The following Opinions are available for download:
Cases posted the week of 06/27/2005
State of Tennessee v. Amy Denise Sutton -
W2003-01183-SC-R11-CD View
Carroll County - We
granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 11 to determine the legality of the defendant's sentence.
The defendant, Amy Denise Sutton, was convicted by a jury of theft of property
valued between $1,000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced her to confinement
for one year, followed by two years in community corrections. On appeal, she
contends that because the length of her confinement exceeds her estimated
release eligibility date of 10.8 months, her sentence is illegal. The defendant
also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because we conclude
that the defendant's release eligibility date is a mere possibility and not a
right, we find the sentence to be valid. Further, we conclude that sufficient
evidence was presented for a rational jury to convict the defendant of the
charged offense. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
State of Tennessee v. Patrick
D. Collins - M2002-02885-SC-S09-CO View
Davidson County -
We granted review of this interlocutory appeal to determine whether the
defendant was sufficiently advised of the consequences of refusing to take a
breath-alcohol test. The arresting officer informed the defendant that his
license would be suspended for one year if he refused the test, but under the
provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(a) (2000) in effect at
the time, the penalty was two years. The trial court held that the defendant
was not sufficiently advised of the consequences and barred the State from
seeking any suspension of the defendant's driver's license. The trial court
also barred the State from arguing to the jury on the DUI charge that the
defendant had refused the breath test. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed,
holding that the defendant was adequately advised of the consequences for
refusing the test. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we
affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals on the separate grounds set forth herein. We hold that although the
State may request suspension of Collins' license, the State may not seek a
suspension of longer than one year because Collins was incorrectly advised of
the consequences of refusing to take the test.
City of Knoxville v. Entertainment Resources,
LLC. - E2002-01143-SC-R11-CV View
(Concur) - View
Knox County - We
granted this appeal to determine the constitutionality of a Knoxville city
ordinance regulating the location of adult businesses. The chancery court
upheld the ordinance and enjoined operation of the defendant's video store
after finding that it fit the definition of an adult bookstore and was located
within 1,000 feet of prohibited areas and therefore was operating in violation
of the ordinance. The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the
ordinance's definition of adult bookstores is unconstitutionally vague. Because
we have also determined that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague under
the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals but on the separate grounds set forth herein. We remand to the
trial court for an assessment of the amount of damages incurred by the
defendant as a result of the chancery court's injunction.
Murfreesboro Medical Clinic, P.A. v. David
Udom - M2003-00313-SC-S09-CV View
(Concur/Dissent) -
View
Rutherford
County - The issue presented in this case is whether a covenant not to
compete is enforceable between a physician and his former employer, a private
medical clinic. The trial court concluded that the non-compete agreement was
enforceable and enjoined the physician from establishing a medical practice at
a location within the restricted area. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision that the non-compete agreement was enforceable, but reversed
the grant of the temporary injunction and remanded the case to the trial court
for further determinations with respect to the agreement's "buy-out" provision.
After a thorough review of the issues presented, including considerations of
public policy, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment. We hold that except
for those specifically prescribed by statute, physicians' covenants not to
compete are unenforceable and void.
James L. Milligan, Jr. v. Board of Professional
Responsibility - M2004-01765-SC-R3-BP View
Knox County -
Pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, the
Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility ("the Board") appeals from an
order of the Chancery Court for Knox County imposing the sanction of public
censure upon James L. Milligan, Jr., Esq. ("Milligan"). The Board contends that
the Chancery Court erred in concluding that: (1) Milligan did not
misappropriate funds; (2) Milligan's use of a client's funds for personal
purposes was not a serious violation; and (3) public censure is the appropriate
sanction. Because we conclude that Milligan did misappropriate funds and did
otherwise conduct himself in a manner inconsistent with the Rules of
Professional Conduct, as will be hereinafter detailed, we have determined that
suspension for a period of two years is appropriate.
Rickey Hogan v. David G. Mills, Warden, et al.,
- W2004-00182-SC-R11-HC View
Lauderdale County - We granted this appeal to determine
whether habeas corpus relief is available when: (1) the trial court imposed
concurrent sentences for two offenses committed by the petitioner while on
parole; and (2) the trial court failed to order these new sentences to be
served consecutively to the remaining sentence for the paroled offense. We
conclude that the sentences are not illegal under either claim and that the
petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s
judgment dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Cases posted the week of 06/20/2005
Robert D. Walsh v. State of Tennessee -
W2003-02040-SC-R11-PC View
Shelby County - This case comes before us on appeal from a
denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner sought relief from his
conviction for aggravated sexual battery, raising several claims including that
he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial because of an
improper communication by a court officer to the jury during deliberations.
During the hearing on the post-conviction petition, the court heard testimony
from a juror regarding the content of the communication and also the subjective
effect of the officer’s statement upon the juror. At the close of the
hearing, the trial court found that the improper communication had not
influenced the verdict and therefore denied the petition for post-conviction
relief. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. In this Court, the
petitioner challenges admission of the juror’s testimony relating to the
effect of the court officer’s statement on the juror. After thorough
consideration, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals. We hold that Tennessee
Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits introduction of juror testimony concerning
the effect on the juror of an improper communication by a court officer during
jury deliberations.
Jerry W. Peck v.
William B. Tanner and Tanner-Peck, LLC - W2001-02794-SC-S10-CV
View
Shelby County -
This civil action pertains to an alleged business partnership between the
individual parties. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the
defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. While the appeal was pending, the
plaintiff filed a motion in the Court of Appeals alleging misconduct by the
chancellor during the trial proceedings and requesting that the intermediate
court “investigate and rule on whether and how [the plaintiff’s]
allegations will affect the appeal of this matter.” The Court of Appeals
granted the motion and remanded the case to the trial court, providing in its
order that the trial court would supervise the taking of discovery and that the
additional evidence then would be transmitted to the intermediate court and the
case would be set for oral argument. We hold that the procedure adopted by the
Court of Appeals exceeded its appellate jurisdiction; the proper remedy would
have been for the plaintiff to file a motion asking the intermediate court to
remand the case to the trial court for the filing and adjudication of a motion
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.
Beverly Miller, et. al. v. United Automax
- W2003-01394-SC-R11-CV View
Shelby County - This case arises out of the sale of a used car
which Plaintiffs, the buyers of the car, maintain was damaged prior to sale
despite Defendant’s denial of damage. A jury found for Plaintiffs, the
buyers, on their claims for both common law intentional misrepresentation and
for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tennessee Code
Annotated section 47-18-101 et seq. (1995). Plaintiffs elected to receive the
punitive damages awarded by the jury under the common law claim in lieu of
treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. When Plaintiffs
then requested attorney’s fees under the Act, the trial court held that
they could not receive both punitive damages and attorney’s fees. The
trial court also held that the election of remedies made by Plaintiffs had
become final before the entry of judgment and before Plaintiffs were informed
of the amount they might have received in attorney’s fees under the Act
and that Plaintiffs could not amend their election of remedies. The Court of
Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court. We reverse, holding that
Plaintiffs can receive both punitive damages under the common law
misrepresentation claim and attorney’s fees under the Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act. We remand to the trial court for award of appropriate
attorney’s fees and costs.
State of
Tennessee v. Anthony Crowe - W2003-00800-SC-R11-CD
View
McNairy County -
The defendant, Anthony Crowe, entered a plea of nolo contendere to facilitation
of first degree murder and received an eighteen-year sentence. After imposition
of the sentence, but before the judgment became final, the defendant filed a
motion to withdraw his plea alleging that the plea was not supported by a
factual basis and that the plea had not been voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly entered. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion,
and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted permission to appeal to
consider whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion
to withdraw. Although we conclude that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(f) does not mandate that a plea of nolo contendere be supported by a factual
basis, we also conclude that the trial court erred in denying the
defendant’s motion to withdraw because the defendant established that his
plea had not been voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. Thus,
permitting withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct manifest injustice.
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court and the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, grant the
defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, vacate the conviction of
facilitation of first degree murder, and remand this case to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases posted the week of
06/06/2005
Overnite Transportation Co.
v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, et al. - M2002-02116-SC-R11-CV
View
Davidson County
- We granted this appeal to determine 1) whether a trial court's order
declining to hold an alleged contemnor in civil contempt may be appealed; 2)
whether compensatory damages for civil contempt are available pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-105 (1980 & 2000) from a contemnor
who commits an act forbidden by a trial court's order; and, if so, 3) whether
those damages may be recovered if the violation is not ongoing at the time of
the hearing. We answer these questions in the affirmative. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases posted the week of 05/23/2005
State v. Paul Dennis Reid,
Jr. - M2001-02753-SC-DDT-DD View
(Concur/Dissent) - View
(Appendix)- View
Montgomery County -
The defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of
premeditated first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. In imposing a death
sentence for each count of first degree murder, the jury found three
aggravating circumstances, i.e., that the defendant was previously convicted of
one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to
the person, that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in
that they involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to
produce death, and that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding,
interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant
or another, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6) (2003). In addition, the jury found that the evidence
of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2003). The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentences.
After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying
numerous issues for oral argument. We now hold as follows: 1) the trial court
did not err in finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial; 2) the
trial court did not err in excluding evidence during the competency hearing; 3)
the trial court did not err in refusing to hold a new competency hearing on the
basis that a court-appointed expert was biased; 4) the evidence was sufficient
to support the defendant's convictions; 5) the trial court did not err in
denying the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the aggravating
circumstances were not stated in the indictment; 6) the trial court did not err
in allowing the prosecution to amend the indictment; 7) the trial court did not
commit reversible error in limiting extrinsic evidence of inconsistent
statements; 8) the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury; 9) the death sentences were not arbitrary or
disproportionate as imposed in this case; 10) the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's finding that evidence of aggravating circumstances
outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances; 11) the capital sentencing
statutes are not unconstitutional on the basis that they allow evidence to be
admitted in violation of due process and confrontation under the United States
Constitution; 12) the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the
victims at the crime scene during sentencing; 13) the trial court did not
commit reversible error in failing to charge the jury on the "catch-all"
statutory provision as to mitigating circumstances; and 14) the trial court did
not err in denying a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during
sentencing. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusions with
respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in
the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals'
judgment is affirmed.
Lillian Griffis, et
al. v. Davidson County Metropolitan Government>d/b/a Davidson County
Board of Education - M2003-00230-SC-R11-CV View
Davidson County -
In 1908, a fee simple determinable estate in real property was conveyed to the
Davidson County Board of Education and its successors ("Metro"). The deed
required the property to be used "for school purposes" and to be "devoted
exclusively to the cause of education." The deed further provided that the
property would revert to the grantors or their heirs should the property be
"abandoned" for these purposes. In July 2000, the defendant Metro ceased using
the property for classroom instruction and administration but continued to
maintain the property, to use it to store surplus food service equipment, and
to hold it in reserve for possible use in the indefinite future. In April 2001,
heirs of the grantors brought suit against Metro, claiming that the property
had been abandoned for school purposes, thereby triggering reversion to them.
Concluding that there had been no abandonment, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Metro. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
limitations "for school purposes" and the "cause of education" are satisfied
solely by classroom instruction. The Court of Appeals thus not only held that
Metro had abandoned the property for these limitations, but also granted
summary judgment in favor of the nonmovants, the heirs of the grantors. We
vacate the Court of Appeals' holding that "school purposes" and the "cause of
education" require classroom instruction alone. We hold that these limitations
permit any use that directly benefits and enhances the process of learning and
instruction or that directly advances the objective of instructing, training,
and rearing. Further, we hold that in a fee simple determinable where the term
"abandon" is not otherwise defined, the common law definition of abandonment
applies; a complainant therefore must show both intent to abandon for the
stated limitations and some external act or omission by which the intent to
abandon is effectuated. Whether abandonment has occurred is predominantly a
factual determination based upon all the relevant circumstances. In the
proceedings below, the parties lacked the benefit of our holding today
concerning the legal standard for abandonment; consequently, the factual record
relevant to this standard has not been sufficiently developed. We thus vacate
both the Court of Appeals' grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We
remand this case to the trial court to allow the parties the opportunity to
litigate the case in accord with the legal standard adopted herein.
Cases posted the week of 05/16/2005
State v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S.
Londono - M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD View (Order Denying Petition to
Rehear)
(Original Opinion)
VACATED
Overnite Transportation Co. v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 480, et al. - M2002-02116-SC-R11-CV
View
Cases posted the week of 05/09/2005
Gatha Blankenship v. American Ordnance
Systems, d/b/a Milan Army Ammunition Plant - W2004-00866-SC-R3-CV
View
Carroll
County - The employee in this workers' compensation case injured her
back while taking an upper body strength test on the employer's premises. The
employee, who was laid off at the time of the injury, voluntarily took the
strength test as part of the application process for new jobs being created in
the employer's factory. The trial court found that the employee's injury was
not compensable because it did not arise out of her employment. The employee's
appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel hearing oral argument. The dispositive question
before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial
court's finding that the employee's injury did not arise out of her employment.
After carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we hold that
the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the
employee's injury did not arise out of her employment. We also conclude that
the employee's injury did not occur in the course of her employment.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Christa Gail Pike v. State - E2003-00766-SC-R11-PD
View
Knox County - This
appeal presents two determinative issues: (1) whether post-conviction review of
a death sentence should be mandatory and should proceed over the objection of a
competent death-sentenced inmate; and if not, (2) whether, and under what
circumstances, a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke her waiver of
post-conviction review. We conclude that post-conviction review is not
mandatory and may be waived by a competent death-sentenced inmate. We also
conclude that a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke a waiver of
post-conviction review so long as the revocation occurs within thirty days of
the trial court's order permitting the inmate to waive post-conviction review.
Our holding is limited to death-sentenced inmates who seek to revoke an initial
waiver of post-conviction relief. Our holding does not apply to death-sentenced
inmates who attempt to manipulate and to delay the judicial process by
repeatedly seeking to waive and thereafter to reinstate post-conviction review.
Applying this rule, we conclude that Christa Gail Pike may revoke her waiver
and reinstate her post-conviction petition. Pike filed a motion seeking to
revoke her waiver on the twenty-ninth day after the trial court filed its order
permitting her to waive post-conviction review. Pike had not previously waived
post-conviction review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to
reinstate the petition for post-conviction relief and to schedule an
evidentiary hearing.
Cases posted the week of 04/25/2005
State v. Steven Ray Thacker -
W2002-01119-SC-DDT-DD View
(Concur/Dissent) -
View
Appendix -
View
Related Press
Release
Dyer/Lake Counties - A jury convicted the
defendant, Steven Ray Thacker, of first degree murder. Following a capital
sentencing hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant; and (2) the murder
was knowingly committed by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial
role in committing, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in
committing, a first degree murder, rape, robbery, burglary, theft or
kidnapping. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6), (7) (1997). The jury also
found that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the jury imposed a
sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both the conviction
and sentence. Upon automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-13-206 (2003) this Court entered an order specifying five issues for
oral argument, including (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of Dr.
Keith Caruso, a forensic psychiatrist, at the sentencing hearing; (3) whether
the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct on the
defendant's "history of abuse and neglect" as a non-statutory mitigating
circumstance; (4) whether the State improperly relied upon aggravating
circumstance (i)(6) to support the death penalty; and (5) whether the death
sentence is comparatively proportionate and valid under the mandatory review
provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)-(D) (2003).
After a careful review of the record and relevant legal authority, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Cases posted the week of 04/18/2005
Connie Frances Fritts v. Safety National
Casualty Corporation - E2003-01456-SC-WCM-CV
View
McMinn County
- The employee in this workers' compensation case suffered a
spontaneous and large right-lung pneumothorax while at work. The pneumothorax
required two corrective surgeries and resulted in treatment with narcotics for
chronic pain. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the injury
sustained was an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her
employment. We further hold that the evidence supports the trial court's
finding that the employee was totally and permanently disabled. We affirm the
trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Cases posted the week of 04/11/2005
State v. Edwin Gomez & Jonathan S.
Londono - M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD View
(Concur/Dissent) -
View
See also -
Press Release
Davidson County - We granted this appeal to determine whether the defendants are entitled to relief on their claim that admission of testimony about a co-defendant's oral statement violated their Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and whether the defendants' sentences were imposed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. We conclude that admission of testimony about a co-defendant's oral statement violated the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the defendants had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant. See Crawford v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). Nevertheless, we conclude that Gomez is not entitled to relief on this claim because he has failed to preserve it for review and has failed to establish the prerequisites for obtaining relief via plain error review. Although Londono preserved the issue for plenary appellate review, we conclude that he is not entitled to relief because the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we conclude that the defendants' sentences were not imposed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. See United States v. Booker, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Thus, the defendants are not entitled to relief on this claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
Cases posted the week of 04/04/2005
Maylene E. Ledbetter v. Bryan K. Ledbetter
- E2004-00239-SC-S09-CV View
Anderson County - In
this interlocutory appeal, we must determine whether the trial court had the
authority to enforce a mediated marital dissolution agreement when one of the
parties repudiated its terms prior to court approval. Here, the parties,
Maylene and Bryan Ledbetter, reached, through mediation, a marital dissolution
agreement pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31. Shortly after the
mediation, and prior to presentation for court approval, Mr. Ledbetter
repudiated the agreement. Mrs. Ledbetter then filed a motion to enforce the
terms of the agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court overruled Mrs.
Ledbetter's motion, ruling that the oral agreement reached in mediation was not
binding and enforceable against the parties. After a thorough review of the
record and relevant case law, we conclude that because Mr. Ledbetter repudiated
the terms of the agreement prior to its presentation to the court, the trial
court lacked authority to enter a judgment on the agreement. Further, because
the agreement had not been reduced to writing and signed by the parties, it is
not an enforceable contract. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.