This Page Last Updated: May 01, 2008 at 10:02.31 hours
The following Opinions are available for download:
Cases posted the week of 09/03/2007
Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company
v. Linda E. Rose, et al. - E2005-00006-SC-R11-CV View
Morgan County - We granted permission to appeal in this
case to determine whether the decedent’s
durable power of attorney authorized her attorney-in-fact to change the beneficiary
of the decedent’s life insurance policy. For the reasons stated below,
we conclude that the durable power of attorney authorized the attorney-in-fact
to change the beneficiary of the policy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments
of the lower courts; however, because our holding does not resolve all of
the issues raised in the pleadings, we remand this case to the trial court
for further proceedings.
Cases posted the week of 08/27/2007
Jerry T. Troup, Jr. v. Fischer Steel Corporation -
W2005-00913-SC-R11-CV View
Shelby County - The plaintiff in this case suffered
an on-the-job injury and filed a tort claim against the third-party
defendant. We granted review to determine whether the third-party
defendant is entitled to argue the comparative fault of a principal
contractor who is an employer for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation
Law. We conclude that the third-party defendant may not argue the
comparative fault of a principal contractor even if the principal
contractor does not have a subrogation interest in the plaintiff’s
recovery. The third-party defendant may, however, argue that the
principal contractor was the sole cause in fact of the plaintiff’s
injuries. We also conclude that the jury instruction provided by
the trial court accurately and adequately explained the jury’s
ability to consider whether the actions of the principal contractor
were the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s
injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration
of the issues pretermitted by its opinion.
William W. Brown, Jr., individually,
and as surviving spouse of Shirley Brown, deceased v. Erachem Comilog,
Inc. - M2005-01825-SC-WCM-CV View
Humphreys County - We granted review to determine
when the statute of limitations begins to run in a workers’ compensation
case in which the employee suffers from an occupational disease.
The trial court dismissed Employee’s suit as untimely, reasoning
that the statute of limitations began to run when Employee gave
notice to Employer that she had an occupational disease. The Special
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the trial court’s
judgment, relying upon Bone v. Saturn Corp., 148 S.W.3d 69 (Tenn.
2004), overruled by Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Britt, 211 S.W.3d
706 (Tenn. 2007), a gradually occurring injury case. We conclude
that the Panel erred in relying upon Bone in affirming the trial
court’s finding of untimeliness. Claims involving occupational
diseases are governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-306(a)
(2005). This statute provides that the statute of limitations in
an occupational disease case begins to run when an employee knows
or should know that she has an occupational disease and that it
has injuriously affected her capacity to work to a degree amounting
to a compensable injury. Because Employee filed suit within one
year of becoming incapacitated from working, we hold that her claim
for benefits was timely. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
judgment.
Cases posted the week of 08/20/2007
State of Tennessee vs. Henry A.
Edmondson, Jr. - M2005-01665-SC-R11-CD View
Davidson County - We granted the Defendant Henry
A. Edmondson, Jr.’s request for permission to appeal to
address an issue of first impression regarding the meaning of
the word “possession” as it is used in the carjacking
statute. The Defendant accosted the victim in a retail parking
lot when she was several yards away from her parked car. He demanded
her keys and then drove away in her car. The Defendant contends
that the victim was too far away from her vehicle to be in “possession” of
it as required by the carjacking statute, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-13-404 (2006). We hold that the victim was in possession
of her motor vehicle and that the Defendant’s
conviction of carjacking is supported by sufficient evidence.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth C.
Dailey, III - M2005-01223-SC-R11-CD View
Davidson County - The Defendant, Kenneth C. Dailey,
III, pleaded guilty to second degree murder and reserved a certified
question of law regarding the admissibility of his statements of confession
to the crime. Disagreeing with the trial court, the prosecutor, and
the defense that the question was dispositive of the case, the Court
of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal. We hold that, on the record
before us, the certified question is dispositive of the case. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand this matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals
for its review of the certified question on its merits.
Simpson Strong-Tie Company v.
Stewart, Estes & Donnell - M2006-02407-SC-R23-CQ
VIew
We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether the
absolute litigation privilege applies to what may be defamatory communications
made by an attorney prior to a proposed judicial proceeding when the
communications are directed at recipients unconnected with the proposed
proceeding. We hold that an attorney is privileged to publish what may
be defamatory information prior to a proposed judicial proceeding even
when the communication is directed at recipients unconnected with the
proposed proceeding. In order for the privilege to apply, (1) the communication
must be made by an attorney acting in the capacity of counsel, (2) the
communication must be related to the subject matter of the proposed
litigation, (3) the proposed proceeding must be under serious consideration
by the attorney acting in good faith, and (4) the attorney must have
a client or identifiable prospective client at the time the communication
is published.
UT Medical Group, Inc. v. Val Y. Vogt, M.D.,
et al. - W2005-00256-SC-R11-CV View
Shelby County - We granted review in this case to determine
whether UT Medical Group, Inc. presented a justiciable case or controversy
to the trial court when it alleged that Dr. Vogt anticipatorily breached
an employment contract covenant. Because the record fails to show that
Dr. Vogt committed an anticipatory repudiation of the non-competition
covenant found in her employment agreement, Dr. Vogt is entitled to
summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an
order dismissing the case.
Cases posted the week of 08/13/2007
Michael Wilhelm v. Kroger's d/b/a
Peyton's Southeastern - E2006-00268-SC-WCM-WC
View
Bradley County- In 2004, the plaintiff, Michael Wilhelm,
filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging an injury to his
back and left hip. In response, the defendant, Krogers d/b/a Peyton’s
Southeastern, denied the claim, asserting that the injuries did not
arise out of his employment. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial
court awarded the plaintiff a 35% permanent partial disability to the
body as a whole. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel
affirmed the judgment. Because, however, the injuries do not qualify
as work-related and an earlier workers’ compensation
settlement bars recovery, the judgment must be reversed and the case
dismissed.
State of Tennessee v. Tino Vernell Rodgers
(a minor) - W2005-00632-SC-R11-CV View
Gibson County - We granted review to answer two questions:
(1) whether the trial court erred by dismissing a petition for post-commitment
relief from a probation violation in juvenile court; and (2) whether
the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing the appeal as moot because
the Petitioner had reached the age of nineteen. Because an oral directive
by the juvenile court placing a minor under house arrest is not a valid
court order, the trial court erred by dismissing the petition for post-commitment
relief. Because a probation violation in juvenile court may have adverse
consequences after the completion of a term of commitment, the doctrine
of mootness does not apply. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the order of juvenile commitment is set aside.
Alexander C. Wells v. TN Board of Regents,
et al. - M2005-00938-SC-R11-CV View
Davidson County - We accepted review of this case to
decide whether a tenured university professor whose employment by the
State was wrongfully terminated may recover back pay and lost benefits
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-8-304. While the trial
court initially found there was no statutory authority to grant monetary
damages, the plaintiff was awarded back wages, lost benefits, and interest.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because there is no statutory authority
for the award, however, the judgments of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals must be reversed and the cause dismissed.
Marissa Miller, a minor, by and through
her mother, and next friend, Miranda Miller v. John Dacus, M.D. -
M2006-02728-SC-R23-CQ View
In 2003, the Plaintiff through her mother and next friend brought a
medical malpractice suit in federal district court against the obstetrician
for injuries sustained by the Plaintiff during her birth in 1993, alleging
both medical negligence and lack of informed consent. The district court
dismissed the lack of informed consent claim on summary judgment, ruling
that a child born alive does not have an independent action for lack
of informed consent. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit certified two questions of law to this Court. We hold
that a child born alive does have an independent cause of action for
injuries caused by the failure of a physician to obtain informed consent
from the child’s mother during labor. Also, we hold that Tennessee
Code Annotated section 28-1-106 tolls the three-year statute of repose
for the Plaintiff’s
lack of informed consent claim because the claim was commenced before
December 9, 2005. See Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005).
State of Tennessee v. Eric Berrios -
W2005-01179-SC-R11-CD View
Shelby County - The defendant, Eric Berrios, was charged
with one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver more than
three hundred grams of cocaine. After the trial court granted the defendant’s
motion to suppress the cocaine seized during the traffic stop, the State
was granted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
the suppression of the evidence. We granted the State’s application
for permission to appeal to determine whether the officer’s actions
amounted to an unconstitutional seizure and, if so, whether the defendant’s
consent to search the vehicle was sufficiently attenuated from that
illegal act. Because the seizure violated constitutional safeguards
and because the consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from
the violation, we affirm the suppression of the evidence. The judgment
of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
State of Tennessee v. Sabrina Renee
Lewis - M2004-02255-SC-R11-CD View
Davidson County - The Defendant, Sabrina Renee Lewis,
was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and facilitation of especially
aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a twenty-one-year effective
sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted permission
to appeal in order to consider three evidentiary questions, the last
two of which require interpretations of the federal and state constitutional
provisions relating to the right of confrontation: (1) whether a videotaped
statement by the Defendant was admissible as “against interests”;
(2) whether a statement by the victim was admissible as a dying declaration;
and (3) whether expert testimony regarding DNA test results was admissible.
Because the videotaped statement by the Defendant was properly allowed
as an admission by a party opponent, because a testimonial dying declaration
does not violate the right of confrontation under the federal or state
constitution, and because confrontation rights do not prohibit an expert
evaluation of DNA data, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
is affirmed.
Auto Credit of Nashville v. Melissa
Wimmer - M2005-00978-SC-R11-CV View
Sumner County - This case arises out of the financing
and subsequent repossession of an automobile. After retaking possession
of the collateral, the creditor sent written notification to the debtor
that the automobile would be sold but that she could redeem the vehicle
by paying the full amount owed. Although the debtor never received this
notification, the creditor was unaware of that fact until after the
sale of the vehicle. Because the sale price did not cover the amount
owed on the vehicle, the creditor sought a deficiency judgment against
the debtor. The debtor filed a counterclaim for statutory damages under
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), claiming that she had not received
proper notification. The trial court awarded a deficiency judgment against
the debtor and dismissed the debtor’s counterclaim. The Court
of Appeals, only addressing the dismissal of the counterclaim, reversed
the trial court and held that the creditor failed to furnish reasonable
notification of the sale to the debtor, in that the creditor failed
to take reasonable steps to determine whether the notification had been
delivered to the debtor before proceeding with the sale. We reverse
the Court of Appeals and hold that the UCC’s reasonable notification
requirement does not require the creditor to verify receipt and that
the creditor’s
actions in this case were sufficient to comply with the statute. Therefore,
the counterclaim for statutory damages is dismissed.
Anthony Tigg, et al. v. Pirelli Tire Corporation,
et al. - M2003-02118-SC-R11-CV View
Davidson Cuonty - The eleven plaintiffs in this case
were hired to replace union employees who were on strike against Pirelli
Tire Corporation. Once the strike ended, Pirelli Tire Corporation terminated
the plaintiffs’ employment. Years later, the plaintiffs filed
this lawsuit naming Pirelli Tire Corporation, United Steelworkers of
America, and United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America
(“URW”) Local Union 670 as defendants. Upon the defendants’ motion,
the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint as untimely.
The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal as to two of the plaintiffs’ claims.
The defendants, Pirelli Tire Corporation, United Steelworkers of America,
and URW Local Union 670, have appealed. We granted review to determine
whether the previous timely commencement of a class action by other
terminated replacement workers tolled the statutes of limitations applicable
to the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. We hold that the complaint filed
by the previous plaintiffs, which purported to be a class action, did
not operate to toll the statutes of limitations for the plaintiffs in
this case after the time for seeking class certification expired. We
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint as untimely. Our ruling
that the plaintiffs’ action
is barred by the statutes of limitations is dispositive of the case;
therefore, we will not address the other issues presented by the parties.
State of Tennessee v. Danny Strode -
M2005-00906-SC-R11-DD View
Marion County - In this capital case, we consider whether
the State may pursue an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s
determination that a defendant is ineligible for the death penalty due
to mental retardation. Upon holding that it may, we also consider whether
the trial court erred in finding the Defendant, Danny Strode, mentally
retarded as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(a)
(2003). We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(a) requires
that a defendant’s mental retardation must have been manifested
by eighteen years of age. Because the proof in this case preponderates
against the trial court’s finding that the Defendant’s
mental retardation manifested by his eighteenth birthday, we hold that
the trial court erred in finding the Defendant to be mentally retarded
and therefore ineligible for the death penalty. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. This matter is remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases posted the week of 07/23/2007
Gilbert Waters, et al. v. Wesley Coker,
M.D. - M2004-01540-SC-R11-CV View
Corrected Opinion - Originally Filed June 29, 2007
Davidson County - In a medical malpractice suit filed
by the Plaintiffs, Gilbert Waters and his wife, Hixie Waters, against
an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Wesley Coker, the trial court provided a
divided jury with a variation of the “dynamite charge.” Because
the Plaintiffs did not present the issue as a ground for relief in the
motion for new trial or otherwise provide the trial court with the opportunity
to correct its error, the issue has been waived. Accordingly, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court
is reinstated.
Cases posted the week of 07/09/2007
Pamela C. Lichtenwalter v. Chris
Edward Lichtenwalter - M2003-03115-SC-R11-CV View
Davidson County - We granted this appeal to determine
whether adult children who are not parties to this action may receive
a judgment for child support arrearage that accrued pursuant to a valid
order awarding child support to their mother. We hold that the right
of recovery for the child support arrearage in this case lies with the
parent to whom the child support is due. The mother is therefore entitled
to the child support arrearage that accrued during the children’s
minority. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ award
of the child support arrearage to the parties’ adult
children and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.