The following Opinions are available for download:
Terrance Burnett v. State -
W2000-01954-SC-R11-PC View
Lauderdale
County - Terrance Burnett, appellant, pleaded guilty to two counts of
felony murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of
especially aggravated burglary. He received sentences of life without the
possibility of parole, twenty years, and eight years, respectively. One year
later, Burnett filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging several
constitutional violations that he claimed entitled him to relief from the above
judgments. After having appointed counsel, the trial court dismissed the
petition without having conducted an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the judgment. On appeal to this Court, Burnett contends that
the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary
hearing. For the reasons discussed herein, we are of the opinion that the trial
court acted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Post-Conviction
Procedure Act of 1995. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court and the
Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
State
v. Alan Adler - W2001-00178-SC-R11-CD View
Fayette County
- The appellant, Alan L. Adler, was indicted for aggravated child neglect of a
child under six years of age, a Class A felony. Following trial, a Fayette
County jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of reckless
endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. Subsequently, the appellant, pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101 (section 40-32-101), petitioned the
trial court to expunge all public records pertaining to his indictment,
prosecution, and trial for the aggravated child neglect charge. After the
appellant's petition was granted by the trial court, the State of Tennessee
appealed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) (Rule 3(c)) and
argued that Adler was not entitled to expungement under section 40-32-101
because he was convicted of a lesser-included offense. We granted this appeal
to determine if the State is authorized under Rule 3(c) to appeal a trial
court's expungement order. After examining the facts and the law pertinent to
this issue, we hold that the State is not permitted to appeal a trial court's
expungement order as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c). Nevertheless, treating the
State's appeal as a writ of certiorari, we also hold that the appellant was
entitled in this case to expungement of all public records pertaining to the
felony charge of which he was acquitted.
State v. Ernest Wilson - M2000-01997-SC-R11-CD
View
Davidson
County - This appeal arises from Ernest Edward Wilson's conviction for
second degree murder in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. At the close of
trial, the trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder, second
degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter; it did not instruct the jury on
reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. The jury convicted Wilson
of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and the trial court
imposed a sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On
direct appeal, Wilson challenged the trial court's failure to instruct on
lesser-included offenses. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in a split decision,
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We granted review and now conclude
that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide
and criminally negligent homicide. Further, we hold that this error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new trial in accordance
with this opinion.
Marco Butler v. State
- W2001-01376-SC-R11-PC View
Shelby County
- On November 19, 1999, the defendant, Marco D. Butler, pleaded guilty in the
Shelby County Criminal Court to first degree murder and especially aggravated
robbery in connection with the death of Charles Cantrell. On March 13, 2001,
the defendant filed a post-conviction petition which was dismissed by the trial
court as being time-barred by the statute of limitations. However, the
defendant claimed that he originally caused to be mailed, and therefore filed,
his post-conviction petition on October 9, 2000, though it was never received
by the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk's Office. The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the defendant's petition as
being untimely filed. We granted this appeal to determine if the Court of
Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of Butler's post-conviction
petition as time-barred. After examining the facts and the law relevant to this
issue, we hold that pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 § 2(G)
(Rule 28 § 2(G)), the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the defendant's alleged original post-conviction petition was
timely filed.
Steve Vinson v. United Parcel
Service - W2001-02180-WC-R3-CV View
Shelby County
- The dispositive issue in this workers' compensation action is whether the
Special Chancellor erred in finding the appellant, Steve Vinson, to be 100%
permanently partially disabled, as a result of a motor vehicle accident that
occurred in the scope of his employment. For the reasons set forth herein, we
conclude that no such impairment classification exists in the workers'
compensation statutes and cases of this state. After conducting our own de novo
review of the record, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence supports
the appellant's claim that he is 100% permanently and totally disabled and
entitled to full workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i). Additionally, pursuant to relevant
workers' compensation statutes, we hold that the trial court erred in allowing
appellees a credit for temporary total disability benefits that have heretofore
been paid to appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the chancery court is
affirmed, as modified herein, and the case remanded for enforcement of the
judgment of this Court.
James Jones v. Pierce
Garrett a/k/a Perry Garrett - E2000-00196-SC-R11-CV
View
Hamblen
County - This case arises from a proceeding to terminate parental
rights. In that proceeding, the prospective adoptive parents sought a
determination that the father of the child in their custody had abandoned him.
The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the termination. We granted permission to appeal to determine
whether the trial court erred in terminating parental rights on the basis of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-13-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) (1996 & Supp. 1999)
(failure to file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days after
notice of alleged paternity by the child's mother) when the father had been
adjudicated the legal parent of the child at the time of the hearing. We hold
that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) applies only to
cases in which no legal relationship between the parent and child has been
established.
Cases posted the week of
12/23/2002
Sharon Keisling v. Daniel
Keisling - M2002-01833-SC-R10-CV View
Wilson County
- This case is before the Court on an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 10
of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted permission to appeal
to determine whether the trial court erred in transferring child custody from
one parent to the other when no petition requesting a change of custody had
been filed at the time of the ruling. After carefully reviewing the record, we
conclude that the trial court erred in changing custody when the aggrieved
party was not provided with notice that custody would be addressed at the
hearing. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's award of custody and remand
this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases posted the week of
12/16/2002
John T. King v. Anne B.
Pope - M2000-02127-SC-R11-CV View
Davidson County -In
this case, we must decide whether a pay telephone sale-leaseback program
marketed and sold by the plaintiff constitutes an investment contract, and thus
a security under the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980. In finding that the
program was a security, the trial court applied the definition of "investment
contract" adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Brewer, 932
S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1996). Under this test,
an investment contract exists where (1) An offeree furnishes initial value to
an offeror, and (2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks
of the enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by
the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial
value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the
enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise
practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
Brewer, 932 S.W.2d at 11 (quoting State v. Hawaii Market, 485 P.2d 105, 109
(Haw. 1971)). The Court of Appeals rejected the Brewer test and instead adopted
the federal test for determining whether a particular transaction is an
investment contract. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Applying this test, the
Court of Appeals held that the pay telephone sale-leaseback program at issue in
this case is not a security. After careful consideration, we agree with the
trial court's finding that the appropriate test for determining the presence of
an investment contract is set forth in Brewer. Applying this test, we agree
with the trial court that the plaintiff's payphone sale-leaseback program is an
investment contract and that the plaintiff was thus marketing and selling
unregistered securities in violation of Tennessee law.
Joanne Carter v. First Source Furniture Group -
W2001-01849-SC-WCM-CV View
Lauderdale County
- In this workers' compensation case, we granted the defendant's motion for
review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e) primarily to
determine whether the trial court erred by finding that the two and one-half
times cap on the permanent partial disability award set forth in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply, where the plaintiff was fired
by the employer for gross misconduct prior to being treated for her injury. We
hold that an employer should be permitted to enforce workplace rules without
being penalized in a workers' compensation case. Thus, the trial court erred in
refusing to apply the two and one-half times cap found in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1). Furthermore, under our review, where expert
medical testimony is by deposition, we may draw our own conclusions about the
weight and credibility to be given to the medical testimony. Given the
disagreement between the evaluating and treating physicians over the surgical
procedure performed on the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that the physician
who actually performed the surgery was better situated to understand and rate
the resulting impairment. We adopt the medical impairment rating of the
treating physician, equating to 6% to the body as a whole and set the
plaintiff's permanent partial disability at 15% to the body as a whole.
Gloria B. Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons -
W2000-01580-SC-R11-CV View
Shelby County - We
granted review in this case to determine whether a landowner can bring a
nuisance action against an adjoining landowner when tree branches and roots
from the adjoining landowner's property encroach upon and damage the
neighboring landowner's property. The plaintiff asserts that encroaching
branches and roots from the defendant's trees constitute a nuisance for which
she is entitled to seek damages. The defendant responds that the plaintiff's
sole remedy is self-help and, therefore, the plaintiff may not recover for any
harm caused by the defendant's trees. The trial court and Court of Appeals
agreed with the defendant, and held that an adjoining landowner's only remedy
is self-help and that a nuisance action cannot be brought to recover for harm
caused by encroaching tree branches and roots. We have determined that
self-help is not the sole remedy of an adjoining landowner and that a nuisance
action may be brought when tree branches and roots from the adjacent property
encroach upon and damage the neighboring landowner's property. Although
encroaching trees and plants are not nuisances merely because they cast shade,
drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or just because they encroach upon adjoining
property either above or below the ground, they may be regarded as a nuisance
when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual harm to
adjoining property. If so, the owner of the tree or plant may be held
responsible for harm caused by it and may also be required to cut back the
encroaching branches or roots, assuming the encroaching vegetation constitutes
a nuisance. We do not, however, alter existing Tennessee law that the adjoining
landowner may, at his own expense, cut away the encroaching vegetation to the
property line whether or not the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance
or is otherwise causing harm or potential harm to the adjoining property. We
further find that the record in this case is sufficient to establish liability
for nuisance. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the
trial court's dismissal of the case is reversed. The case is remanded to the
trial court for a determination of damages and other appropriate relief.
Cases posted the week of
12/02/2002
Susan Godfrey v. Jesus
Ruiz - M2000-00101-SC-R11-CV View
Davidson
County - This case arises out of an action by the plaintiffs to
recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The
plaintiffs claim their injuries were caused by the negligent operation of a van
owned by the defendants and driven by a cousin of one of the defendants. In
support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants offered affidavits
and deposition testimony stating that the driver was operating the van without
their permission and that the driver was not their employee. Despite the prima
facie evidence of an owner-driver agency relationship created by Tennessee Code
Annotated section 55-10-311(a) (1998), the trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. We
hold that an owner's offer of testimony negating the issue of agency, standing
alone, cannot overcome the prima facie evidence created by Tennessee Code
Annotated section 55-10-311(a).
Cases posted the week of
11/25/2002
State v. Paul
Dennis Reid - M1999-00803-SC-DDT-DD View
State
v. Paul Dennis Reid - M1999-00803-SC-DDT-DD (Concur/Dissent)
View
State v. Paul Dennis Reid - M1999-00803-SC-DDT-DD
(Appendix) View
Davidson
County - In this capital case, the defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr.,
was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of especially
aggravated robbery for killing two Captain D's employees and robbing one of the
employees. As to each conviction of first degree murder, the jury found in the
sentencing hearing that the State had proven three aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt – (1) that the defendant was previously
convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory
elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; (2) that the
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3)
that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the
defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or
attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in
committing or attempting to commit robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-13-204(i)(2), (6), and (7) (1997). Finding that these aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death on each murder conviction. The
trial court subsequently imposed a twenty-five-year sentence for the especially
aggravated robbery conviction and ordered this sentence to be served
consecutively to the two death sentences. On direct appeal to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, the defendant mounted numerous challenges to both his
convictions and sentences. After fully considering the defendant's claims, the
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. Thereafter, the
case was docketed in this Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1)
(1997). After carefully and fully reviewing the record and the relevant
authority, the defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.
Thomas Eugene Graham v. State -
E2000-03168-SC-R11-PC View
Hamilton
County - We granted this appeal to determine whether the petitioner
timely filed an application for permission to appeal. The trial court had
denied his motion to reopen his previous petition for post-conviction relief in
accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217(c). The Court of Criminal
Appeals ruled that the appeal was untimely because it was not filed within ten
days of the date on which the trial court signed the order denying the motion
to reopen. After reviewing the record, we hold that the appeal was timely
because it was filed within ten days of the date the trial court's order
denying the motion to reopen was filed with the clerk and that the petitioner
substantially complied with the procedural requirements of Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-30-217(c). We further conclude, however, that the allegations in the
petition itself are without merit; therefore, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
Linda Poper, by
Husband and Conservator, Thomas C. Poper v. Joseph Rollins -
W2000-00391-SC-R11-CV View
Shelby County -
We granted this appeal to determine whether the doctrine of comparative fault
affects the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(d). The statute
establishes that the limit of liability for an insurer providing uninsured
motorist coverage is the amount of the insurance policy coverage less the sum
of the limits collectible under all other liability and primary uninsured
motorist insurance policies, bonds, and securities. The trial court found that
the statute operates as a liability "cap" for uninsured motorist insurance
coverage by offsetting the amounts of all other liability insurance limits
collected with respect to the injury or death and that the doctrine of
comparative fault does not affect the application of the statute. The Court of
Appeals affirmed this finding, holding that the statute clearly limits the
liability for uninsured motorist coverage by allowing the offsets described by
the trial court. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we hold
that Tenn. Code. Ann. § 56-7-1201(d) unambiguously allows an uninsured
motorist insurance carrier to limit its liability by offsetting all other
insurance payments, bonds, and securities applicable to the injury or death in
question and that Tennessee's comparative fault doctrine does not affect the
application of the statute. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment.
Cases posted the week of
11/18/2002
State v. Keith Goodman
- M2001-00036-SC-R11-CD View
Anderson County - The
threshold issue presented in this appeal is whether the Court of Criminal
Appeals erred in holding that the defendant's motion to dismiss was not capable
of pretrial determination under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)
because it requires a determination of the general issue of the defendant's
guilt or innocence. In our view, the defendant's motion presents a legal
question – the proper interpretation of a statute – and does not
require a determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Having decided
the threshold issue, we also are of the opinion that the trial court correctly
interpreted the statute when it held that a parent is not subject to
prosecution for especially aggravated kidnapping under Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-13-305(a)(2) when the indictment fails to allege that the minor
child was removed or confined by force, threat, or fraud. Therefore, the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the
trial court granting the defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss count one of
the indictment is reinstated.
John Houghton
v. Aramark Educational Resources - M2002-00289-SC-R23-CQ
View
U.S. District
Court - Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, we accepted
certification of a question of law from the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee concerning regulations issued by the Tennessee
Department of Human Services. The certified question from the district court
asks us to determine whether the rationale of statutorily imposed vicarious
liability under Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799 (Tenn.
2000), applies to rules governing licensing and operation of day care centers
in Tennessee. For the reasons given herein, we answer that our holding in
Gleaves is distinguishable from the present case, and the Tennessee regulations
governing day care centers do not, absent fault on the part of the licensee,
provide for vicarious liability for the injurious acts of an employee occurring
outside the scope of employment.
Cases posted the week of
10/28/2002
In Re Ronald Lebron Akins,
Sr. - M2002-00337-SC-R23-CQ View
U.S. Bankruptcy
Court - Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this
Court accepted certification of the following questions from the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern Division: (1)
Whether the following acknowledgment on a deed of trust is valid under
Tennessee law: State of Tennessee County of Bradley
I, Tammy
Bentley, a Notary Public of the county and state first above written, do hereby
certify that Ronald L. Akins, unmarried, personally appeared before me this day
and acknowledged the execution of the foregoing instrument. Witness my hand and
official seal, this 12th day of April, 2000.
Tammy Bentley Notary Public My
commission expires: 2/26/2003
(2) If the foregoing certificate of
acknowledgment is not valid, then whether the admittedly valid acknowledgment
on the assignment of rents cures the defective acknowledgment on the deed of
trust under the circumstances of this case. We hold that the deed of trust in
this case was properly acknowledged under Tennessee law and is not voidable by
a judicial lien creditor or a bona fide purchaser for value.
Timothy Kendrick v. Judy Shoemake -
E2000-01318-SC-R11-CV View
Timothy Kendrick v. Judy Shoemake -
E2000-01318-SC-R11-CV (Concur) View
Hamilton
County - We granted this appeal to determine the proper standard to
apply to a petition to modify custody when both parents are parties. We hold
that a trial court may modify an award of child custody when both a material
change of circumstances has occurred and a change of custody is in the child's
best interests. We hold that the preponderance of the evidence does not support
the trial court's ruling that a material change of circumstances has occurred.
We therefore do not address the second inquiry–whether a change of custody
is in the child's best interests. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed, as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Hubert Patty v. Board of Professional Responsibility
- E2002-00499-SC-R3-CV View
Blount County -
This is a direct appeal in a Board of Professional Responsibility case. A
hearing committee found that the petitioner violated four disciplinary rules
arising out of client representation, imposed a one-year suspension from the
practice of law, and ordered the petitioner to complete courses in ethics and
civil procedure at an accredited law school before applying for reinstatement.
The chancery court upheld the hearing committee's findings and conclusions with
respect to the violations, but reduced the suspension to 60 days and vacated
the requirement for law school education. After our review of the record and
applicable authority, we conclude that the chancery court properly affirmed the
hearing committee's findings with regard to the petitioner's violations of the
disciplinary rules, but we modify the length of the suspension to four months
and the condition for reinstatement by requiring the petitioner to complete six
hours of continuing legal education in ethics and twelve hours of continuing
legal education in courses related to civil trial practice or civil litigation,
in addition to the three hours of ethics and twelve hours of general credit
required annually of attorneys in this State. The judgment is, therefore,
affirmed as modified.
J.Y. Sepulveda v.
State - E1999-02766-SC-R11-PC View
Jefferson
County - In this post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner alleges
that his pre-trial counsel failed to accompany him while he gave statements to
the police and that trial counsel failed to offer the testimony of an expert
pathologist. These failures, the petitioner asserts, deprived him of the
constitutionally-grounded right to the effective assistance of counsel. Our
review is guided by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Strickland v.
Washington, which requires petitioners alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel to prove that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness" and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient
representation. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). We readily conclude that
pre-trial counsel's representation fell below reasonable standards. Because we
hold, however, that the petitioner has failed to prove he was prejudiced by the
deficient pre-trial representation, the petitioner is not entitled to the
relief sought. As far as trial counsel's failure to offer the testimony of an
expert pathologist is concerned, we hold that the petitioner failed to
sufficiently articulate this claim in his post-conviction petition. Thus, the
trial court properly refused to hear evidence concerning that claim. It results
that the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.
State v. Linnell Richmond - E2000-01545-SC-R11-CD
View
Knox
County - Following a jury trial, the defendant, Linnell Richmond, was
found guilty by a Knox County jury of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated
robbery and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial
court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years for
his convictions, to be served consecutively to a federal sentence arising out
of the same criminal episode. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the
judgment of the trial court upon finding that the trial court erred in failing
to instruct the jury on: (1) the "natural and probable consequence rule" in
relation to the charges of attempted first degree murder; and (2) robbery as a
lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a
lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. The State appealed to
this Court, and we granted the application. We hold that: (1) it was harmless
error by the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the natural and
probable consequences rule in relation to the charge of attempted first degree
murder; and (2) it was likewise harmless error by the trial court in failing to
instruct the jury regarding robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated
robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted
aggravated robbery. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed, and the defendant's convictions are reinstated. This case is remanded
to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment.
State v. Takeita M. Locke - E2000-00923-SC-R11-CD
View
Knox County
- The defendant, Takeita M. Locke, was tried and convicted in the Knox County
Criminal Court of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in the death
of Chuck Newman. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed both
convictions. We granted this appeal to determine if the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included
offenses of felony murder, namely: second degree murder, reckless homicide, and
criminally negligent homicide. Additionally, with respect to her conviction for
especially aggravated robbery, the defendant maintains that the trial court
committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the
lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (especially aggravated
robbery), aggravated robbery, and robbery. After examining the facts and the
law relevant to these issues, we hold that the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder,
reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide was reversible error. We
also hold that the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser-included
offenses of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery,
and robbery was erroneous, but such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Cases posted the week of
10/21/2002
Pero's Steak House v.
Elizabeth Lee & 1st American Bank & 1st Tennessee Bank -
E2001-00254-SC-R11-CV View
Knox County -
The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erred in refusing to apply the discovery rule to the three-year statute of
limitations for conversion of negotiable instruments and in granting the
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment as to checks allegedly
converted more than three years before the plaintiffs filed suit on August 29
and 30, 1996. After fully and carefully considering the record and the relevant
authorities, we conclude that the discovery rule does not apply to toll the
statute of limitations when the claim alleged is conversion of a negotiable
instrument. This conclusion applies both to the former statute of limitations,
Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-105, and the current statute of
limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-3-118(g). Therefore, in the
absence of fraudulent concealment, a cause of action for conversion of a
negotiable instrument accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run,
when the instrument is negotiated. With respect to the plaintiffs' claim that
the defendant is guilty of fraudulent concealment, we are of the opinion that
the record contains no genuine issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendant is affirmed on the
separate grounds stated herein.
Jackie Martin
v. Lear Corporation - E2001-01002-SC-WCM-CV View
Hamblen County
- In this workers' compensation case, we are called upon to determine whether
the trial court may admit a form C-32 medical report obtained by the plaintiff
from the defendant's "consulting expert," a physician who made a physical
examination of the plaintiff. The defendant claims that the physician it hired
to make an independent medical examination of the plaintiff is protected from
compelled testimony under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02(4)(B).
However, the Tennessee's Workers' Compensation Law, specifically Tennessee Code
Annotated sections 50-6-204(f) and 50-6-235(c), clearly permits the admission
of testimony, including a medical report form, of an examining physician paid
for by the employer in a workers' compensation case. Therefore, we hold that,
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-204(f) and 50-6-235(c), the
trial court did not err by admitting the physician's medical report.
State v. Christopher Flake - W2000-01131-SC-R11-CD
(Rehear petitiion) View
The appellee, Christopher M.
Flake, by and through counsel, has filed a petition to rehear the opinion of
this Court filed August 29, 2002. As grounds for rehearing the petition asserts
that the Opinion did not address another issue raised in Flake's brief,
specifically, that the trial court erred in denying Flake's motion to suppress
because Flake was not mentally capable of knowingly and intelligently
consenting to a search or waiving his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Cases posted the week of
10/07/2002
Larry Seal v. Charles Blalock
& Sons - E2001-00050-SC-WCM-CV View
Hancock County -
In this workers' compensation case, we are asked to determine whether the trial
court erred in awarding benefits for a 93% vocational disability to the body as
a whole. The employer contends that compensation should be limited to an award
for loss of a scheduled member. After reviewing the record and applicable
authority, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial
court's award of benefits for disability to the body as a whole; accordingly,
we modify the judgment of the trial court to provide for an award of 100%
disability to the leg. Additionally, we find no error in the trial court's
admission of the physical therapist's testimony.
Tennessee Small School Systems v. Ned Ray
McWherter - M2001-01957-SC-R3-CV View
Davidson
County - This is the third appeal to this Court of the plaintiffs'
suit challenging the constitutionality of the manner in which the State funds
public education. In the first appeal, we held that the State was required by
the Tennessee Constitution to maintain and support a system of public schools
that affords substantially equal educational opportunities to all students, and
we found that the State's school funding scheme unconstitutionally denied equal
educational opportunities to all students. Tennessee Small School Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993) ("Small Schools I"). In the second
appeal, we conditionally upheld a new funding plan allocating funds to school
systems according to a formula based on the cost of forty-three components
necessary for a basic education, known as the Basic Education Program ("BEP"),
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-3-351 to -360. Tennessee Small School Sys. v.
McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn. 1995) ("Small Schools II"). We found, however,
that the omission of a requirement for equalizing teachers' salaries was a
significant defect in the Basic Education Program ("BEP"), which put the entire
plan at risk both functionally and legally, and we concluded that "the plan
must include equalization of teachers' salaries according to the BEP formula"
in order for the plan to be constitutional. Id. at 738. In this third appeal,
the question is whether the State's current method of funding salaries for
teachers – the salary equity plan found in Tennessee Code Annotated §
49-3-366 – equalizes teachers' salaries "according to the BEP formula" or
whether it fails to do so and violates equal protection by denying students
substantially equal educational opportunities. The trial court dismissed the
case after finding that the State had met its constitutional obligation to
equalize teachers' salaries under Small Schools II. The plaintiffs then filed a
motion asking this Court to assume jurisdiction of the appeal, see Tenn. Code
Ann. § 16-3-201 (Supp. 2001), asserting that the State failed to comply
with this Court's directive in Small Schools II to equalize teachers' salaries
according to the BEP formula for funding public education. We granted the
motion. After careful consideration of the record and applicable authorities,
we find that the salary equity plan embodied in Tennessee Code Annotated §
49-3-366 does not equalize teachers' salaries according to the BEP formula and
contains no mechanism for cost determination or annual cost review of teachers'
salaries, unlike the BEP conditionally approved in Small Schools II. We further
find that no rational basis exists for structuring a basic education program
consisting entirely of cost-driven components while omitting the cost of hiring
teachers, the most important component of any education plan and a major part
of every education budget. Therefore, the lack of teacher salary equalization
in accordance with the BEP formula continues to be a significant constitutional
defect in the current funding scheme. Accordingly, we hold that the salary
equity plan fails to comply with the State's constitutional obligation to
formulate and maintain a system of public education that affords a
substantially equal educational opportunity to all students. The trial court's
judgment dismissing the case is reversed and the case is remanded.
Harold Wayne Nichols v. State -
E1998-00562-SC-R11-PD View
Harold Wayne Nichols
v. State - E1998-00562-SC-R11-PD (Concur/Dissent) View
Hamilton
County - The petitioner, Harold Wayne Nichols, filed post-conviction
petitions seeking relief from his conviction for felony murder, his sentence of
death, and his numerous convictions for aggravated rape, first degree burglary,
and larceny upon the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as
other legal grounds. After conducting several evidentiary hearings, the trial
court denied relief as to the felony murder conviction and sentence of death,
but granted partial relief by ordering new sentencing hearings as to the
remaining convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial
court erred by allowing the petitioner to assert his right against
self-incrimination during the post-conviction proceedings, yet upheld the trial
court's judgment in all other respects. After reviewing the record and
applicable authority, we conclude: (1) that the petitioner was not denied his
right to the effective assistance of counsel based on the failure to
investigate and challenge his confessions as false; (2) that the petitioner was
not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel based on the
failure to challenge the legality of his arrest; (3) that the petitioner was
not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing
phase of his capital trial based on the failure to present additional
mitigating evidence; (4) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the
effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial
based on the failure to object to misconduct by the prosecution; (5) that the
petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at
the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to request
mitigating instructions; (6) that the petitioner was not denied his right to
the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital
trial based on the failure to raise issues regarding the constitutionality of
capital punishment; (7) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the
effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial
based on the failure to object to the discovery of notes prepared by a defense
psychologist on self-incrimination grounds; (8) that the Court of Criminal
Appeals did not err in refusing to remand the case for additional DNA testing;
(9) that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by addressing the issue of whether
the petitioner had a right against self-incrimination in this post-conviction
proceeding but the error had no effect on the outcome; and (10) that the trial
court's findings were not clearly erroneous and cumulative error did not
require the reversal of the petitioner's convictions. Accordingly, we affirm
the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment.