This Page Last Updated: November 08, 2007 at 13:13.49 hours
The following Opinions are available for download:
Cases posted the week of 03/19/2007
State of Tennessee v. Arthur Buford - W2004-00786-SC-R11-CD View
Shelby County -
We granted this appeal of the defendant’s perjury conviction to determine whether the prosecutor must prove which of the defendant’s two inconsistent statements was false. We hold that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-707 (1997), the prosecutor was not required to prove which of the two statements made by the defendant was false. Therefore, the State was relieved of any election requirement, and no enhanced unanimity instruction was warranted. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s perjury conviction and that the trial court properly allowed the defendant’s trial counsel to testify.
Cases posted the week of 03/12/2007
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Flood - E2005-00878-SC-R11-CD View
Knox County - The defendant was convicted of four counts of rape of a child in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-522. At the trial, the defendant attempted to present testimony from the victim’s father about statements made by the victim. The victim had made two statements to her father that the defendant argued rebutted the victim’s testimony and suggested that a third party had committed the crimes. The trial court excluded the evidence because the testimony was hearsay and because the defendant had failed to question the victim about the statements during cross-examination. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that while the trial court properly applied the rules of evidence, the evidence was improperly excluded because the exclusion denied the defendant his right to present a defense. We hold that the trial court correctly excluded both statements as inadmissible extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements even though one of the statements was non-hearsay. We also hold that the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence in this case does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because the excluded evidence was not critical to the defense. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed.
James L. Williams, et al. v. Jordan Lee Fox - E2004-03027-SC-R11-CV VIew
Sevier County - We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a subdivision’s restrictive covenant that specifically prohibited “mobile homes” and “trailers” includes a restriction on “modular homes.” The plaintiffs obtained a temporary injunction against the defendant prohibiting him from erecting a modular home on his property. Following a hearing before the trial court, the plaintiffs were granted a permanent injunction and the defendant was ordered to remove the partially erected structure from his property. The trial court held that the subdivision’s restrictive covenant prohibiting mobile homes and trailers extended to include modular homes as well. The Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction. We reverse, holding that “modular homes” are distinct types of structures from “mobile homes” and “trailers” and because the restrictive covenant did not expressly prohibit “modular homes,” the courts cannot expand the plain wording of the covenant to include the defendant’s modular home.
Gary Edwin Bennett, et al. v. Trevecca Nazarene University - M2004-01287-SC-R11-CV
View
Davidson County - We accepted this appeal of a premises liability case to determine whether the “independent contractor rule” adopted in Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1996), relieves a premises owner from liability when a premises owner provides an independent contractor inaccurate information germane to the contractor’s work. We hold that a property owner has a duty of reasonable care to provide accurate information to an independent contractor if the owner provides specific information germane to the repair after engaging the contractor. Because material facts remain in dispute between the parties in this case about what information the premises owner provided, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases posted the week of 03/05/2007
State of Tennessee v. Roberto
Vasques, Kevin Joel Hernandez, Luis
Martin Vasquez, Hector Alonzo and Victor Hugo Garza - M2004-00166-SC-R11-CD View
(Concur/Dissent) - View
Davidson County - Our grant of the applications
for permission to appeal filed by the State of Tennessee and certain
of the defendants was for the purpose of determining (1) whether
the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the convictions
for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy
pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone;
(2) whether the waiver of lesser-included offense instructions
under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110 violates constitutional
principles; and (3) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals applied
the proper standard in affirming the grant of coram nobis relief
to Vasquez and Garza, reversing the trial court, and denying the
relief to Vasques, Hernandez, and Alonzo. We conclude that the
trial evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that
the statutory waiver of the entitlement to complete jury instructions
does not violate the right to a jury trial or the separation of
powers principle. We also hold that Vasquez and Garza are entitled
to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence and that Vasques,
Hernandez, and Alonzo are not entitled to coram nobis relief.
In consequence, the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals
are affirmed.
The Travelers Indemnity Company of America, et al. v. Moore & Associates, Inc. - M2004-01233-SC-R11-CV View
Sumner County - This case is before us on appeal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in which the trial court held that the appellants have a duty to defend the appellee under the terms of a commercial general liability policy. We granted the appeal in this case to determine: 1) whether an insured contractor’s defective workmanship may constitute an “occurrence” under the terms of the “insuring agreement” of a commercial general liability policy; 2) whether damages resulting from faulty workmanship are “property damage”; and 3) whether damages to the insured contractor’s work are excluded from coverage if those damages are caused by the faulty workmanship of a subcontractor. We conclude that defective workmanship may constitute an “occurrence.” We also conclude that damages caused by faulty workmanship are “property damage.” We further conclude that damages resulting from the faulty workmanship of a subcontractor are not excluded from coverage. Therefore, we hold that under the language of the commercial general liability policy in this case, the appellants have a duty to defend the appellee against a claim that water penetration resulting from the faulty workmanship of a subcontractor caused damages to the appellee’s work. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Robert Dye V. Witco Corp., et al. - W2005-01796-SC-R3-CV View
Shelby County - The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer in this workers’ compensation case, finding that the statute of limitations bars the employee’s claim and that the savings statute provides no relief to the employee. We hold that the employee’s complaint for workers’ compensation benefits is barred by the statute of limitations. We further hold that the employee failed to file his complaint within the time allowed by the savings statute. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Cases posted the week of 02/26/2007
City of Memphis v. Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis, et al. - W2004-00091-SC-R11-CV View
Shelby County - After an internal administrative hearing, the appellee, the City of Memphis (“the City”), discharged Police Officer Jack Vincent (“Vincent”), the appellant. The Civil Service Commission (“the Commission”) heard Vincent’s appeal, ruled that the termination was not reasonable, and ordered reinstatement with full back pay and benefits. Subsequently, the City filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the decision of the Commission. The Chancery Court reviewed the record and affirmed the Commission. On direct appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Vincent was lawfully terminated. We granted an application for permission to appeal to ascertain whether substantial or material evidence supported the decisions of the Commission and the Chancery Court. Because it is our view that there was no substantial or material evidence supporting the reinstatement of Vincent, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Steven A. Edwards, et al. v. Nancy Allen, et al. - M2004-01944-SC-R11-CV View
Rutherford County - The Plaintiffs, who own property adjacent to a shooting range, sought declaratory relief from the Defendant property owners and leaseholders of the range. Rutherford County, whose board of commission had passed a resolution to reclassify the property in 1992 to permit usage as a range, was joined as a Defendant. The chancellor ruled that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and granted motions to dismiss filed by each of the Defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the county resolution reclassifying the property was void. We granted this appeal to consider whether the reclassification qualified as a rezoning amendment; if so, whether the deviation by the Rutherford County legislative body from the issue considered by its planning commission subjected the ordinance to a declaration of void ab initio; and, finally, whether the record establishes circumstances which might preclude the Plaintiffs from a remedy. Because the reclassification qualified as a zoning amendment, the deviation by the county from the proposal before the planning commission was substantial, and because there are no circumstances in the record which might preclude the Plaintiffs relief, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the chancery court.
State v. James Riels - W2004-02832-SC-DDT-DD View
Appendix Filed March 31, 2007 View
Shelby County - The defendant, James Riels, pled guilty to two counts of premeditated murder and two counts of felony murder for the murders of Mary Jane Cruchon and Franchion Pollack. He also entered guilty pleas to one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury found three aggravating circumstances in each murder: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (3) the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit a robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (7) (2003). The jury found one additional aggravating circumstance with respect to Franchion Pollack: the victim of the murder was seventy years of age, or older. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(14) (2003). The jury also found that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the jury imposed a sentence of death for each of the murder convictions. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective thirty-five year sentence for the remaining noncapital convictions, to be served concurrently with the death sentences. The defendant appealed the sentences of death. After fully considering the issues raised by the defendant, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentences.
Upon automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1) (2003), this Court entered an order specifying four issues for oral argument: (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the defendant regarding the circumstances of the offenses and, if it did, was the error harmful; (2) whether the sentence was invalid under any of the mandatory issues for review set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)-(D) (2003); (3) whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury that aggravated robbery is a felony whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. After a careful review of the record and relevant legal authority, we hold that the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the defendant and that the error was reversible. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new capital sentencing hearing.
George Haskel Stewart v. Demple L. Sewell, et al. - M2003-01031-SC-R11-CV View
Franklin County - We granted this appeal to clarify the applicability of the rule of ademption by extinction and of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 concerning the sale of specifically devised property. In August 1994, the decedent Clara Stewart executed her last will and testament in which she left a parcel of real estate to her stepson, the plaintiff in this matter. In November 1994, the decedent executed a durable power of attorney to her natural children, defendants Sewell and Judkins. In January 1997, the decedent’s health had so far deteriorated that she required placement in a nursing home. In February 1997, Sewell and Judkins sold a portion of the devised real estate in order to fund the decedent’s nursing home expenses. After their mother’s death, Sewell and Judkins inherited the remaining proceeds of the sale; the plaintiff inherited that portion of the real estate which had not been sold. Plaintiff sued Sewell and Judkins as well as the purchasers of the real estate, alleging fraud. After a trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that Sewell and Judkins had acted improperly and granted the plaintiff relief. We granted the defendants’ application for permission to appeal and hold that the specific devise of the real property was adeemed by extinction and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 and in imposing a constructive trust in order to avoid that result. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s case.
William Scheele, Jr. v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance - E2006-01050-SC-R3-WC View
Sevier County - Before this case was heard or decided by a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, we granted review to clarify whether insurance coverage for a sole proprietor existed under a workers’ compensation policy despite the sole proprietor’s failure to comply fully with the thirty-day notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(10)(B). We hold that coverage existed in this case because the sole proprietor complied substantially with the thirty-day notice requirement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Cases posted the week of 02/19/2007
Phil Bredesen, Governor of the State of Tennessee v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission, et al. - M2006-02722-SC-RDM-CV View
Additional Appeals Filings
Davidson County - This appeal concerns the process for appointing a new justice to become the fifth member of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The issues in this case involve the proper interpretation of sections 17-4-101 to 17-4-118 of the Tennessee Code Annotated (“the Tennessee Plan”) and matters of constitutional law. For the reasons stated below, we hold that: (1) the first list of nominees certified to the Governor under the Tennessee Plan was not rendered invalid upon one nominee’s subsequent withdrawal from consideration for appointment; (2) an individual listed on a panel of nominees certified to the Governor by the Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission (“the Commission”) which has been rejected by the Governor may not be included on the second panel of nominees certified to the Governor under the Tennessee Plan; (3) the Governor’s rejection of Lewis and Gordon did not violate the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) because a nominee or applicant to fill a judicial vacancy is an not “employee” for purposes of the THRA; (4) the equal protection challenge to the Governor’s rejection of the first panel is a non-justiciable political question; (5) the equal protection challenge to the Governor’s rejection of the first panel is otherwise without merit; (6) the Governor's letter rejecting the first list of nominees did not encroach on the powers assigned to the Commission by the Tennessee Plan; and (7) the trial court erred in its determination of the appropriate remedy.
Cases posted the week of 01/29/2007
Frances Barnett v. Milan Seating Systems - W2006-00582-SC-R3-WC View
Gibson County - We accepted this appeal prior to its review by a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel primarily to determine whether the chancery court correctly ruled that an employee is working for her “pre-injury employer” for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) when the company she was working for at the time of the injury is sold to a new entity and the employee’s place of work, job duties, and rate of pay with the new entity remain unchanged. We conclude that an employee is not working for her “pre-injury employer” when she returns to work and the company she was working for at the time of the injury then is purchased by a different company, and this is so even if the employee’s place of work, job duties, and rate of pay remain unchanged. The judgment of the chancery court on this particular issue is, therefore, reversed.
State of Tennessee v. Melissa Ann Layman - E2004-01471-SC-R11-CD
and
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Ray Taylor - E2004-02866-SC-R11-CD View
( Concur/Dissent ) - View
Anderson County - We granted and consolidated the applications for permission to appeal filed on behalf of Melissa Ann Layman and Jonathan Ray Taylor to determine the scope of a trial court’s discretion to deny a motion to nolle prosequi to which the defendant has consented. Layman’s appeal also presents the issue of whether a victim’s family has a right to be heard at a pretrial hearing concerning a plea agreement or a nolle prosequi. We conclude that when an uncontested motion to nolle prosequi or dismiss a criminal charge is independent of a plea agreement, a trial court’s discretion to deny the motion under Rule 48(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure is limited to extraordinary circumstances indicating betrayal of the public interest. Because in each case the prosecutor’s independent, uncontested motion to nolle prosequi the greater charge of the indictment was neither filed in bad faith nor motivated by considerations clearly contrary to manifest public interest, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the nolle prosequi. We also hold in Layman’s case that the victim’s family did not have the right to be heard at the pretrial hearings concerning the plea agreement and nolle prosequi because such pretrial hearings are not critical stages of the criminal justice process as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-302(2). Any error in considering the statements of the family, however, was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals in each case and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
State of Tennessee v. Stephen McKim - W2005-02685-SC-S10-CD View
Shelby County - We accepted this extraordinary appeal in order to (1) determine the effect of a district attorney general’s consideration of an irrelevant factor in deciding whether to grant pretrial diversion and (2) clarify when an interlocutory appeal from a denial of pretrial diversion should be granted. In this case, the defendant was indicted for criminally negligent homicide following the death of his daughter after the defendant left her in his car on a hot summer day. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion. The district attorney general’s office denied diversion, in part on the basis of its judgment that diversion of a negligent homicide “appears to be an aberration of the law.” The trial court refused to overturn the prosecutor’s decision, and the defendant applied for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The trial court denied permission, and the defendant then applied to the Court of Criminal Appeals for permission to pursue an extraordinary appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the defendant’s application. We granted review and hold that the district attorney general abused his discretion when he relied upon an irrelevant factor in denying pretrial diversion. The trial court’s judgment affirming the denial of the defendant’s application for pretrial diversion is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases posted the week of 01/22/2007
Builidng Materials Corp d/b/a GAF Materials Corp v. Melvin D. Britt - M2005-00918-SC-WCM-CV View
Davidson County - The sole issue in this workers’ compensation action is whether the employee’s claim for benefits is barred by the statute of limitations. In 1997, the employee reported to his employer that he had sustained a work-related back injury, but he did not file a claim for workers’ compensation benefits at that time. The employee’s back pain improved following conservative treatment. In August of 2001, however, the employee informed his employer that his back pain was becoming worse. In February 2002, the employee filed a complaint seeking permanent partial disability benefits. At trial, the trial court granted the employer’s motion for involuntary dismissal, holding that the employee’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations because it was not made within one year of his original back injury in 1997. Based upon the last-day-worked rule, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel concluded that the employee’s claim is not barred by the statute of limitations. Upon due consideration, we hold that the claim in this matter is not time-barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203 because the statute does not begin to run until the employee is prevented from working due to the employee’s injury. To the extent that our opinion in Bone v. Saturn Corp., 148 S.W.3d 69, 73 (Tenn. 2004), compels a contrary result by its abandonment of the last-day-worked rule in determining a similar but related issue, it is overruled. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this case and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Wilson - M2003-02151-SC-R11-CD View
Robertson County- Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of evading arrest, carjacking, one count of reckless endangerment, and driving on a revoked license. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for carjacking and reckless endangerment and that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on robbery and theft as lesser-included offenses of carjacking. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions for carjacking and reckless endangerment. We further hold that robbery and theft are not lesser-included offenses of carjacking and that therefore the failure to give instructions with regard to these offenses was not plain error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Charles G. Summers v. State of Tennessee - M2004-02806-SC-R11-HC View
Hickman County - The petitioner, Charles G. Summers, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of his concurrent sentence for misdemeanor escape. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, concluding that Summers should be afforded the benefit of counsel and an opportunity to prove his allegations to the trial court under McLaney v. Bell, 59 S.W.3d 90 (Tenn. 2001). We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we overrule McLaney to the extent that it can be interpreted to require the appointment of counsel and a hearing whenever a pro se habeas corpus petition alleges that an agreed sentence is illegal based on facts not apparent from the face of the judgment. We hold that summary dismissal may be proper when, as in this case, the petitioner fails to attach to the habeas corpus petition pertinent documents from the record of the underlying proceedings to support his factual assertions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Shaun Hoover v. State - W2005-01921-SC-R11-HC View
Lauderdale County - We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to consider the legality of a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement. The agreed sentence exceeds the maximum available term in the offender Range but does not exceed the maximum punishment authorized for the offense. For the reasons explained herein, we conclude that the plea-bargained sentence is legal. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
In Re Adoption of A. M. H. - W2004-01225-SC-R11-PT View
Shelby County - This case concerns the termination of parental rights. The appellants, who are the parents, seek reversal of the termination of their parental rights to the care and custody of their daughter, A.M.H. The trial court predicated the termination on the ground that the parents abandoned A.M.H. by willfully failing to visit her for four months. First, we hold that the statute of repose under section 36-1-113(q) of the Tennessee Code Annotated does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the termination of parental rights. Second, because the undisputed evidence shows that there was animosity between the parties and that the parents were actively pursuing custody of A.M.H. through legal proceedings during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, we hold that the trial court erred in finding a willful failure to visit. Finally, we conclude that the parents’ consent to transfer custody and guardianship of A.M.H. to the appellees was not made with knowledge of the consequences of the transfer. Therefore, according the parents those superior rights to the custody of their child that constitutional law mandates, only a showing of substantial harm that threatens the child’s welfare may deprive the parents of the care and custody of A.M.H. Although A.M.H. has now been with the appellees for more than seven years, six of those years elapsed after the parents’ first unsuccessful legal filing to regain custody. Evidence that A.M.H. will be harmed from a change in custody because she has lived and bonded with the Bakers during the pendency of the litigation does not constitute the substantial harm required to prevent the parents from regaining custody. For the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the chancery court to be expeditiously transferred to the Juvenile Court of Shelby County for the entry of an order that implements a plan to reunite A.M.H. with her natural parents.
Patti Zakour v. UT Medical Group, & Scott Craig - W2003-01193-SC-R11-CV View
Tipton County - The issue we review in this case is whether the Defendants exercised peremptory challenges during jury selection based on race and/or gender in a discriminatory manner contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Batson v. Kentucky. The Defendants used six of their seven peremptory challenges to strike women from the jury panel, including the only African-Americans who were seated in the jury box. In response to the Plaintiff’s race-based Batson challenge, the Defendants responded that one of the African-American women was dismissed because she had difficulty remembering the verdict in a previous civil jury case in which she had served as a juror and because she had a family history of cancer. As to the Plaintiff’s gender-based Batson objection, the Defendants responded that the women were excused based on “experience and body mechanics.” The trial court overruled the Plaintiff’s objections and the trial proceeded. Following a defense verdict, the Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. After careful review of the record and applicable authorities, we hold that the Defendants’ stated reasons for exercising peremptory challenges to strike the African-Americans and women from the jury panel were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Batson v. Kentucky. Because the trial court erred in overruling the Plaintiff’s Batson objections, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.
State of Tennessee v. Kelly Michael Pickett - M2004-00732-SC-R11-CD
&
State of Tennessee v. Gregory T. Harwood - M2004-01811-SC-R11-CO View
Davidson County - We granted the appeal in each of these cases to determine the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003 (2003), which prohibits the possession of child pornography. Initially, the statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Secondly, we hold that because the charges against Pickett were multiplicitous, only one conviction is permissible under the circumstances of that case. In consequence, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in each case is affirmed.
Cases posted the week of 01/08/2007
George R. Fusner, Jr., as designated representative of the Mexican Consulate
v. Coop Construction Co., LLC, et al. - M2006-00076-SC-R3-CV View
We granted review of this workers’ compensation case to clarify whether
non-resident foreign nationals can qualify as “dependents” under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210 and receive benefits due upon an
employee’s death. We accepted review before the case was heard or considered
by a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. We hold that non-resident
foreign nationals can be “dependents” under our workers’ compensation
laws. In this case, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the decedent
employee’s parents were “dependents,” but we reverse the
trial court’s finding that they were “actual dependents” under
the statute. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion, including for a determination of the benefit due to the parents as “partial
dependents” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210(d).
Cases posted the week of 01/08/2007
Diane Jordan, et al. v. Knox County, Tennessee, et al. - E2006-01377-SC-RDM-CV View
Knox County - In this expedited appeal, the primary issue presented for review is whether Knox County, Tennessee, has a valid governmental charter. A secondary issue is whether a term limits amendment to the county charter should be applied and, if so, to which of the elected county officials. We hold that while Knox County failed to comply with the enabling legislation for instituting a charter form of government, since September 1, 1990, Knox County has been governed under a de facto charter with a county mayor, county commissioners, and other de facto officers. For the reasons set out in this opinion, it is our conclusion that the term limits amendment meets due process guidelines and applies to all elected Knox County Government officials except for the court clerks and the school board member, each of whom is protected by either the state constitution or statute. The judgment of the Knox County Chancery Court, which invalidated both the charter and the amendment, is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part.