Cassandra Burks v. Gregory B. Burks
This is a divorce proceeding in which the wife filed a divorce complaint against the husband on the grounds of adultery and inappropriate marital conduct. While the action was pending, Husband drafted a handwritten reconciliation document in which he promised that the marital residence would become the wife’s separate property if he ever “cheated” on her again, “in consideration of her reconciling with [him] (also dropping the |
Court of Appeals | ||
Ann Calabria v. Corecivic of Tennessee, LLC
The mother of an incarcerated person filed suit against the prison operator for injuries |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Boesch v. Scott D. Hall
The Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed the motion for summary judgment filed by Stephen Boesch (“Plaintiff”) due to his failure to file a separate statement of undisputed material facts in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. The Trial Court additionally denied Plaintiff’s oral motion for default judgment against Scott D. Hall (“Defendant”) and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has appealed. Upon our review, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This is the second interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Chaquana P. Williams v. Dollar General Corporations, LLC
Appellant filed a premises liability claim against the defendant store after she fell at its entrance. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Blakele Bakker M.D. v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority D/B/A Erlanger Health System
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant hospital in this premises liability case, finding that the defendant had no notice of the alleged dangerous or defective condition on its premises. The plaintiff has appealed. Following our review, we determine that the plaintiff was not provided notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond to all issues to be considered by the trial court at the summary judgment stage. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jerome Penzich v. Lauren Woodall
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Brittany Sharayah Lehmann v. Jerry Scott Wilson
The appellant challenges his convictions on two charges of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection prohibiting him from contacting his former partner. The convictions arise from two communications between the appellant and the appellee when exchanging their minor child. We have determined that the underlying orders lack the required level of clarity and contain significant ambiguities. We, therefore, reverse the convictions. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Glen Hale v. Brian Bergmann et al.
Two neighboring property owners had the right to use the same easement for ingress and egress. For many years, the neighbors used and maintained a shared gravel road to access their properties. Then one property owner unilaterally removed gravel from part of the road and created an alternate route. The other property owner filed suit, seeking to protect his easement rights. The trial court held the owner who damaged the road liable for “acting beyond his legal rights” and “changing the nature and character of the easement.” Among other things, the court awarded the damaged party a judgment for the costs of the repairs plus pre-judgment interest and a permanent injunction. Because the evidence preponderates against the damages awarded, we modify the judgment by reducing the award. We also vacate the permanent injunction because the damaged property owner did not seek that relief. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Kaminski v. Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
This is an appeal from a final order affirming the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s denial of a request for termination of registration on the Sex Offender Registry. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Staci L. Robinson v. Eric S. Robinson
Husband moved for relief from a final decree of divorce under Tennessee Rule of Civil |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Essy Kazemi et al. v. Hamid Arab
The Defendant signed a promissory note and borrowed $500,000 from the Plaintiffs, with the loan secured by his home. Months later, the parties entered into a note modification agreement that increased the principal to $900,000. The Defendant did not pay back the loan, making no payments, so the Plaintiffs sued to recover under the agreements. Over two years after the original answer was filed, the Defendant moved to amend his answer to add several affirmative defenses. The trial court denied the motion to amend. After a trial, the trial court found that the Defendant owed the Plaintiffs $843,011.47. The Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to amend and raises multiple other issues primarily relating to the amount owed. We find no error and affirm the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond T. Throckmorton, III, et al. v. Steven L. Lefkovitz, et al.
The plaintiff attorneys filed this action alleging tortious interference with a business relationship and unlawful procurement of breach of contract, Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-50-109, against the defendant attorney and his law firm for his defense of their former clients in an action to recover fees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorney and the law firm. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re S.C., et al.
Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that her children were dependent and neglected. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Thomas Lee Griffin
This appeal arises from a petition for declaratory judgment concerning a quit claim deed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Daxleigh F. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the children. The trial court also determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh K.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Both parents appeal the trial court’s determination of the existence of statutory grounds to terminate their rights, as well as its conclusion that termination is in their child’s best interests. The father also challenges whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for in-person attendance at trial. Upon our review of the record, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ember H. Et Al.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. Maternal grandparents Chaunta C. (“Grandmother”) and Thomas C. (“Petitioners,” collectively) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Bethany U. (“Mother”) to her minor children Ember H. and Erowynn H. (“the Children,”collectively). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, failure to manifest, and persistent conditions. Mother appeals, arguing among other things that Petitioners prevented her from visiting the Children. We vacate the ground of persistent conditions. However, we find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the three other grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We thus affirm as modified, resulting in affirmance of the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Stoneybrooke Investors LLC v. Agness McCurry
This matter involves an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the Washington County Circuit Court’s denial of a motion to recuse filed by the appellant. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal and other filings submitted by the appellant, we determine that the appellant failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 10B. We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Chance B. et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights and the stepparent adoption of her two children by their stepmother. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The termination was conjoined with a stepparent adoption, which the trial court granted. The Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights and granting the stepparent adoption. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Loren Probst Et Al. v. Liberty Mutual Group, Inc. Et Al.
This appeal challenges the enforceability of a purported settlement agreement among homeowners, their insurance provider, and a service provider. The plaintiffs originally brought claims against their insurance provider and a service provider after efforts to repair water damage resulted in further damage to their home. The dispute progressed to settlement negotiations, and it seemed an agreement was reached; however, the plaintiffs stopped short of executing the written agreement. The defendants filed a joint motion to enforce the settlement agreement, which the plaintiffs opposed in the trial court, claiming that “counsel was not provided with express authorization to accept” the defendants’ counteroffer. The trial court deemed it a case of “buyers’ remorse” and granted the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On appeal, the plaintiffs raise the sole issue of whether a condition subsequent made the agreement unenforceable. Defendants contend that this issue was waived because it was not raised in the trial court. We have determined that the plaintiffs waived their only issue on appeal by failing to raise it in the trial court. We have also determined, as the defendants contend, that the trial court correctly ruled that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. Thus, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Baron Construction, LLC v. 4J Construction Company, Inc. et al.
A general contractor sued two business entities and their sole owner for breach of contract. The defendants denied liability and filed a counter-complaint. Four years later, the contractor moved for sanctions under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 16.06. The trial court entered a default judgment against the defendants and dismissed their counterclaims with prejudice due to their repeated failure to comply with pretrial orders. The defendants moved to set aside the final judgment. The trial court granted the owner relief from the judgment. But it refused to set aside the judgment against his two companies. And it granted the contractor summary judgment against the owner on the remaining claims. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Debbie Lynn Simmons, et al. v. Deborah Matlock Bass, et al.
Appellees, a married couple at the time, purchased two properties. Appellants, Husband’s adult daughters from a previous relationship, sought imposition of resulting trusts on the respective properties. Appellants, each of whom lived in one of the properties, maintained that they had agreements with their father whereby they would own the properties so long as they paid all expenses thereon. Appellee/Wife disputed such arrangement and maintained that the disputed properties were marital properties. Because of the suspect circumstances surrounding the purchases of the properties and the disputed testimony regarding any agreements by and between Husband and Appellants, Wife argued that the properties were not subject to the imposition of the equitable remedy of resulting trusts. The trial court denied Appellants’ respective petitions to establish resulting trusts, and they appeal. Because Appellants failed to meet the burden of proof to establish resulting trusts, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Ella Mae Haire et al. v. Shelby J. Webster et al.
Decedent’s son, individually and as personal representative of his mother’s estate, sued several of his siblings and decedent mother’s bank. Among other things, the son alleged that the bank breached its duties to the decedent by disbursing funds out of her checking and savings accounts following her death. Eventually, the bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not negligent in its handling of the decedent’s accounts, nor did it breach any contractual duty to either the decedent or her son. The son appeals and, discerning no error by the trial court, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Kamdyn H. et al.
This is an appeal of a termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Tara C. (“Mother”)to two of her children, Kamdyn H. and Bentyn H. upon finding that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was mentally incompetent and that it was in the best interest of Kamdyn and Bentyn for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother has appealed. Upon our review, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |
