State of Tennessee v. Glover P. Smith
The defendant was indicted on two counts of fabricating evidence and on six counts of making a false report arising out of the disappearance of his wife. A jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the trial court imposed a sentence of one year in the county jail followed by six years on probation. After a hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court affirmed the convictions for making a false report but dismissed the convictions for fabricating evidence after concluding that no investigation was “pending” when the defendant fabricated evidence. Both the State and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals reinstated the defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence, dismissed as multiplicitous two convictions for making a false report, and affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. We granted the defendant permission to appeal. Although we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reinstatement of the defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence, we conclude that two of the defendant’s convictions for making a false report should be dismissed because the evidence is insufficient to support these convictions. We also conclude that three of the defendant’s convictions for making a false report are multiplicitous and therefore dismiss two of those convictions. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals in all other respects. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Fletcher Whaley Long v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that an attorney had violated multiple disciplinary rules and imposed a public censure. The attorney appealed, and the trial court affirmed the Hearing Panel’s decision. On appeal to this Court, the attorney raises a number of issues, including a facial constitutional challenge to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9. After reviewing the evidence and the applicable law, we reject the attorney’s constitutional challenge to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, and we conclude that his other issues are without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Guadalupe Arroyo v. State of Tennessee
The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive twelve-year terms for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The defendant twice appealed the sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which twice remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Each time, the trial court imposed a twenty-four-year sentence. The defendant did not appeal the third sentencing order. Later, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to appeal the third sentencing order. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he and the defendant discussed the futility of a third appeal and the defendant agreed that no appeal would be filed. The defendant denied that he and his trial counsel discussed a third appeal. Trial counsel did not file a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(d)(2) waiver of appeal. The post-conviction court found trial counsel to be more credible than the defendant. Based on that finding, the trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the defendant knew of his right to appeal and waived that right. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We hold that the defendant had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know of his right to appeal or that he otherwise did not waive that right. His trial counsel’s failure to file a written waiver of appeal was not per se deficient performance, but was a fact properly considered by the trial court on the issue of whether trial counsel rendered effective representation. Based on the credibility determinations made by the post-conviction court, we hold that the defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence his allegations of ineffective |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Guadalupe Arroyo v. State of Tennessee - Dissent
In January of 2002, Guadalupe Arroyo (the “Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide. The trial court imposed two twelve-year sentences to be served consecutively—an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The Petitioner successfully appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals on the basis that the trial court had imposed consecutive sentencing based upon the “dangerous offender” classification in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(4) (2010) without first addressing the requisite factors set forth in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). A second appeal on the same issue also resulted in a second remand to the trial court. In a third sentencing order, the trial court held that the sentences were reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and were necessary to protect the public, grounds essential for the imposition of consecutive sentences based upon the “dangerous offender” classification. Id. at 938; see also State v. Pollard, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 6732667, at *9-10 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013). The reasons cited were as follows: [One,] during the prior sentencing hearing the [Petitioner] admitted to underage drinking on a daily basis, confirmed in the pre-sentence report; Two, the [Petitioner] admitted to driving without a license daily; and Three, the [Petitioner] has been illegally within this country since his arrival. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Richard Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC et al.
Sixty days prior to filing his complaint, the plaintiff in this health care liability action sent written notice of his potential claim to each of the health care providers that would be named as defendants. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2013). The plaintiff served the pre-suit notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, as permitted by statute. Id. § 29-26-121(a)(3)(B). In his subsequent complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had complied with the statutory requirement of pre-suit notice, id. § 29-26-121(b), but the plaintiff failed to file with the complaint “an affidavit of the party mailing the [pre-suit] notice establishing that the specified notice was timely mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested,” id. § 29-26-121(a)(4). The defendants moved for dismissal of the lawsuit, citing the plaintiff’s failure to file with the complaint an affidavit of the person who had sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail. The defendants did not allege that the lack of the affidavit resulted in prejudice. Instead, the defendants contended that the pre-suit notice statute demands strict compliance with all its requirements and that dismissal is the mandatory remedy for noncompliance. The trial court “reluctantly” agreed with the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed but noted the “harsh results” strict compliance produces in cases, such as this one, where no prejudice is alleged. We granted the plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the statutory requirement of an affidavit of the person who sent pre-suit notice by certified mail may be satisfied by substantial compliance. We also hold that the plaintiff substantially complied with the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’sdismissal of the complaint is reversed; the complaint is reinstated; and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kiara Tashawn King
The defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary and theft of property over five hundred dollars. The trial court imposed concurrent, Range I sentences of five years and one year and six months, respectively, all to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences and by denying her application for judicial diversion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the application for permission to appeal in order to clarify the appropriate standard of appellate review for the grant or denial of judicial diversion. We hold that when the trial court places on the record its considerations for the grant or denial of judicial diversion, the determination should be given a presumption of reasonableness on appeal and reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In the absence of appropriate considerations on the record, the appellate court should either remand for reconsideration or perform a de novo review. After our own de novo review of this record, we hold that the defendant is not entitled to judicial diversion. |
Marshall | Supreme Court | |
Larry O. Evans v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company
An employee sustained a compensable injury. The trial court ruled that the employee’s partial disability award should be apportioned to the arm. The employee has appealed, asserting that the award should have been apportioned to his thumb. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Coffee | Supreme Court | |
Jose Rodriguez a.k.a. Alex Lopez v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, a Mexican citizen, entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge of patronizing prostitution and was granted judicial diversion. After successfully completing his diversion, the petitioner’s criminal record was expunged. More than three years after the entry of his plea, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that trial counsel failed to advise him of the potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The trial court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a petitioner whose record has been expunged may not obtain post-conviction relief and affirmed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition. We granted the petitioner permission to appeal. Following our review, we conclude that a guilty plea expunged after successful completion of judicial diversion is not a conviction subject to collateral review under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Roger David Hyman v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that a Knoxville attorney violated a number of the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six months and his attendance at six hours of ethics and professionalism coursesin addition to those mandatedby Tennessee Supreme CourtRule 21, section 3.01. The attorney timely filed a petition for certiorari in the Circuit Court for Knox County under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3. In his petition, the attorneyalleged thatthe hearing panel improperlyconsidered his disciplinaryhistoryand that his six-month suspension was excessive. The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the hearing panel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
John Jay Hooker et al. v. Governor Bill Haslam et al.
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether certain provisions of the Tennessee Plan, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 17-4-101 through 17-4-109 (2009), which governs the way in which Tennessee appellate judges are initially selected and thereafter stand for reelection, violate the Tennessee Constitution. We hold that the issue of the constitutional validity of the Judicial Nominating Commission/gubernatorial appointment process under the Tennessee Plan is moot, and we decline to rule on this issue. We further hold that the retention election portion of the Tennessee Plan satisfies the constitutional requirement that the judges of the appellate courts be elected by the qualified voters of the State and does not violate the Tennessee Constitution. We likewise hold that the election of judges to the Tennessee Court of Appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee on a statewide basis does not violate the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, the portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the issue of the constitutional validity of the Judicial Nominating Commission/gubernatorial appointment process under the Tennessee Plan is vacated and that claim is dismissed. We affirm the portions of the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the constitutional validity of the retention election portion of the Tennessee Plan and the constitutional validity of the election of Tennessee intermediate appellate court judges on a statewide basis. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Michael S. Becker et al. v. Ford Motor Company
This appeal involves a question of law concerning the interpretation and application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 (2009) certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Based on the undisputed facts, the District Court has asked this Court to determine whether, after a defendant asserts a comparative fault claim against a non-party tortfeasor who was known to the plaintiff when the original suit was filed, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 permits the plaintiff to amend its complaint to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor named by the defendant, even though the statute of limitations on that claim has expired. We hold that the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 is not restricted to tortfeasors who were unknown to the plaintiff when its original complaint was filed. Therefore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the tortfeasor named by the defendant within ninety days after the filing of the answer or amended answer in which the defendant first asserts a comparative fault claim against the tortfeasor. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Courtney Bishop
This appeal involves questions regarding when the police may legally arrest a suspect based on information provided by an accomplice and the amount of corroboration required to convict a person who has confessed to a crime. A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of attempted aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both convictions after deciding (1) that the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed because it was the result of an illegal arrest and detention and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction because the State did not introduce sufficient evidence, independent of the defendant’s confession, to corroborate the commission of the attempted robbery. State v. Bishop, No. W2010-01207-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 938969 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012). We have determined that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant. We have also determined that the defendant’s in court confession did not require corroboration but that, had his extrajudicial confession required corroboration, the State presented ample evidence that this confession was trustworthy. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s convictions and sentences. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
George Ernest Skouteris, Jr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
This is a direct appeal of an attorney disciplinary proceeding involving six complaints of professional misconduct. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision that the attorney had violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct and should be disbarred from the practice of law. After review of the evidence presented and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Dwayne Bell
This appeal involves the weight that should be given to a motorist’s performance on field sobrietytests in determining whether probable cause existed to arrest the motorist for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”). A law enforcement officer stopped a motorist who was driving in the wrong direction on a divided highway in Sevier County. Another officer administered several field sobriety tests, and arrested the motorist for DUI because the motorist had been driving in the wrong direction on a divided highway, smelled of alcohol, and admitted that he had been drinking. When the grand juryreturned a presentment charging the motorist with DUI and DUI per se, he filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Sevier County to suppress the evidence and to dismiss the charges. The trial court dismissed the charges on the ground that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the motorist in light of his performance on the field sobriety tests. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Bell, No. E2011-01241-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3776695 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2012). We granted the State’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal and now hold that the officer had probable cause to arrest the motorist for DUI without a warrant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the trial court, reinstate the charges, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings |
Sevier | Supreme Court | |
Doris Cannon ex rel. Juanita E. Good v. Bhaskar Reddy, M.D.
The plaintiff filed a health care liability action against the defendant. During the pendency of her action, the General Assembly enacted the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and -122. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her original action. The plaintiff then filed two successive actions. First, the plaintiff filed a second action that did not comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith statutes. The plaintiff then filed a third action that complied with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and -122. The plaintiff moved to consolidate her second and third actions, and the defendant moved to dismiss. The defendant contended that the plaintiff’s second action should be dismissed for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements and that her third action should be dismissed based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court consolidated the lawsuits and denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss. The defendant moved for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court denied. We granted the defendant’s application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her second action. As a result of the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal and our recent holding in Rajvongs v. Wright, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2013 WL 6504425 (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2013), we hold that the plaintiff, who properly provided pre-suit notice of her claim prior to filing her third action, was entitled to a 120-day extension in which to refile her complaint pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c). The plaintiff’s third complaint was therefore timely filed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
Derrick Brandon Bush v. State of Tennessee
This appeal concerns the retroactive application of Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), in which this Court held that trial courts have an affirmative duty, before accepting a guilty plea to a crime carrying a mandatory sentence of community supervision for life, to inform the defendant desiring to plead guilty of the consequence of lifetime supervision. In April 2011, a prisoner, who pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted rape in December 2000, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Sumner County alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly or intelligently entered because he had not been informed that he would be subject to lifetime community supervision following his release from prison. The trial court decided that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act’s statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds and that the prisoner was entitled to post-conviction relief because Ward v. State should be applied retroactively. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding no grounds for due process tolling and that Ward v. State did not announce a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application. Bush v. State, No. M2011-02133-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 2308280 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2012). We granted the prisoner’s appeal to clarify the standards governing retroactive application of this Court’s authoritative interpretations of the Tennessee Constitution and to resolve related issues in the interpretation of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. In accordance with the retroactivity framework for post-conviction proceedings the Tennessee General Assembly codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-122 (2012), we have determined that our holding in Ward v. State does not require retroactive application and, therefore, that the prisoner is not entitled to tolling under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(b)(1) (2012). We also hold that the prisoner’s case does not warrant due process tolling. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
E. Ron Pickard et al. v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board et al. - REHEAR
E. Ron Pickard and Linda Pickard have filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition requesting this Court to revisit its opinion filed in this case on December 17, 2013. This petition is premised on the Pickards’ erroneous conclusion that the focal point of the Court’s analysis was their April 6, 2009 petition for a declaratory order, to the exclusion of their January 16, 2009 petition for a declaratory order. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Pope
The defendant, convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, and sentenced to concurrent terms of ten and six years respectively, appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the evidence of identification was sufficient as to both convictions and, as to the aggravated burglary, holding that the victim had not given his “effective consent” to the entry of the residence. We granted the application for permission to appeal to determine whether the evidence, circumstantial or direct, was sufficient to establish both convictions. Because the jury had the prerogative to reject the alibi testimony offered by the defendant, the identification evidence was sufficient as to both offenses. The aggravated robbery conviction is, therefore, affirmed. As to the aggravated burglary, however, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction because there was no evidence that the Defendant engaged in an act of “deception,” as defined by statute, in the context of “effective consent.” The aggravated burglary conviction is, therefore, reversed and the charge dismissed. We remand for a new trial on the lesser included offenses of aggravated criminal trespass and criminal trespass. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Juan Alberto Blanco Garcia v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction proceeding the petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The petitioner also alleged that his plea was involuntary and unknowing because the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(J). The post-conviction trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We conclude that the record fully supports the post-conviction court’s findings that trial counsel advised the petitioner he would be deported upon pleading guilty and that his guilty plea could have an adverse effect upon his ability to return legally to the United States. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(J) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the proof shows that the petitioner was aware his guilty plea would result in his deportation and could adversely affect his ability to return legally to the United States. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
Zoyle Jones v. State of Tennessee
The issue presented in this case is one of first impression: whether cabinet-level state executive officials are absolutely immune from defamation claims arising out of statements made while performing their official duties. An employee of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) was disciplined for double-billing claims for his job-related travel expenses to both the state and a private organization. After the TDOC Commissioner responded to media inquiries about the employee’s demotion for violating the state’s travel billing policy, the employee sued the State of Tennessee and the TDOC for defamation. The State moved for summaryjudgment, asserting that the TDOC Commissioner had an absolute privilege to make the allegedly defamatory statements to the media. The Tennessee Claims Commission denied the State’s motion. Upon review, we hold that the State is absolutely immune from the employee’s defamation claims that relate to the TDOC Commissioner’s statements in response to media inquiries about the employee’s demotion. This ruling allows cabinet-level officials to perform their governmental duties free from legal harassment and uninhibited by the fear of potential lawsuits arising out of their job-related speech. It also furthers the vital free-expression principle that the public has a right to receive critical information from the government and its public officials, who must be free to speak with complete candor about matters of public importance. The judgment of the Claims Commission is reversed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Westgate Smoky Mountains at Gatlinburg v. Burns Phillips, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development et al.
The claimant is a licensed time-share salesperson who sold time-share interests at a resort owned by Westgate in Gatlinburg, Tennessee. When resort management terminated the business relationship, the claimant filed for state unemployment benefits with the Department of Labor and Workforce Development. The initial agency decision, the Appeals Tribunal, and the Board of Review affirmed an award of benefits to the claimant, concluding that a time-share salesperson is not a licensed real estate agent and therefore is not subject to the Tennessee Employment Security Law’s exclusion for services performed by a “qualified real estate agent.” Westgate sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. The chancery court reversed, finding that a time-share salesperson is a “licensed real estate agent” and that the claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits as a “qualified real estate agent.” The Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s findings, and Westgate appealed. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the chancery court. |
Sevier | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Allen Pollard
The defendant was convicted of felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery. After merging the murder convictions, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life for the murder and eighteen years for the especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded to the trial court for a proper determination of whether the sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently. We hold that, when a trial court places findings on the record to support its sentencing decision, the applicable standard of appellate review for a challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences is abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. Because, however, the trial court failed to address the factors required to impose consecutive sentences based on the dangerous offender classification, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Edith Johnson et al. v. Mark C. Hopkins et al.
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether a provision of the unlawful detainer statute, which requires that a tenant appealing to the circuit court from a general sessions court’s judgment in favor of a landlord must post a bond equal to one year’s rent of the premises, applies regardless of whether the tenant has surrendered possession of the property prior to the appeal. We hold that the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-18-130(b)(2) (2012) does not require that a tenant appealing to the circuit court from an adverse general sessions court judgment in an unlawful detainer action post a bond corresponding to one year’s rent of the premises if the tenant has surrendered possession of the premises prior to the appeal. Accordingly, the cost bond that the tenants have already posted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103(a) (2000) is sufficient to perfect their appeal and confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Circuit Court. We affirm the Circuit Court’s judgment denying the landlords’ motion to dismiss and remand the case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Erik Hood v. Casey Jenkins et al.
The minor beneficiary of a $100,000 life insurance policy filed suit against his financial guardian and the insurance company after the guardian misappropriated the insurance proceeds. The trial court entered judgments in favor of the minor against both the guardian and the insurance company. On appeal by the insurance company, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the insurance company breached its contractual duties by entrusting the proceeds to the guardian. The insurance company then applied for permission to appeal to this Court, contending that it could not be held liable for the loss to the minor because it had relied upon the validity of a juvenile court order of guardianship. Because the insurance company acted in good faith when it relied upon a facially valid court order establishing a financial guardianship in making payment of the life insurance proceeds, it is not liable for breach of contract. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and the claim against the insurance company is dismissed. |
Grainger | Supreme Court | |
Jolyn Cullum et al. v. Jan McCool et al.
The issue presented in this premises liability case is whether a store owes a duty to protect its customer from a visibly intoxicated customer who was ordered to leave the store by store employees. A store patron sued a store for negligence after she was struck and injured in the store’s parking lot by a vehicle driven by another store patron. Store employees had refused to fill the other patron’s medical prescriptions because they believed she was intoxicated; she became belligerent, and store employees ordered her to leave the store knowing that she was alone and would be driving her vehicle. In response to the lawsuit, the store filed a motion to dismiss, contending that it did not have a legal duty to control the intoxicated patron after she left the store. The trial judge granted the store’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the store owed the injured patron a duty of care to protect her from the intoxicated patron. Taking the plaintiffs’ allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, we hold that the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm to the injured patron outweighed the burden placed on the store to protect the patron against that harm. Therefore, the store patron’s complaint contains sufficient allegations which, taken as true, establish that the store owed a duty of care to the injured patron. The trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court |
