State of Tennessee v. Demetrius Grimes

The Defendant, Demetrius Grimes, was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder; five counts of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony; four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony with a prior dangerous felony conviction; two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery; two counts of attempted carjacking; one count of attempted first-degree murder with serious bodily injury; two counts of assault; and one count of simple possession of a controlled substance, third offense. The sentences for the attempted first-degree murders of Michael Dixon and Carl Chesney were ordered to be served consecutively to each other, as well as to both of the 10-year sentences for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, which were, in turn, to be served consecutively to each other, resulting in a total effective sentence of sixty years. Further, all the sentences were to be served consecutively to a sentence for a prior conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that, since the State argued at trial that Michael Dixon was the intended target of the shots, the attempted first-degree murder conviction for the shooting of Carl Chesney could not stand. Further, the Defendant argues on appeal that the multiple convictions for employment of a firearm during the commission of multiple dangerous felonies cannot stand, for the evidence showed that the Defendant used only one weapon, thus supporting only a single firearm conviction; and that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. The State agrees on appeal that the court erred as to sentencing in Counts 15 through 18, which enhanced the Defendant’s sentences for employing a firearm during the commission of four attempted dangerous felonies, for the prior felonies upon which the enhancement was based, were not “dangerous” felonies, as required by statute, but, rather, were simple drug possession convictions. Accordingly, we reverse the convictions as to Counts 15 through 18 and dismiss those charges. We reinstate the convictions for Counts 2, 4, 8, 10 and 12, which were merged into Counts 15 through 18, and remand for entry of amended judgments. We conclude that the other issues raised on appeal by the Defendant are without merit.