two minor children. The trial court found as grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to support, (2) abandonment by failure to visit, and (3) a failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. We affirm as to the finding of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient findings of fact, we vacate the trial court’s
findings that the father failed to manifest a willingness and ability to parent. We also reverse the trial court’s use of the outdated best interest factors and vacate the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.

Polk Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Guy
W2023-00177-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Paula L. Skahan

The Defendant, Christopher Guy, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective sixyear
probationary sentence for his convictions for two counts of misdemeanor domestic
assault and one count of felony vandalism. The Defendant argues that (1) the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because he had completed his probationary
period by the time the revocation warrant was filed and (2) the revocation warrant should
have been dismissed due to law enforcement’s failure to preserve evidence. The Defendant
also contends that he should have been granted an appellate bond during the pendency of
the appeal. The State responds that we should affirm the trial court’s revocation order and
that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on his appellate bond issue. Following our
review, we determine that the Defendant had completed the probationary periods on his
misdemeanor domestic assault convictions before the issuance of the revocation warrant
but that the revocation warrant was timely as to the probation for his felony vandalism
conviction. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for entry of an amended
probation revocation order and a corrected judgment for the Defendant’s felony vandalism
conviction in accordance with this opinion.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Christina N. Lewis v. Walter Fletcher, et al.
W2022-00939-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn Peeples

This appeal arises out of an incident where the plaintiff fell off a staircase and sustained
injuries. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants, who owned the building,
alleging negligence and negligence per se based on a violation of a building code. The
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We
affirm.

Weakley Court of Appeals

Priscilla Smith v. Sharon Berry Et Al.
E2023-00281-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

Priscilla Smith filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) against multiple neighbors, including Michael and Sharon Berry. She sought access to her property by way of an undeveloped road called Hyder Lane. The Berrys’ garage was on the undeveloped road. After trial, the Trial Court determined that Hyder Lane was a public road and ordered the garage to be removed and the road opened for
Ms. Smith’s use and access to her property. The Berrys appealed. Having concluded thatcertain indispensable parties were never joined to the action, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the joinder of these indispensable parties.

Hawkins Court of Appeals

James R. Vandergriff v. Erlanger Health Systems Et Al.
E2022-00706-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ward Jeffrey Hollingsworth

The plaintiff underwent surgery for a severe head injury. Due to various complications and infections, he required multiple follow-up procedures and treatments. The plaintiff filed medical malpractice claims against the hospital and doctors involved in his treatment over the course of an approximately five-month time period. The defendants moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The trial court found that the plaintiff filed his lawsuit more than one year after his cause of action had accrued and that he was not entitled to an extension of the statute of limitations. It therefore dismissed the entire lawsuit. We conclude that the trial court did not err in its determination of the accrual date for the plaintiff’s cause of action as to his initial medical treatment; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the plaintiff’s cause of action as to allegations of medical malpractice as it relates to the plaintiff’s initial treatment. We reverse, however, the dismissal insofar as it
extends to later alleged incidents of malpractice, as they fell within the statute of limitations.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. David Lyndel Cochran
E2023-00142-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

Defendant, David Lyndel Cochran, stands convicted of one count each of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping. He appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in allowing a sexual assault nurse examiner to offer expert testimony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Kim Owen Alley
E2022-01523-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

The Hawkins County Grand Jury charged the Defendant, Kim Owen Alley,1 by
presentment with one count of theft of $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, one count
of transacting business as an unregistered broker-dealer, and one count of fraudulent acts
or devices. A few months later, another presentment was issued charging the Defendant
with two additional charges: one count of money laundering and one count of theft of
$2,500 or more but less than $10,000.2 Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi for
the theft count in the second presentment. Then, following the State’s proof at trial, the
trial court dismissed all three charges from the first presentment because the evidence
presented did not correspond to the dates alleged in the presentment. At the conclusion of
the trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of the remaining money laundering count, and
the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to ten years’
incarceration with a release eligibility of thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues:
(1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his money laundering conviction; (2) the trial
court erred in providing a jury instruction for theft of property as a part of the jury
instruction for money laundering after all the theft charges had been dismissed; and (3) his
ten-year sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hawkins Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Gregory Ryan Webb
E2023-00464-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gary McKenzie

A Cumberland County jury convicted Defendant, Gregory Ryan Webb, of one count of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail at seventy-five percent service. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to dismiss based on the State’s failure to preserve body camera footage from the crime scene; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (3) his sentence was excessive. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Cumberland Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. John Butler
W2023-00566-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Paula L. Skahan

The Appellant, John Butler, entered a guilty plea to three counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and was placed on judicial diversion with a probationary period of six years. The State subsequently alleged that the Appellant violated his probation, and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s diversion and entered judgments of conviction imposing an effective sentence of three years to be served in confinement. In this appeal, the Appellant contends the trial court erred in revoking the Appellant’s diversion and in ordering confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. John Butler - CONCURRING
W2023-00566-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Paula Skahan

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court acted within its discretion in revoking the Defendant’s judicial diversion probation and imposing a three-year sentence. I part ways with my fellow panel members in my reasoning for this conclusion.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Annaliese Potter v. Paul Israel
E2023-00486-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Suzanne S. Cook

In this breach of contract case, the trial court awarded Appellee damages for Appellant’s
failure to perform his obligations under a construction contract in a workmanlike manner.
Appellant appealed. Due to deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we do not reach the
substantive issues and dismiss the appeal.

Court of Appeals

Williamson County, Tennessee et al. v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization et al.
M2021-01091-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

A taxpayer appealed a County Board of Equalization’s property valuation to the State Board of Equalization. The State Board reduced the valuation. The County then sought judicial review. After a new hearing in which the trial court heard testimony from competing appraisers, it affirmed the State Board’s valuation. It also determined that the County’s request to reclassify the property was untimely. We affirm.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Christina K. Collins v. Tennessee Department of Health, Et Al
E2022-01501-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard B. Armstrong, Jr.

In the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”), Christina K. Collins sought
judicial review of a disciplinary order entered against her by the Tennessee Board of
Nursing (“the Board”). Finding that Ms. Collins’s petition for judicial review was
untimely, the Trial Court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
matter and dismissed her petition. Ms. Collins has appealed the Trial Court’s order of
dismissal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Court of Appeals

John Earheart v. Central Transport et al.
M2023-00384-SC-WCM-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Don R. Ash, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kenneth M. Switzer

John Earheart, Jr. ("Employee") filed a workers' compensation claim against Central Transport ("Employer") for temporary disability benefits. After initially denying the claim, Employer ultimately agreed to pay the requested benefits on the day before the scheduled expedited hearing. Following a compensation hearing, the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("trial court") ordered Employer to pay Employee's attorney's fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(d)(l)(B). The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("Appeals Board") affirmed. Employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix.

 

Supreme Court

Detrick Turner v. State of Tennessee
W2022-01494-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee V. Coffee

Petitioner, Detrick Turner, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that
the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of
counsel. He argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate and
failing to raise additional issues on appeal. Following our review of the entire record,
including the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re Christabell B. Et Al.
M2021-01274-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

Rebecca F. B. ("Mother") appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children Christabell B., Ashtynn B., Colton B., and Elan B. (Colton B. and Elan B. collectively, "Minor Children"; the Minor Children, Christabell B., and Ashtynn B. collectively, "Children").2 The Chancery Court for Maury County ("trial court") granted a default judgment against Mother and terminated her parental rights based on several statutory grounds: abandonment; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody. We conclude that the ground of abandonment was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore reverse the trial court's judgment as to that ground. However, we affirm the trial court's findings as to the other statutory grounds and its finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Minor Children's best interests.

Maury Court of Appeals

Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance v. William Max Ridden
E2023-00932-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle E. Hedrick

The notice of appeal filed by the appellant, William Max Riden, stated that appellants were
appealing the judgment entered on May 24, 2023. As the order appealed from does not
constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Christopher B. Patton Et Al. v. Jill Marie Campoy
E2023-00231-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ronald Thurman

This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiffs seek to establish that they have
an ingress and egress easement over the portion of a once public road that crosses over
their neighbor’s property. The plaintiffs contend that they have a prescriptive easement or,
in the alternative, a private access easement for ingress and egress because their properties
abut the once public road that runs through the defendant’s property. The chancery court
found that the plaintiffs have a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress across the
defendant’s property. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the
plaintiffs have an easement across the defendant’s property, albeit on different grounds.
We have determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove a prescriptive easement;
nevertheless, they have proven a private access easement over the defendant’s property
because their properties abut a once public road that passes through the defendant’s
property. Accordingly, we affirm as modified the decision of the trial court awarding the
plaintiffs an ingress and egress easement over the defendant’s property.

Cumberland Court of Appeals