The following Opinions are available for download:
Cases posted the week of
03/25/2002
State v. Timothy McKinney
- W1999-00844-SC-DDT-DD
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State v. Timothy McKinney
- W1999-00844-SC-DDT-DD (Concur/Dissent)
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Shelby County - The defendant, Timothy
McKinney, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and
attempted second degree murder. The jury imposed a death sentence for
the first degree murder after finding that evidence of an aggravating
circumstance, i.e., the defendant was previously convicted of a felony
whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person,
outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. The trial judge imposed a sentence of twelve (12) years for the
attempted second degree murder, to run consecutively to the death
sentence. After the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions
and the sentences, the case was automatically docketed in this Court.
We entered an order specifying six issues for oral argument, and we now
hold as follows: (1) the trial court did not commit error by denying
the defendant's motion to introduce expert testimony on the issue of
eyewitness identifications; (2) the jury's verdict form was
sufficiently clear to demonstrate that the jury found the prior violent
felony aggravating circumstance relied upon by the prosecution; (3) the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the prior violent felony aggravating
circumstance found by the jury; (4) the trial court's refusal to allow
defense counsel to refer to evidence from the guilt phase of the trial
during his closing argument in the sentencing phase of the trial did
not affect the jury's determination to the prejudice of the defendant
and was harmless error; (5) the trial court did not commit error in
admitting victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase; and (6)
the sentence of death was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. We
also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
findings that the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance had
been established beyond a reasonable doubt and that it outweighed
evidence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we
agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusions with respect to
the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in
the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Robert Davis, et al v. Wilson County
- M2000-00785-SC-R11-CV
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We granted this appeal to determine whether county employees
had a vested interest after retirement in health care benefits provided
under resolutions passed by the Wilson County Commission. The
chancellor found that the appellants had a vested interest in health
care benefits because they were county employees who met the
requirement of ten years of service and eight years of continuous
service with Wilson County under a 1992 resolution. The Court of
Appeals reversed the chancellor's judgment, concluding that the health
care benefits were welfare benefits in which the appellants did not
have a vested interest. After reviewing the record and applicable
authority, we hold that the health care benefits were welfare benefits
that did not vest automatically and that there was no clear and express
language in the resolutions that the health care benefits were intended
to vest or could not be terminated. We therefore affirm the Court of
Appeals' judgment.
Ralph Richards v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co.
- M2000-01255-SC-WCM-CV
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Coffee County - We granted review in this
workers' compensation case to determine whether the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel erred in concluding that the evidence
preponderated against the trial court's finding that the employee's
injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. After
reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the
evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that
the employee's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his
employment. We therefore reject the Panel's findings and conclusions
and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Connie Givens v. Ed Mullikin, Admin. ad
litem for Larry McElwaney
- W1999-01783-SC-R11-CV
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Shelby County - The principal issue in this
case is whether an insurance carrier and an insured may be held
vicariously liable for the alleged tortious actions of an attorney
hired to defend the insured. The trial court held that the plaintiff's
complaint stated a claim of vicarious liability against the defendant
insured and his insurance carrier for abuse of process, inducement to
breach express and implied contracts of confidentiality, inducement to
breach a confidential relationship, and invasion of privacy. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling with respect to the
vicarious liability issue, though it dismissed the claims for
inducement to breach a confidential relationship and invasion of
privacy. The defendants then appealed to this Court, and we now hold
that an insurer and an insured may be held vicariously liable for the
tortious acts or omissions of an attorney hired to defend the insured,
if the attorney's tortious actions were directed, commanded, or
knowingly authorized by the insurer or by the insured. We further hold
that the complaint in this case states a claim of vicarious liability
against the insurer alone for abuse of process. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Trau-Med of America, Inc. d/b/a
Bellevue Clinic v. AllState Ins. Co.
- W1999-01524-SC-R11-CV
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Shelby County - The plaintiff, a medical
clinic, filed an action against the defendants alleging, among other
things, tortious interference with business relationships and civil
conspiracy. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial
court granted. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
dismissal of these claims, finding that the facts alleged in the
complaint were sufficient to state claims upon which relief could be
granted. This case is now before us to determine whether the trial
court should have granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. We hold
that the complaint in this case alleges sufficient facts to state a
cause of action for tortious interference with business relationships.
However, we dismiss the plaintiff's claim of civil conspiracy for
failure to satisfy the plurality requirement necessary to establish an
actionable conspiracy claim. Consequently, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this
case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Heirs of Neil Ellis v. Estate of Virgie
Ellis
- M1999-00897-SC-R11-CV
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Rutherford County - The issue in this case
is whether property held in a tenancy by the entirety is subject to the
120-hour survival rule contained in section 31-3-120 of the Tennessee
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. Three days after her husband's death,
Mrs. Ellis died of unrelated natural causes, and her will was admitted
to probate. The husband's heirs sought to intervene in the probate
proceeding, claiming that because Mrs. Ellis did not survive her
husband for 120 hours, section 31-3-120 deems both to have died
"simultaneously." Consequently, they argued, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 31-3-104 authorized them to seek a one-half interest in the
entireties property. The trial court denied the motion to intervene,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal to this Court, we hold
that section 31-3-120 does not require one spouse to survive the other
by 120 hours in order to obtain fee simple title to property formerly
held by the entirety. We also hold that the General Assembly, in
enacting section 31-3-120, did not intend to define the term
"simultaneously" in section 31-3-104 as meaning "within 120 hours."
Instead, we conclude that the legislature intended that this term
should continue to receive its ordinary construction, meaning "at the
same time." The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Cases posted the week of
03/18/2002
Exxon Corp. v. Metro Govt. of Nashville
& Davidson County
- M2000-0061-SC-R11-CV
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We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine
whether the Court of Appeals erred in defining the phrase "on that same
location" as it is used in Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-109 to mean
anywhere within the boundary lines of the property. We hold that such a
definition, when considered in pari materia with the Nashville and
Davidson County Metropolitan Code, broadens the scope of this statutory
grandfather provision. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
State v. Alvin Taylor
- M1999-02566-SC-R11-CD
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The sole issue in this appeal is whether Article I, Section
16 of the Tennessee Constitution or the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution is violated by Tenn. Code Ann. §
55-50-504(a)(2), a statute which provides a minimum fine, for second
offense driving on a revoked license, but which fails to provide a
maximum fine for the offense. We conclude that the statute is not
facially unconstitutional under either the state or the federal
constitution. However, fines imposed in specific cases under such
statutes are subject to being challenged as excessive. When such a
challenge is made, however, courts should first apply the principles of
the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act to determine whether the fine is
excessive before analyzing the constitutional validity of the fine. We
conclude that the $27,500 fine imposed by the jury in this case is
excessive under the principles of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act.
Accordingly, we modify the fine to the statutory minimum of $3,000. As
modified, this fine does not contravene the state and federal
constitutional provisions prohibiting excessive fines. Accordingly, we
reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
holding Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504(a)(2) unconstitutional.
William Dixon v. Flora Holland
- M1999-02494-SC-R11-PC & Dixon v. Campbell -
M1999-02122-SC-R11-CV
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Davidson County - We granted review in these
consolidated cases to determine (1) whether William Andrew Dixon's
sentence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2603 (1975) is void and thus
subject to habeas corpus relief; and (2) whether Tenn. Code Ann. §
41-21-236(c) (1997) applies to Dixon's sentence. We hold that Dixon's
sentence is void and grant habeas corpus relief. We further hold that
Dixon is entitled to any sentence reduction credits earned from 1988
until 1998. Our grant of habeas corpus relief pretermits the remaining
issues raised by Dixon. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the criminal
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases posted the week of
03/11/2002
State v. Sean Imfeld
- E2000-00094-SC-R11-CD
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Knox County - The defendant entered guilty
pleas to five counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to three
years for each conviction. The trial court ordered three of the
sentences for aggravated assault to be served consecutively, for an
effective sentence of nine years. The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed. We granted permission to appeal to address three issues: (1)
whether the trial court properly enhanced the defendant's sentences for
aggravated assault on the basis that the offenses involved more than
one victim, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(3) (1997 & Supp.
2001); (2) whether the trial court properly enhanced the defendant's
sentences on the basis that the crimes were committed under
circumstances where the potential for bodily injury to a victim was
great, id. § 40-35-114(16); and (3) whether the trial court
properly imposed consecutive sentences on the basis that the defendant
was a dangerous offender, id. § 40-35-115(b)(4). After reviewing
the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the lower courts
erred in applying the "multiple victims" and "potential bodily injury
to a victim" enhancement factors, see id. §§ 40-35-114(3) and
-114(16), but that a reduction in the length of the sentences is not
warranted because several other valid enhancement factors were
supported by the record. We also conclude that the trial court's
imposition of consecutive sentences on the basis that the defendant was
a dangerous offender was supported by the record. See id. §
40-35-115(b)(4). We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
Ernest Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience
Center
- E2000-02155-SC-R11-CV
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Sullivan County - We granted this appeal to
determine whether process issued upon a second complaint satisfies Rule
3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure when the plaintiff failed
to serve process on the original complaint. After careful consideration
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable case law, we
hold that a plaintiff may rely upon the initial filing date to satisfy
a statute of limitations if that plaintiff, having failed to issue or
serve process within thirty days of filing the complaint, continues the
action by issuing new process on the original complaint as required by
Rule 3. In addition, a plaintiff may request a voluntary dismissal
within the one-year time period under Rule 3, without having served
process, and still rely on the original date of commencement to satisfy
a statute of limitations if the plaintiff serves a copy of the Notice
of Voluntary Dismissal and the complaint on the defendant as required
by Rule 41.01. Because the plaintiff in this case failed to comply with
either Rule 3 or Rule 41.01, the plaintiff may not rely on the filing
date of the original complaint for purposes of satisfying the
applicable one-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals granting the defendants summary judgment is
affirmed.
Cases posted the week of
02/18/2002
Robert Mannery vs. Wal-Mart
Distribution Center
- E2000-01930-SC-WCM-CV
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Greene County - The dispositive issue in this
workers' compensation appeal is factual: whether the right inguinal
hernia for which the plaintiff claims recovery existed prior to the
work-related accident that occurred on April 24, 1998. If the hernia
existed prior to the accident, recovery is barred by Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-212(a)(5) which provides that an employee must prove that
the "hernia or rupture did not exist prior to the accident for which
compensation is claimed." The trial court found that the hernia did not
exist prior to the work-related accident, concluded that the plaintiff
had a compensable workers compensation claim, and awarded the plaintiff
twenty-one percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.
The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the decision
of the trial court. We granted the defendant's motion for review and
now affirm the decision of the trial court and the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel.
Woodlawn Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Roger
Keith
- M2000-00612-SC-WCM-CV
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Davidson County - In this workers'
compensation appeal, an employee was allegedly injured in the course
and scope of her employment. While purportedly seeking medical
treatment for these injuries, she contracted an infection and died. The
employer filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court claiming that
no compensable injury occurred and that the employee used the excuse of
an injury to seek prescription drugs for her addiction. The trial court
held for the employer and later granted the employer's motion for
discretionary costs. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel
reversed, finding that a preponderance of the evidence established that
a work-related injury did occur and that the employee died as a result
of seeking treatment for those injuries. We then granted the employer's
application for full court review and hold that the trial court's
findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We also hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
discretionary costs to the employer. The judgment of the Davidson
County Chancery Court is affirmed.
Daniel Barge vs. Earl and Vera
Sadler
- M1999-01923-SC-R11-CV
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Humphreys County - Daniel B. Barge III filed
a petition seeking to condemn a portion of Earl and Vera Sadler's
property for use as an easement for access to his landlocked property.
The trial court found that Barge already enjoyed an easement by
implication across John Sonday's property; thus, he could not show, as
required by the condemnation statute, that he had no other access to a
public road. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment
and held that the Sadler property was the proper location for an
easement to Barge's land. The Sadlers make two contentions on appeal:
(1) that the Court of Appeals erred in designating the property to be
burdened by the easement; and (2) that Barge failed to join all
adjoining landowners as indispensable parties defendant. We hold that
the jury of view, not the intermediate appellate court, is the proper
body to determine the location of an easement granted pursuant to Tenn.
Code Ann. § 54-14-101(a)(1) (Supp 2000). We further hold that
those owning property upon which an easement could practically be
constructed should be named as parties defendant. Therefore, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the property is
landlocked and reverse the judgment locating the easement; in all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial
court for the appointment of a jury of view and other proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Tammy Kline et al vs. Daniel Eyrich
- E2000-01890-SC-R11-CV
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Knox County - The primary issue in this case
is whether a trial court may use the common fund doctrine in a wrongful
death action to spread attorneys' fees equitably among the surviving
beneficiaries of the action. The trial court consolidated two wrongful
death actions, which were brought by the surviving spouse and children
of the decedent, and it gave the surviving spouse control of the
consolidated action. After the suit was settled, the trial court
awarded the surviving spouse's attorney one-third of the settlement
proceeds as a fee. On appeal, the children argued that the trial court
improperly awarded fees to the surviving spouse's attorney from their
share of the settlement because they possessed no contract with that
attorney. A majority of the Court of Appeals held that although the
award of fees could be proper under the common fund doctrine, the case
should be remanded to resolve factual ambiguities in the record. We
granted permission to appeal and hold that a trial court has the
discretion to apply the common fund doctrine to the proceeds of a
wrongful death action, thereby obliging the beneficiaries of that
action to pay a reasonable fee to the attorney procuring the judgment
or settlement. We also hold that the record contains no evidence
showing that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees to
the surviving spouse's attorney. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Cases posted the week of
02/18/2002
State vs. Walter Lee Allen
- E1998-00416-SC-R11-CD
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State vs. Walter Lee Allen
- E1998-00416-SC-R11-CD ( Dissent)
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Jefferson County - The defendant, Walter Lee
Allen, was indicted for aggravated robbery. He was convicted of the
lesser-included offense of robbery and received a ten-year sentence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. We
granted permission to appeal to review two issues: (1) whether a
variance existed between the indictment alleging robbery "by violence"
and the proof showing robbery by pointing a gun at the victim; and (2)
whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on
facilitation of robbery as a lesser-included offense. We conclude that
no variance existed because pointing a deadly weapon at the victim
constitutes robbery "by violence." We further conclude that the failure
to instruct on facilitation of robbery was reversible error under the
circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new trial.
Cases posted the week of
02/03/2002
State vs. Jerry W. Yancey, Jr.
- M1999-02131-SC-R11-CD
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State vs. Jerry W. Yancey, Jr.
- M1999-02131-SC-R11-CD ( Dissent)
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Williamson County - We granted this appeal
to determine the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Criminal
Appeals, in reviewing the denial of pretrial diversion, erred by
considering evidence presented at trial and failing to limit its review
to evidence considered by the district attorney general; and (2)
whether the trial court applied the correct standard in reviewing the
district attorney general's denial of pretrial diversion pursuant to a
petition for writ of certiorari. After a thorough review of the record
and relevant authority, we hold that in reviewing the denial of
pretrial diversion, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in failing to
limit its review to the evidence that was considered by the district
attorney general and any factual disputes resolved by the trial court.
We also hold that in considering the petition for writ of certiorari,
the trial court failed to apply the proper standard of review, which
requires that it determine whether the district attorney general has
considered and weighed all of the relevant factors and whether there is
substantial evidence to support the district attorney general's
decision. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court to apply the
appropriate standard of review.
Cases posted the week of
01/28/2002
State vs. Johnnie Bell, Jr.
- E1999-00819-SC-S09-CD
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State vs. Johnnie Bell, Jr.
- E1999-00819-SC-S09-CD ( Dissent)
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Sullivan County - We granted this appeal to
determine the following issues: (1) whether the district attorney
general abused his discretion by failing to consider and weigh evidence
favorable to the defendant before denying the defendant's request for
pretrial diversion; and (2) whether the trial court erred in upholding
the denial of pretrial diversion despite the district attorney
general's failure to consider and weigh evidence favorable to the
defendant. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that
the district attorney general abused his discretion by failing to
consider and weigh all of the relevant factors, including evidence
favorable to the defendant, but nevertheless concluded that the trial
court properly found that substantial evidence supported the denial of
pretrial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and relevant
authority, we hold that when the district attorney general denies
pretrial diversion without considering and weighing all the relevant
factors, including substantial evidence favorable to the defendant,
there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. We further hold that in
such a case, the proper remedy under the applicable standards of review
requires a remand for the district attorney general to consider and
weigh all of the relevant factors to the pretrial diversion
determination. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed, and this case is remanded for the district attorney general's
further consideration of the defendant's pretrial diversion application
in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Whirlpool Corp. vs. Ketkeo
Nakhoneinh
- M2000-01965-SC-WCM-CV
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Davidson County - We granted this appeal to
determine whether the employee proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) she complied with the notice requirement of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-201 and that (2) her injury was caused by her
employment as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-103(a). We hold
that she complied with the notice requirement and that her injury arose
out of her employment. The judgment of the trial court and the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel is reversed. The case is remanded
to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases posted the week of
01/21/2002
State v. John Farner, Jr.
- E1999-00491-SC-R11-CD ( Rehear Petition)
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Cases posted the week of
01/07/2002
State v. Marcus Morrow
- M1999-00769-SC-R11-CD
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Maury County - We granted this appeal to
determine whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2-128 authorizes a court
other than a general sessions court to grant work release to a
defendant convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant
(DUI), second offense. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2-128
does not permit a circuit court to grant work release to DUI second
offenders during the forty-five-day minimum mandatory sentence. The
holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. The case is
remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.