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This Page Last Updated: May 01, 2008 at 10:02.31 hours
The following Opinions are available for viewing or download in PDF format:
Cases posted the week of 9/22/2008
Dennis Pylant v. State of Tennessee - M2005-02721-SC-R11-PC View
Cheatham County - We accepted this appeal to determine whether the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner Dennis Pylant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In 2001, a jury convicted Petitioner of the first degree felony murder of two-year-old S.J.D. in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and this Court denied Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. At the hearing, Petitioner adduced testimony about self-incriminating statements made by the victim’s mother but which trial counsel did not present to the jury at trial. The post-conviction court struck this testimony as hearsay and denied Petitioner’s claim for relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court. We hold that the post-conviction court erred in striking the proffered testimony as hearsay. We also hold that, because the post-conviction court made no credibility findings with respect to the proffered witnesses, we are unable to reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment in this case and remand for a new post-conviction hearing.
State of Tennessee vs. Tyson Lee Day - M2006-00989-SC-R11-CD View
Separate Dissenting Opinion - View
Sumner County - After unsuccessfully moving to suppress evidence resulting from the traffic stop that led to his arrest, the defendant, Tyson Lee Day, pleaded guilty to third offense driving under the influence and driving on a revoked license. The plea agreement provided for reservation of a certified question of law regarding whether the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that at the time the officer initiated the traffic stop, he lacked reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and, because the question was dispositive, dismissed the case. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider the question of whether the community caretaking rationale for traffic stops justified the stop in this case. After carefully examining the certified question, however, we conclude that the community caretaking issue was not included within the scope of the question reserved for review. Accordingly, our review extends solely to the issue preserved, i.e., whether the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed. We conclude that the facts do not support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Cases posted the week of 9/15/2008
Michael Dwayne Edwards v. State of Tennessee, Wayne Brandon, Warden -
M2006-01043-SC-R11-HC View
Separate, Dissenting Opinion - View
Hickman County - We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in remanding this habeas corpus case to the trial court for a hearing on Michael Dwayne Edward’s claim that his sentence is illegal. After careful consideration we conclude that, even assuming the trial court erroneously classified Edwards as a persistent offender for sentencing, this non-jurisdictional error renders the judgment voidable, not void, and does not entitle Edwards to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the habeas corpus petition.
Cases posted the week of 9/8/2008
Diane Downs, individually and as natural
parent of Ryan Cody Downs v. Mark Bush, et al - M2005-01498-SC-R11-CV View
Separate Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion - View
Davidson County - We granted the plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal
in this wrongful death case to determine whether the trial court
properly granted summary judgment to each of the defendants. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Although
the parties have raised several issues in this appeal, the central
issue is the nature of the legal duty, if any, owed by the defendants
to the plaintiff’s decedent. The decedent was socializing and
consuming alcohol with the defendants. While riding in a four-door
pick-up truck with the defendants, he became ill. The defendants
stopped the truck on the side of an interstate highway so the decedent
could vomit. After resuming the trip, the decedent rode in the bed
of the truck and, for reasons unknown, exited it. After exiting the
truck, he was struck by two vehicles and subsequently died. Upon
careful review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude
that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
defendants placed the decedent in the bed of the truck. Similarly,
we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the decedent was helpless and whether the defendants took
charge of him. Lastly, we hold that none of the defendants stood
in any special relationship with the plaintiff’s decedent and
consequently they did not assume any affirmative duty to aid or protect
him. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Colonial Pipeline Company v. John G. Morgan, TN Comptroller and
TN State Board of Equalization, Members of the TN State Board of Equalization,
Individually, as follows: Governor Phil Bredesen, Riley Darnell, Secretary
of State, Dale Sims, State Treasurer -
M2006-00591-SC-R11-CV View
Davidson County - Colonial Pipeline Company filed
suit for declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality
of specified portions of the state tax code and seeking an injunction
as to the enforcement of those provisions. The Chancery Court
dismissed the action, holding that the company had failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded. We granted an application for permission to appeal and,
after consideration of the issues, hold that (1) a party making
a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of a statute
need not exhaust its administrative remedies, and that (2) the
doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for declaratory
judgment asking state officers to be enjoined from enforcing such
a statute so long as the action does not seek money damages. We,
therefore, affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Doug Satterfield, as personal representative of the Estate
of Amanda Nicole Satterfield, Deceased, vs. Breeding Insulation Company,
Inc. and Alcoa, Inc., f/k.a Aluninum Company of America -
E2006-00903-SC-R11-CV View
Separate Dissenting Opinion - View
Blount County - This appeal involves the efforts
of the estate of a twenty-five-year-old woman who contracted mesothelioma
to recover damages for her death. While she was alive, the woman
filed a negligence action against her father’s employer,
alleging that the employer had negligently permitted her father
to wear his asbestos-contaminated work clothes home from work,
thereby regularly and repeatedly exposing her to asbestos fibers
over an extended period of time. After the woman died, the Circuit
Court for Blount County permitted her father to be substituted
as the personal representative of her estate. The employer moved
for a judgment on the pleadings on the narrow ground that it owed
no duty to its employee’s daughter. The trial court granted
the motion. The deceased woman’s father appealed the dismissal
of his daughter’s wrongful death claim. The Tennessee Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation
Co., No. E2006-00903-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1159416 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 19, 2007). We granted the employer’s application for
permission to appeal to determine whether the deceased woman’s
complaint can withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
We have determined that it does because, under the facts alleged
in the complaint, the employer owed a duty to those who regularly
and for extended periods of time came into close contact with
the asbestos-contaminated work clothes of its employees to prevent
them from being exposed to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk
of harm.
Cases posted the week of 9/1/2008
State of Tennessee vs. Randy Lee Meeks and Ernest Lonnie Snyder,
Jr. -
M2006-01385-SC-R11-CO View
Coffee County - This appeal involves the warrantless
search of a motel room containing an actively operating methamphetamine
laboratory. After the occupants of the room were indicted for
manufacturing methamphetamine and for possessing methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia, they filed a motion in the Circuit Court
for Coffee County seeking to suppress the evidence found in the
motel room. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and
dismissed the indictment. The State appealed, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to
suppress the evidence and vacated the order dismissing the indictment.
State v. Meeks, No. M2006-01385-CCA-R3-CO, 2007 WL 1987797 (Tenn.
Crim. App. July 10, 2007). We granted the defendants’ Tenn.
R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to address
more fully the principles applicable to warrantless searches of
actively operating methamphetamine laboratories when the State
asserts that the officers were acting to avert a serious and immediate
risk of injury to themselves or others. Like the Court of Criminal
Appeals, we have determined that the trial court erred by granting
the motion to suppress and by dismissing the indictment.
Cases posted the week of 8/25/2008
State of Tennessee vs. Marco M. Northern - M2005-02336-SC-R11-CD View
Separate Dissenting Opinion - View
Davidson County - We granted this appeal to consider
whether the courts below correctly held that Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600 (2004), does not bar the introduction into evidence
of the defendant’s Mirandized videotaped confession which
occurred after the defendant made an incriminating admission during
a prior unwarned custodial interrogation. This Court has not previously
interpreted and applied Seibert. After carefully considering the
plurality opinion, the concurring opinions, and the dissenting opinions
in Seibert, we conclude that the courts below correctly held that
Seibert does not bar admission of the defendant’s videotaped
confession. We further hold that this Court’s decision in
State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1992), interpreting the right
against self-incrimination provided by article I, section 9 of the
Tennessee Constitution, does not bar admission of the defendant’s
videotaped confession. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the defendant’s
conviction of second degree murder but remanded for resentencing.
Cases posted the week of 8/11/2008
State of Tennesee v. Ariel Ben Sherman and Jacqueline P. Crank -
E2006-01226-SC-R11-CD View
Loudon County - A Loudon County grand jury indicted
the defendant, Ariel Ben Sherman, and co-defendant, Jacqueline
Crank, for child neglect. The trial court dismissed the indictment
against Sherman. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded.
We granted Sherman’s application for permission to appeal
to consider the issues presented for review, and hold as follows:
(1) When deciding a motion to dismiss an indictment, a trial court
may consider undisputed facts that are clearly and unequivocally
agreed upon by the parties; (2) a person standing in loco parentis
to a child may have a legal duty of care, the breach of which
may result in criminal culpability; and (3) the State is not bound
at the outset of a trial by the legal theories espoused in its
bill of particulars. Because the trial court erroneously dismissed
the indictment, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstate
the indictment against Sherman, and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
State of Tennessee vs. Robert T. Downey - M2005-02335-SC-R11-CD View
Montgomery County - The defendant in this case was
convicted of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, especially
aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and reckless endangerment.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions but remanded
for re-sentencing. We granted the defendant’s application for
permission to appeal to consider the following issues: 1) whether
the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress
his written statement; 2) whether the trial court erred by overruling
defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment when the State
violated rules of discovery; 3) whether the State failed to prove
the use of a deadly weapon; 4) whether there was sufficient evidence
of conspiracy to use a deadly weapon; and 5) whether the verdict was
contrary to the weight of the evidence. Neither party appealed the
Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision to remand for re-sentencing.
After considering these issues, we conclude that the trial court properly
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and motion to dismiss.
We also hold that there was sufficient evidence to support all of
the convictions. We therefore affirm the defendant’s convictions,
while remanding to the trial court for re-sentencing under the Court
of Criminal Appeals’ order.
Willis B. Amos, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville
and Davidson County -
M2005-00932-SC-R11-CV View
Davidson County - Willis Bruce Amos and fifteen
other individuals, each of whom was formerly employed in the police
or fire departments of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville
and Davidson County, filed suit, asking to have the lump-sum payments
for unused vacation days paid at their retirement included in
the formula determining the amount of their pension. Pursuant
to applicable provisions of the Metro Code, the trial court granted
a motion for summary judgment, holding that the lump-sum payments
to Amos and the other individuals were not included in their “average
earnings” for purposes of the calculations. The Court of
Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court. We affirm.
Marc Eskin and Karen Eskin, each individually & as parents & next
friends to Brendan Eskin and Logan Eskin v. Alice B. Bartee, et al -
W2006-01336-SC-R11-CV View
Shelby County - This appeal involves claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress made by two family members of a child
who was seriously injured in an automobile accident. In their complaint
filed in the Circuit Court for Shelby County, the injured child’s
mother and brother alleged that they had sustained severe emotional
injuries after they observed him lying on the pavement in a pool of
blood. The injured child’s parents served a copy of the complaint
on their automobile insurance company because the driver of the automobile
that struck their son lacked adequate insurance. The insurance company
moved for a partial summary judgment on the negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim because neither the injured child’s
mother nor his brother had seen or heard the injury-producing accident.
The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion, and
the injured child’s mother and brother appealed to the Tennessee
Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment
and remanded the case for further proceedings. We granted the insurance
company’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to
appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly permitted
these negligent infliction of emotional distress claims to proceed.
We have determined that persons who observe an injured family member
shortly after an injury-producing accident may pursue a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Tammy Renee Maggart v. Almany Realtors - M2005-02532-SC-R11-CV View
Sumner County - In this personal injury case, the plaintiff
was an employee of the defendant and was injured on the job. The trial
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment concluding
that the plaintiff had executed a general release of liability in favor
of the defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the release
was invalid as against public policy. Upon thorough consideration of
the record and of the applicable law, we hold that summary judgment
was inappropriate because the release of liability only covered accidents
occurring while the plaintiff was running errands off-premises and did
not cover the particular accident at issue in this case. Therefore,
we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision denying summary judgment,
on alternate grounds, and remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Billy Anderson v. Westfield Group - M2006-01571-SC-WCM-WC View
This workers’ compensation appeal involves an employer’s liability
for medical benefits stemming from injuries that occurred subsequent to
an original compensable injury. Following a 2001work-related injury to
his elbow, the employee and his employer settled the employee’s
claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The settlement obligated
the employer to pay future medical bills resulting from the elbow injury.
Shortly after undergoing corrective surgery on the injured elbow in 2004,
the employee burned his hand while cooking at home. While recuperating
from the burn to his hand, he suffered additional injuries to his hand
in a fall near his sister’s home. The employee filed a petition
seeking to recover medical expenses for these two injuries to his hand
on the basis that the medical expenses associated with these injuries
were the direct and natural consequence of the original work-related injury
to his elbow. The trial court found that the medical expenses sought by
the employee were the result of intervening causes, namely the employee’s
own negligence, and denied the petition. The Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel reversed, finding that the subsequent injuries were the
direct and natural consequence of the original compensable injury and
that there were no intervening causes. Upon review of the record and applicable
law, we hold that the injuries to the employee’s hand were due to
his own negligence, and therefore, the employer is not required to pay
the medical bills associated with those injuries. Accordingly, we reverse
the Panel’s decision and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Cases posted the week of 7/7/2008
Jeremy Flax and Rachel Sparkman, as the Natural Parents of Joshua
Flax, deceased; Rachel Sparkman, Individually v. DaimlyerChrysler Corporation;
and Louis A. Stockell, Jr.
- M2005-01768-SC-R11-CV View
Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (Justice Clark) - View
Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (Justice Koch)
- View
Separate Concurring Opinion (Justice Wade) - View
Davidson County - The plaintiffs filed this products
liability case against DaimlerChrysler seeking damages for the wrongful
death of their son and for emotional distress suffered by the mother.
The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages. We granted review to determine:
1) whether a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought
simultaneously with a wrongful death claim is a “stand-alone” claim
that requires expert medical or scientific proof of a severe emotional
injury; 2) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support
an award of punitive damages; 3) whether the punitive damages awarded
by the trial court were excessive; and 4) whether the trial court erred
by recognizing the plaintiffs’ second failure to warn claim. We
hold that the simultaneous filing of a wrongful death suit does not prevent
a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim from being a “stand-alone” claim.
Therefore, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims brought under
these circumstances must be supported by expert medical or scientific
proof of a severe emotional injury. In addition, we conclude that the
punitive damages awarded by the trial court were adequately supported
by the evidence and were not excessive. Finally, we hold that the trial
court erred by recognizing the plaintiffs’ second failure to warn
claim but conclude that the error did not prejudice the judicial process
or more probably than not affect the jury’s verdict. Accordingly,
we affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the compensatory and
punitive damage awards based on the negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim and reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn
the punitive damage award related to the plaintiffs’ wrongful death
claim.
Dennis J. Hughes v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee -
M2007-01562-SC-R3-BP View
Separate Concurring/Dissenting Opinion - View
Davidson County - This is a direct appeal from a judgment
of the trial court, which set aside a decision by a hearing panel designated
by the Board of Professional Responsibility granting a disbarred attorney’s
petition for reinstatement of his law license. The issue presented is
whether the attorney, who was convicted of bribing a witness and conspiracy
to bribe a witness in a criminal trial, has met the criteria for immediate
reinstatement to the practice of law. Although the panel properly determined
that the evidence clearly and convincingly proved the moral qualifications
of the attorney and his knowledge of state law, we hold that the evidence
failed to so meet the threshold as to the third requirement–that
reinstatement would not be detrimental to the standing of the bar, the
administration of justice, and the interest of the public. The judgment
of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed.