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The following Opinions are available for viewing or download in PDF format:
Cases posted the week of 12/17/2007
Lawrence County Education Association and Jerry Taylor v. The Lawrence County Board of Education, et al. -
M2004-02224-SC-R11-CV View
Lawrence County - Jerry Taylor, a tenured teacher in Lawrence County, and the Lawrence County Education Association brought this action against the Lawrence County Board of Education, primarily seeking the reinstatement of Taylor’s additional role as head girls’ basketball coach at Loretto High School but also asking for other relief. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. After granting the motion filed by Taylor and the Education Association, the judge approved back pay for 2001-2002, ordered that Taylor should have been considered as the incumbent coach for 2002-2003, and directed pay for that year as well. The judge declined to reinstate Taylor as coach. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment but ruled that teacher transfers, including the reassignment of a coach to full-time teaching responsibilities, were within the exclusive authority of the director of schools and not a proper subject of the collective bargaining process. We granted review to determine what remedies, if any, were available to Taylor and the Education Association.
We hold that the director of schools has the statutory authority to “transfer” teachers, including the re-assignment of a tenured teacher with coaching responsibilities to a full-time teaching position when necessary for the efficient operation of the system; however, the subject of teacher transfer may be addressed in the collective bargaining process under our statutes, and the powers of a director in that regard are subject to both the terms of any contract and to board policy. Nevertheless, the director retains the power to transfer a tenured teacher as to their coaching responsibilities, without regard to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, so long as that transfer does not affect the employee’s position as a teacher. This is because a coach does not fall under the statutory definition of a “professional employee.” While Taylor, in his capacity as coach, was not entitled to an arbitration hearing on his transfer from coaching under the collective bargaining agreement, the board of education, by adopting the recommendations of the arbitrator, established a policy granting rights to Taylor which he would not have otherwise possessed.
Because the binding nature of the arbitrator’s decision is not in dispute, Taylor is entitled to a partial summary judgment in that he should receive the coaching supplement for the school year 2001-2002 and should have been treated as the “incumbent coach” for assignment purposes in 2002-2003. In that regard, the judgment is affirmed. There are, however, genuine issues of material fact as to whether Taylor, despite his incumbency status, was properly transferred to a full-time teacher in 2002-2003 in accordance with statutory guidelines; therefore, the award of the coaching supplement for that school year must be set aside, and the cause is remanded for trial as to whether the transfer was arbitrary, capricious, or the subject of improper motivation, as prohibited by law. Any entitlement to the coaching supplement for 2002-2003 or other remedy depends upon the propriety of the transfer under the statute and under the collective bargaining agreement, as modified by the board’s action.
State of Tennessee v. James Taylor - M2005-01060-SC-R11-CD View
Davidson County - A jury convicted the defendant,
James Edward Taylor, of first degree felony murder and
especially aggravated robbery. The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the defendant’s
convictions. We granted permission to appeal and address
two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing
the jury to watch a videotape in which the defendant appears
in custody and wearing jail attire; and (2) whether the trial
court erred in admitting hearsay testimony about the defendant’s
familial relationship with Sabrina Lewis. We hold that the
trial court did not err in admitting the videotape but did
err in admitting the hearsay testimony. We conclude, however,
that the trial court’s error was harmless. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Timothy Wade Keyt v. Nanci Suzanne Keyt - M2005-00447-SC-R11-CV View
(Dissent) - View
Putnam County - We granted the application for
permission to appeal in this divorce case to address two issues
presented by Husband: (1) whether the increase, if any, in value
of his separately-owned stock interest in the family-owned company
for which he worked qualifies as marital property; and if so,
(2) whether the chancellor correctly assessed the increase in
value. Because we find that Husband’s employment
with the company in which he owned stock did not substantially
contribute to the preservation and appreciation of the stock,
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this
matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Cases posted the week of 12/03/2007
Tammie C. Allen v. Sidney McPhee, et. al. - M2005-00202-SC-R11-CV View
Rutherford County - The employee asserts that both her employer and supervisor are liable for retaliation and discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer and supervisor on all issues, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted review of this case to address the standards for imposing liability for sexual harassment discrimination and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. With respect to the discrimination claim against the employer, we hold that the availability of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is not affected by the harassing supervisor’s status as a “proxy” or “alter ego” of the employer. We conclude, however, that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the employer has established the Faragher/Ellerth defense. Accordingly, the employer is not entitled to summary judgment on the employee’s discrimination claim. With respect to the discrimination claim against the supervisor, we hold that to be individually liable for discrimination a supervisor must encourage the employer to engage in employment-related discrimination or prevent the employer from taking corrective action. The employee has failed to present any evidence that the supervisor encouraged the employer to engage in harassment or attempted to prevent the employer from taking corrective action. Accordingly, the supervisor is entitled to summary judgment on the employee’s discrimination claim. With respect to the employee’s retaliation claims, we hold that to state a prima facie case for retaliation an employee must demonstrate: 1) that she engaged in activity protected by the THRA; 2) that the exercise of her protected rights was known to the defendant; 3) that the defendant thereafter took a materially adverse action against her; and 4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. If an employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the materially adverse action. If the defendant articulates such a reason, the employee, who bears the burden of persuasion throughout the process, must present evidence demonstrating that the articulated reason is pretextual. We conclude that the employee succeeded in making a prima facie showing with respect to the employer but has failed to present any evidence that the employer’s stated reason for transferring the employee was pretextual. Accordingly, the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the employee’s retaliation claim. Finally, we conclude that the employee has failed to present evidence demonstrating that the supervisor took an action materially adverse to the employee. Accordingly, the supervisor is entitled to summary judgment on the employee’s retaliation claim. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgments with respect to the discrimination claim against the supervisor and the retaliation claims against the employer and supervisor. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the discrimination claim against the employer and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Cases posted the week of 11/12/2007
Kristina Wait v. Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois - M2007-00099-SC-R3-WC View
Sumner County - This workers’ compensation action presents an issue of first impression in Tennessee. The plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits after a third party assaulted her while she was preparing lunch in her home where she had an employer-approved office. The chancery court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment holding that the plaintiff’s injuries did not arise out of or occur in the course of the plaintiff’s employment. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that: 1) the injuries arose out of her employment because her work arrangement placed her in a position that facilitated the assault, and 2) the injuries occurred in the course of her employment because she was engaged in a permissible incidental activity. We accepted review before the case was heard or considered by the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. Upon due consideration, we conclude that the plaintiff did suffer her injuries in the course of her employment. However, we affirm the chancery court’s holding that the plaintiff’s injuries did not arise out of her employment.
Cases posted the week of 11/05/2007
Dorothy Owens, as Conservator of Mary Francis King, et al. v. National Health Corporation, et al. - M2005-01272-SC-R11-CV View
Order Partially Granting Rehearing of Opinion- View
Rutherford County - In this appeal, the primary issue is whether a durable power of attorney for health care authorized the attorney-in-fact to enter into an arbitration agreement as part of a contract admitting the principal to a nursing home and thereby to waive the principal’s right to trial by jury. The case also presents secondary issues relating to the arbitration agreement, including whether this case is governed by the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act or the Federal Arbitration Act. We hold that the arbitration agreement is to be interpreted pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act and that the power of attorney authorized the attorney-in-fact to enter into the arbitration agreement on behalf of the principal. In addition, we reject the plaintiff’s arguments that: 1) the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because a material term of the agreement is incapable of performance; 2) the arbitration agreement violates federal law; and 3) pre-dispute arbitration agreements in nursing-home contracts violate public policy. However, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the question of whether the arbitration agreement is an unconscionable, and thus unenforceable, contract of adhesion.
Cases posted the week of 10/15/2007
Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Ronald Gifford - W2005-01381-SC-R11-CV View
Weakley County - This case comes before us on an appeal of the trial court’s finding that the injured party was not made whole by his recovery for injuries received in an automobile collision. We conclude that the trial court erred in its computation of the injured party’s total recovery by failing to consider the injured party’s recovery from all sources. We also conclude that the record is insufficient to determine whether the injured party has been made whole. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for the purpose of permitting both parties to present evidence. The injured party will have the burden of presenting evidence that sufficiently enables the trial court to make a reasonable assessment of the injured party’s damages. The trial court will determine the monetary value of the injured party’s recovery from all sources and the monetary value of all elements of the injured party’s damages. Finally, if the trial court finds that the injured party has been made whole, reimbursement should be awarded to the insurer only to the extent that the injured party’s total recovery exceeds the injured party’s total damages.
Cases posted the week of 10/08/2007
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez & Jonathan Londono - M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD View
This matter is before us upon remand by the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of that Court’s decision in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.__, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). In our initial disposition of this matter, State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005), we concluded that the Defendants were not entitled under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny to relief as to their sentences. Upon further review following Cunningham, we now conclude that the trial court’s enhancement of the Defendants’ sentences on the basis of judicially determined facts other than the Defendants’ prior convictions violated the Defendants’ constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In order to redress the unconstitutional enhancement of the Defendants’ sentences, we vacate their sentences and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing.
Cases posted the week of 10/01/2007
Lenore H. Gooden for herself, and as the natural
guardian and mother of Canyon Gooden and Dezert Gooden v. Coors Technical Ceramic Company - E2006-00836-SC-R3-WC View
Anderson County -
We accepted review in this workers’ compensation case to determine
whether an employee who was injured while voluntarily participating in a
recreational activity during a work break on the employer’s premises
was injured within the course of employment. The employer argues that recovery
for such an injury is barred by Young v. Taylor-White, LLC, 181 S.W.3d 324,
330 (Tenn. 2005), which held that the employee’s voluntary recreational
activities were not within the course of employment. We take this opportunity
to clarify that the voluntary nature of an activity, while important, is
but one factor to consider in determining whether an injury occurs in the
course of employment. We further conclude that the employee’s participation
in the recreational activity in this case was a regular incident of employment
because the employer knowingly permitted the activity to occur several times
a week. We therefore hold that the injury occurred in the course of employment.
Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand for a determination
of benefits.
Nora Elizabeth Kilby Moore v. Ronnie Dale Moore - E2005-02469-SC-R11-CV Corrected View
Bradley County - We granted permission to appeal to determine
whether income from a nonrecurring capital gain may be considered in determining
a parent’s gross income
for purposes of modifying child support. We hold that income from an isolated
or “one-time” capital gain must be included in calculating gross
income and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition to modify
child support. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand this case for calculation of child support pursuant to the Child
Support Guidelines.