The following Tennessee Court of Appeals Opinions are available
for download:
Cases Posted the Week of
(12/25/2000)
Fain v. Fain
- M1999-02261-COA-R3-CV
View
In this post-divorce proceeding, Clifton Dean Fain ("Father")
filed a petition seeking sole custody of the parties' minor child.
Susan Lorraine Fain ("Mother") counterclaimed for a modification of the
joint custody arrangement or, in the alternative, for sole custody of
the child. The trial court awarded Mother sole custody. Father appeals
the award of sole custody to Mother. He also challenges the award of
attorney's fees to Mother and questions the fairness of the quantum of
his visitation time with the child. Mother seeks attorney's fees for
this appeal. We affirm.
Maelene Fowler vs. Jerry Wilbanks
- W2000-00452-COA-R3-CV
View
Plaintiffs sued to enjoin Defendant from denying their right to
use a private dirt and gravel road on Defendant's property in order to
access their property. The trial court held that Plaintiffs established
an easement by implication and/or prescription in the private road, and
enjoined Defendant from preventing Plaintiffs' future access to the
road. Defendant appeals.
Jerry Luster vs. Alan Bargery, et
al
- W2000-00022-COA-R3-CV
View
Prisoner filed petition for habeas corpus alleging that he
received an amended sentence of six years for drug violation instead of
the original eight-year sentence with probation. Petitioner alleges
that upon revocation of probation, he was ordered to serve the
eight-year sentence instead of the six-year amended sentence. The trial
court dismissed the petition, and petitioner has appealed.
Nancy Record vs. Brian Record
- W2000-01294-COA-R3-CV
View
Husband appeals a final decree of divorce as it pertains to
an upward deviation of child support, division of marital property and
debt, and the award of alimony in solido for attorney fees. We affirm
as modified.
Chris Farley vs. Charles Ellis, et
al
- W2000-00354-COA-R3-CV
View
Plaintiff sued defendants to enforce alleged oral agreement
to convey real estate or alternatively for damages. The trial court
found that the oral agreement violated the statute of frauds, but
ordered, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the specific
performance of the oral agreement. Defendants have appealed.
Elpidio Placencia vs. Lauren
Placencia
- W1999-01812-COA-R3-CV
View
Elpidio Placencia vs. Lauren
Placencia
- W1999-01812-COA-R3-CV (Concur)
View
This is a post-divorce action involving custody and
relocation of the parties' minor child. Father, primary custodial
parent, filed a petition to relocate, and Mother filed a petition for
change of custody. The trial court awarded custody of the child to
Mother, and Father appealed. This Court reversed the custody award and
remanded the case to the trial court. Pending application for
permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, Mother filed a petition for
stay of execution and a temporary injunction and also requested a
change of custody based on changed circumstances. After the Supreme
Court denied the application for permission to appeal, the trial court
entered its order denying Mother's request for a hearing on her
petition and denying other relief sought. Mother has appealed to this
Court.
Charles Shoffner vs. Billy
Enterprises
- W1999-01609-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a slip and fall case. The plaintiff was injured while
bowling at the defendant's bowling alley. While he was bowling, his
beeper fell from his belt onto the bowling lane. The plaintiff crossed
the foul line to retrieve his beeper, and slipped on the oiled surface.
He sued the bowling alley for his injuries, asserting that the bowling
alley failed to adequately warn him of the danger of crossing the foul
line. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant, finding that the bowling alley had no duty to warn the
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was more than 50% at fault for the
accident. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm, finding that, under the
undisputed facts, the plaintiff was more than 50% at fault for the
accident.
G.L. Omohundro, et al vs. Paul
Harrison, et al
- E2000-00666-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a suit by investors in The Great Smoky Mountain Opry
Corporation against a number of defendants including Paul Harrison. The
trial court found a violation of the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980
and awarded the plaintiffs a judgment for $56,932.50. Harrison appeals,
contending that the judgment should be reversed. We affirm.
State, Ex Rel., Tammy Davenport vs.
Gerald Partridge
- E1999-02779-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal from the Hamilton County Juvenile Court concerns
whether the Juvenile Court erred in determining the child support
obligation of the Appellant, Gerald Lamont Partridge. We vacate the
order of the Juvenile Court and remand for further findings of
fact.
Paul Farnsworth, a/k/a Ronnie
Bradfield vs. Donita Moore
- E2000-01623-COA-R3-CV
View
The Plaintiff, an inmate of the penal system of this State,
sues the Warden of the Southeastern Tennessee State Regional
Correctional Facility and certain other officials of the facility
seeking monetary damages and an injunction based on five separate
causes of action. The Trial Court dismissed his complaint, finding that
because he refused to submit to a medical evaluation provided by the
Defendant pursuant to the orders of the Court, the Court was unable to
make an evaluation and as a result of his violation of Tenn.R.Civ.P.
41.02, dismissed his suit. We affirm.
Robert Covert vs. Kimberloy Covert
- E2000-00864-COA-R3-CV
View
Robert Covert vs. Kimberloy Covert
- E2000-00864-COA-R3-CV (Concur/Dissent)
View
Mother and Father were divorced and Mother moved to Oklahoma
with the two minor children. A Marital Dissolution Agreement was
incorporated into the final decree. The MDA provided that in return for
Mother giving up all rights to Father's military retirement pay, Father
would pay all marital debt. Father's separation from the military was
anticipated at the time of the divorce. Father received severance pay
upon his separation, not retirement pay because he only had 17 years of
service. The Trial Court found that the pay Father received upon his
separation was severance pay rather than retirement, and was considered
income for the purposes of determining child support. The Trial Court,
however, did not award Mother any of the pay for child support. The
Trial Court also ordered Mother to either provide transportation for
the children one way from Oklahoma on two major visitations per year or
Father was to receive credit of $200 against his child support for
providing transportation both ways. Mother appealed. We affirm the
judgment of the Trial Court.
Sharon Kelly vs. George Evans, III
- E1999-00417-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a suit initiated by Sharon S. Sarli (now Kelly)
against George Leroy Evans, III, wherein she sought a determination
that he was the father of her child. After Mr. Evans stipulated that he
was indeed the father of the child, the Referee and the Juvenile Judge
made various determinations relative to custody, child support and the
like. Mrs. Kelly, being dissatisfied with a number of the
determinations in the Referee's last order which on appeal was in the
main affirmed by the Juvenile Judge, filed this appeal. We vacate the
judgment of the Juvenile Court and remand the case for further
proceedings.
Cases Posted the Week of (12/18/2000)
Next Generation, Inc. vs. Wal-Mart
- M2000-00114-COA-R3-CV
View
In this contract dispute, the jury awarded damages to
Wal-Mart, Inc., and the Trial Court concurred. Next Generation, Inc.,
appealed raising issues as to the admissibility of evidence and the
Trial Court's instructions to the jury. We affirm.
Arms vs. Stanton
- M2000-00811-COA-R3-CV
View
In what started out as an order of protection proceeding but
later turned into a "divorce" action, the original plaintiff, James
Vertner Arms, who was the counter-defendant in the "divorce" case,
filed a third-party action against Richard D. Stanton, individually and
doing business as Shiloh Family, Ltd. ("Stanton"). Stanton had
purchased a tract of real property from the counter-plaintiff, Tammy
Lou Arms, subsequent to the institution of her "divorce" action against
Mr. Arms. The trial court determined that Mr. Arms and Tammy Lou Arms
were not validly married; it proceeded to set aside the transfer as a
fraudulent conveyance and awarded Stanton a judgment against Tammy Lou
Arms for $50,000. Stanton appeals, arguing that the trial court erred
in setting aside the conveyance. We reverse.
Castleman vs. Castleman
- M2000-00270-COA-R3-CV
View
Mother appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to set
aside a default judgment awarding divorce to Father, distributing
marital property, and awarding custody of the minor child to Father.
Because no evidence was heard regarding factors which must be
considered by a court in making these determinations, we reverse the
trial court's denial of her motion to set aside the default judgment
and remand this matter for a trial on the merits.
Henderson vs. Dept. of
Safety
- M1999-01911-COA-R3-CV
View
Kenneth Henderson appeals pro se from an order of the
Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissing his case for failure to
prosecute his petition for review under Tennessee Code Annotated
section 4-5-322 under which he sought judicial review of a judgment of
Administrative Law Judge Marian Wall, which judgment had become final
on December 29, 1995 with petition for reconsideration being denied on
January 28, 1996. We affirm the action of the trial judge.
Moss vs. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr.
- M1999-01321-COA-R3-CV
View
Pro se Plaintiff appeals the dismissal by the trial court of
his case on the basis of failure to assert a claim upon which relief
can be granted. We affirm the action of the trial court.
Searle vs. Pfister
- M2000-00731-COA-R3-CV
View
The unmarried parents of a young child separated, and the
mother subsequently filed a petition to modify the father's visitation
so she could move to California with her new boyfriend. The trial court
initially denied her petition, but reversed itself after the mother and
the boyfriend married. On appeal, the father argues that the trial
court erred because it failed to recognize the mother's vindictive
motive. We affirm the trial court.
Seibers vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co.
- M1999-02559-COA-R3-CV
View
This case involves a dispute between a lawyer and his former
client over a fee in a personal injury case. The client discharged the
lawyer before the case was concluded and agreed to give the lawyer a
lien on the potential recovery for the work the lawyer had already
performed. When the lawyer attempted to collect his fee after the case
was settled by another lawyer, the former client asserted that the
lawyer should forfeit his fee because he engaged in unethical conduct.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the lawyer had
"technically" violated Tenn. S. Ct. R. 8, DR 5-105(A) but that the
lawyer's conduct had not prejudiced the client and that the client had
waived his conflict-of-interest claims. Accordingly, the trial court
awarded the lawyer $69,525.83 in legal fees and expenses. We affirm the
trial court's judgment.
Stan Wallace Mosley vs. Carrie Lynn
Mosley
- E2000-01445-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a bifurcated trial in a divorce
action. After hearing the parties' proof in the second phase regarding
alimony, child support and division of property, the Trial Court
entered a Judgment which the Trial Court designated as "final." The
Judgment, however, does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 54.02 of
the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court did not decide
the issue of whether excess retained earnings of Telescan, Inc., a
company in which Stan Wallace Mosley ("Husband") is a 90% shareholder,
should be imputed as income to Husband. The Judgment states that this
issue will be considered by the Trial Court in the future. Husband
appeals the Judgment but does not raise the issue of Telescan's excess
retained earnings. Carrie Lynn Mosley ("Wife") contends that the Trial
Court erred by failing to impute the excess retained earnings of
Telescan to Husband's personal income for purposes of calculating his
child support obligation. We dismiss this appeal because the Judgment
is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies.
Cases Posted the Week of (12/11/2000)
The Bogatin Law Firm vs. Hallum
Motors
- W2000-00409-COA-R3-CV
View
Appellee, an Arkansas corporation, and Appellant, a Delaware
corporation authorized to do business in Arkansas and Tennessee,
entered into an asset sales agreement for the sale and purchase of
assets relating to an automobile dealership in West Memphis, Arkansas.
Earnest money was placed in escrow with the Bogatin Law Firm, PLC in
Memphis, Tennessee. Dispute concerning the asset sales agreement arose,
and both parties made claim to the earnest money. The Bogatin Law Firm
filed a complaint for interpleader in Shelby County, Tennessee.
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss based upon improper venue which the
trial court granted. We reverse, finding that venue in Shelby County
was proper and that Appellee submitted to jurisdiction in Shelby
County, Tennessee.
Lindsey, Bradley &
Maloy vs. Media Marketing Systems, Inc., et al
- E2000-00678-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a grant of summary judgment to Defendant
Sam Cooper, the sole shareholder, president and CEO of his
co-defendant, Media Marketing Systems, Inc. Lindsey, Bradley &
Maloy ("Plaintiff") brought suit against Sam Cooper and Media Marketing
for breach of contract stemming from an agreement between Plaintiff and
Media Marketing. Plaintiff sought to pierce Media Marketing's corporate
veil so as to render Defendant personally liable for the debt owed
under the agreement. Plaintiff also made claims against Defendant for
his alleged individual tortious conduct related to the agreement. Both
Plaintiff and Defendant filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial
Court denied Plaintiff's motion but granted Defendant's motion.
Plaintiff appeals and argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
the issue of whether Media Marketing's corporate veil should be pierced
due to Defendant's conduct. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant
should not have been granted summary judgment because there are genuine
issues of material fact. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
Elliott vs. The Blakeford at Green
Hills
- M2000-00365-COA-R3-CV
View
The Director of Food Service at the defendant retirement home
injured her hand on the job, and was terminated by her supervisor. She
filed suit against her employer, claiming that she had been discharged
in retaliation for making a workers' compensation claim. At the close
of the plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for directed verdict. We reverse.
Fontenot vs. Fontenot
- M1999-02322-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from the trial court's division of marital
property and martial debt, award of alimony, and award of attorney's
fees. After reviewing the record and applicable law, the trial court's
judgment is affirmed as modified.
Isbell vs. Travis Electric Co., et
al
- M1999-00052-COA-R3-CV
View
After Plaintiff resigned from his job and attempted to start
his own competing business, his former manager informed a mutual client
of the circumstances surrounding his resignation. Plaintiff sued his
former employer and its service manager, alleging slander, libel,
defamation, and tortious interference with contract. The trial court
directed a verdict for Defendants, and Plaintiff appeals, arguing that
the trial court misapplied the substantial truth doctrine, failed to
apply the doctrine of implication, and was incorrect in its finding
that no contract existed between Plaintiff and his new company's main
client. Plaintiff also insists that, by failing to grant a new trial so
that he could add an allegation of invasion of privacy, the court
ignored the proper legal consequences arising from the disclosure of a
confidential drug test. For the following reasons, we affirm the
decision of the trial court.
Moore vs. Moore
- M1999-02301-COA-R3-CV
View
In this divorce case, the husband argues that the trial court
erred in the way it classified and distributed the parties' marital
property. We agree that the trial court's implied classification of the
parties' home on Pleasant Cove Road was erroneous as a matter of law,
but we find that its disposition of the property was nonetheless within
the court's authority and discretion. We accordingly modify the final
decree to reflect our view of its correct classification, but otherwise
affirm the trial court.
Owen vs. Martin
- M1999-02305-COA-R3-CV
View
The trial court found that a mother and her adult son had
both breached an oral contract whereby the son agreed to pay off the
mortgage on his mother's home and to permit her to remain there for the
rest of her life, and the mother agreed to give the son her equity in
the home upon her death, and to allow him to use a garage apartment in
the home until that time. We reverse the trial court's finding that
there was an enforceable contract between the parties, but we impress a
resulting trust on the son's interest in the home, which inures to his
mother's benefit.
Sheucraft vs. Roberts
- M1999-01645-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a custody dispute between the maternal grandparents,
Petitioners, and the biological father, Respondent. The child, Lexie,
was born to Dewey and Lisa Roberts in October of 1991 and was seven
years of age at the June 1999 trial. In 1995, Dewey Roberts and Lisa
Sheucraft Roberts separated, and Lisa Roberts and Lexie moved in with
the Petitioners. Ms. Roberts and the child continued to reside with the
Petitioners until her unexpected death in 1998 from a brain aneurysm
related to a cocaine overdose. The Respondent has a history of drug and
alcohol abuse and, at the time of trial, was involved in an abusive
relationship with a female companion. The trial court, applying the
"substantial harm" test of Bond v. McKenzie, 896 S.W.2d 546 (Tenn.
1995), found that to change the residential arrangements from the
grandparents' home to the father's home would be devastating to the
child and would result in substantial harm to her. The trial court
further found that it is in the child's best interests to spend the
majority of her time with the maternal grandparents. Respondent appeals
and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Suntrust Bank vs. Johnson
- M1997-00202-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a dispute between a commercial bank and
the Tennessee Department of Revenue regarding the bank's claim for a
refund of the sales taxes paid in connection with defaulted retail
installment sales contracts purchased from various automobile dealers.
After the Department denied its refund claim, the bank sued the
Commissioner of Revenue in the Chancery Court for Davidson County
seeking a refund. Both parties eventually sought a summary judgment.
The trial court granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment
after concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the
bank's claim. Alternatively, the trial court held that the bank was not
entitled to the requested refund because it was not the dealer who
originally remitted the sales tax to the Department. We have determined
that the trial court erred by determining that it lacked jurisdiction
to consider the bank's refund claim. However, we have also determined
that the trial court correctly concluded that the bank was not entitled
to the requested refund because it was not the dealer who remitted the
sales tax at issue.
Jill Rabuck vs. Robert Lewis
Rabuck
- E2000-00474-COA-R3-CV
View
In this divorce case, Husband appeals the amount and type of
alimony awarded to Wife and the Trial Court's award of Wife's attorney
fees. The Trial Court first awarded Wife $5,800 per month alimony in
futuro, but after hearing arguments of counsel on Husband's Motion to
Alter or Amend, reduced the award to $4,800 alimony in futuro and
$1,000 per month for 24 months as rehabilitative alimony. After the
Trial Court's Judgment was filed, our Supreme Court held, in Crabtree
v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn. 2000), that a concurrent award of
rehabilitative and in futuro alimony is inconsistent. Accordingly, Wife
may receive alimony in futuro or rehabilitative alimony but she may not
receive both concurrently. We therefore modify the Trial Court's
Judgment to reflect that Wife is awarded $5,800 per month alimony in
futuro for 24 months, and $4,800 per month alimony in futuro
thereafter. We affirm the Trial Court's award of Wife's attorney fees
at trial but decline to award Wife's attorney fees on appeal.
Cases Posted the Week of (12/04/2000)
Local 760 IBEW, et al vs. City of
Harriman and Harriman Utility Board
- E2000-00367-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal from the Roane County Chancery Court concerns
whether the Chancery Court erred in determining that a collective
bargaining agreement entered into between Appellant, Local Union 760 of
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and Appellees, the
City of Harriman and the Harriman Utility Board, is null and void. We
affirm the decision of the Chancery Court and remand for further
proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of
the appeal against the Appellants.
Jeffrey Harris vs. Percy
Pitzer
- W2000-00187-COA-R3-CV
View
This case involves the incarceration of the Appellant in the
state of Tennessee pursuant to a contract between the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections and Corrections Corporation of America. The
Appellant filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief in the Circuit
Court of Hardeman County. The trial court entered an order granting the
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The Appellant appeals from the dismissal of
his Petition filed in the Circuit Court of Hardeman County. For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Joseph Canepari vs. George
Summers
- W2000-00527-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a suit for the partition of land. The Appellees
brought a Complaint for Partition of Land by Sale in the Chancery Court
of Fayette County. The Appellants answered and brought a counterclaim
requesting the trial court to order the Appellees' one third-interest
in the property to be partitioned by sale to the Appellants. The
Chancery Court of Fayette County found for the Appellees, ordering the
property to be sold by partition.
Taylor Mehrhoff Co.
- W1999-00413-COA-R3-CV
View
Plaintiffs, Landowners, sued adjoining landowners, seeking a
judgment determining the location of a disputed boundary line. The
trial court found that Defendants had: (1) established record title to
the disputed property; (2) established the boundary line in recorded
deeds and trust deeds, and by the conduct, implied agreement,
acquiescence and recognition of adjoining property owners; and (3)
proven title by adverse possession of the disputed property.
Plaintiffs-Landowners have appealed.
Edward Tuggle vs. AMISUB
- W1999-02444-COA-R3-CV
View
Patient sued hospital for injuries sustained when she fell
after hospital personnel failed to respond to her call for assistance
to go to the bathroom. Patient went to the bathroom without incident
and then decided to bathe her feet while she was out of bed. Patient
filled a pan of water and sat in a chair bathing her feet when the
telephone rang. When she got up to answer the telephone across the
room, her wet feet slipped on the floor, and she fell, sustaining
injuries. The trial court granted hospital summary judgment, and
patient has appealed.
Shirley Marcum vs. Michael
Trippett
- W1999-00255-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves the interpretation of a marital
dissolution agreement pertaining to a division of marital property. The
trial court interpreted the agreement to require Husband to begin
paying $1,200.00 per month to Wife for her interest in the marital
property, an insurance agency. Husband has appealed.
Robinson Property vs. Yoanne
Russell
- W2000-00331-COA-R3-CV
View
This case arises out of a $23,800.00 debt incurred by
appellee Yo Anne Russell at the Horseshoe Casino and Hotel in
Robinsonville, Mississippi. The court below granted summary judgment to
Yo Anne Russell because the court held that the debt represented by the
drafts is unenforceable in Tennessee due to public policy
considerations embodied in section 29-19-101 of the Tennessee Code.
Plaintiff appeals from the court below, arguing that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant Yo Anne Russell. For
the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court.
Allied Business vs. Abraham
Musa
- W1999-00378-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a breach of contract regarding a
commission owed for the sale of a business. Allied, the broker, claims
that Abed Amro owes it a commission based on the contract between the
parties. Amro, however, claims that he is not liable under the Listing
Agreement even though it is undisputed that he signed the contract. The
trial court held that Allied was not entitled to a judgment against
Amro because Amro did not have an ownership interest in the business
that was sold. We reverse.
Trau-Med vs. Allstate
- W1999-01524-COA-R3-CV
View
Plaintiff medical clinic filed a complaint against an
insurance company and several of its employees alleging, inter alia,
that the defendants tortiously interfered with their business
relationship, that the attorneys supplied by the insurance company to
represent its insured were guilty of abuse of process and that the
defendants conspired to destroy plaintiff's reputation in business. The
trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Plaintiff has appealed.
Connie Givens vs. Ed Mullikin
- W1999-01783-COA-R9-CV
View
Plaintiff filed this action against defendant in an
underlying personal injury suit and the defendant's liability insurance
carrier, alleging that the defendants are vicariously liable for the
actions of the attorneys the insurance company hired pursuant to its
policy to represent the insured in defense of plaintiff's personal
injury suit. The complaint alleges that said attorneys were guilty of
abuse of process, invasion of privacy, inducing the breach of a
confidential relationship, inducing the breach of an implied contract
of confidentiality, and inducing the breach of an express contract. The
trial court denied defendants' motions to dismiss, and this case is
before this Court on a Tenn.R.App.P. 9 interlocutory appeal.
Eric Petty, a child
- W2000-00907-COA-R3-CV
View
This case involves an appeal regarding the lower court's
determination that Eric Dylan Petty was a delinquent child. In February
2000, a petition was filed with the Juvenile Court of Obion County
alleging that Eric Dylan Petty committed the delinquent acts of
aggravated assault and vandalism. The juvenile court determined that
Petty was delinquent and ordered him committed to the Tennessee
Department of Children's Services. After a de novo hearing, the circuit
court also declared Petty delinquent based on the acts of aggravated
assault and vandalism and affirmed Petty's commitment to the Department
of Children's Services. This appeal followed.
American Indemnity vs. Foy
Trailer
- W2000-00397-COA-R3-CV
View
American Indemnity Company sought a declaratory judgment that
its commercial general liability (CGL) policy did not cover claims made
by Ms. Johnson against the Appellants in her federal court complaint
and that it did not have a duty to defend Appellants in the federal
action. The Chancery Court for Shelby County held that there was no
coverage and no duty to defend. Appellants appealed. We affirm.
Robert Burton vs. Kent Gearin
- W1999-01022-COA-R3-CV
View
The Appellee was appointed by the Circuit Court of Weakley
County to represent the Appellant in his petition for post conviction
relief. The circuit court denied the Appellant's petition, and the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Appellant filed a
complaint for legal malpractice against the Appellee. The Appellant
also filed a motion to hold the matter in abeyance until he was
released from prison. The trial court failed to rule on the motion for
abeyance. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the
Appellee. The Appellant appeals the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Appellee and the trial court's failure to rule
on the motion for abeyance. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Mary Schremp vs. David Schremp
- W1999-01734-COA-R3-CV
View
Mother, the custodial parent of minor children, desired to
relocate out of state to live with her new husband. Father protested
the move and filed a petition in opposition. Finding that Mother's new
husband could easily move to Memphis to live with his new family and
that dislocating the children was not in their best interest, the trial
court granted the petition. We affirm.
In re: Stephanie Ann Linville, a
minor
- M2000-01097-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of an award
of child support to the appellee, the child's paternal grandmother and
legal custodian, from the child's mother. For reasons stated herein, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Lafferty vs. City of Winchester
- M1997-00224-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a dispute between the owners of a bed
and breakfast and the City of Winchester regarding a proposed expansion
of the business's bar and banquet facilities. When the city's Board of
Zoning Appeals declined to approve the expansion, the owners of the bed
and breakfast filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in
the Circuit Court for Franklin County challenging the Board's decision.
After reviewing the record of the proceedings before the Board, the
trial court determined that the Board acted within its discretion when
it declined to approve the proposed expansion of the bed and breakfast.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Russo vs. Russo
- M1999-02380-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from an action for divorce initiated by
Donald Joseph Russo ("Husband") against Debra Ann Russo ("Wife"). The
trial court granted Wife an absolute divorce and alimony in futuro;
awarded custody of the parties' minor children to Wife; ordered Husband
to pay child support in the amount of thirty-two hundred dollars per
month with additional child support of two thousand dollars per month
to be placed in educational trust for parties' minor children; and
awarded the majority of marital assets to Wife. Husband
appeals.
Harry Barnett and Elizabeth Barnett,
vs. Gary L. Lane and Donnal L. Lane
- E2000-00967-COA-R3-CV
View
Plaintiffs, purchasers of house from defendants, were
awarded damages for defects in house not revealed by defendants.
Plaintiffs appeal, asking punitive damages and an increase in
compensatory damages. We affirm.
James W. Hunter vs. Shirley C.
Hunter
- E2000-00662-COA-R3-CV
View
In this divorce case, Shirley C. Hunter ("Wife") appeals,
arguing that the trial court erred (1) in classifying and dividing the
parties' property; (2) in refusing to find James W. Hunter ("Husband")
in contempt for failing to pay Wife's medical bills; (3) in restricting
Wife's spousal support award to one of alimony in solido of $7,200; (4)
in awarding Husband a judgment against Wife for $5,068.53 in connection
with Wife's use of his vehicle; and (5) in failing to award Wife her
attorney's fees. We vacate the trial court's judgment ordering Wife to
pay for her use of Husband's vehicle. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Beavers vs. The Lebanon Democrat
Newspaper
- M1999-02401-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from an action initiated by Plaintiffs,
Mae and Jerry Beavers, against the Defendant newspaper, the Lebanon
Democrat, for libel and slander. The Beavers' claim arises out of two
separate articles published by the newspaper. The trial court granted
the newspaper's motion for summary judgment, holding that the first
article was substantially true and the second article was a
non-actionable opinion. The Beavers appeal.
General Bancshares vs. Volunteer
Bank & Trust
- M2000-00231-COA-R3-CV
View
The Plaintiff, General Bancshares, Inc., filed a declaratory
judgment action asking the Trial Court to declare a restrictive
covenant in its warranty deed unenforceable. Defendant Volunteer Bank
& Trust's predecessor in title of the property at issue originally
placed the restriction on the property several years ago. Plaintiff
contends, among other arguments, that the restrictive covenant does not
bind it as a remote grantee because the restrictive clause does not
contain specific "successors and assigns" language. Both parties filed
Motions for Summary Judgment, and the Trial Court granted Defendant's
Motion. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Hodges vs. TN Atty. General
- M2000-00550-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a prisoner's pro se
complaint for failure to prosecute. The Chancery Court for Davidson
County dismissed the complaint eleven months after it was filed because
the prisoner had failed to provide summonses and copies of the
complaint for service on the defendants. The prisoner has appealed to
this court. Instead of arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing
his complaint for failure to prosecute, the prisoner has simply renewed
the assertions he made in the trial court that his sentence credits
have been calculated incorrectly and that he should be released on
parole. We determined that the trial court properly dismissed the
complaint for failure to prosecute.
Kennedy vs. Kennedy
- M1997-00219-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a man's efforts to use his voluntary
early retirement as a basis for ending his spousal support obligation.
Three years after the divorce, the man filed a petition in the Circuit
Court for Davidson County seeking to end his responsibility to pay
child support. His former wife responded by filing a petition seeking
to hold him in contempt for failure to pay spousal support. Following a
bench trial, the trial court dismissed the man's petition, held him in
contempt, and entered a $3,106 judgment against him for back spousal
support. On this appeal, the man asserts that the trial court erred by
declining to relieve him of his alimony obligation because of his
inability to pay and his former spouse's lack of need. We affirm the
trial court's judgment.
Mandrell vs. McBee
- M2000-00108-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a partnership dispute occasioned by the
misappropriation of partnership funds by two of the five partners. In
an earlier appeal in this case, this Court affirmed the judgment of the
Trial Court awarding damages to the innocent partners but increased the
amount of that judgment. This Court then remanded the case to the Trial
Court, which heard further proof and made findings as to the
distribution of partnership assets. In this appeal, a Defendant partner
seeks reversal of the Trial Court's valuation and accounting of the
partnership assets and computation of prejudgment interest. We find the
concurrent findings of fact by the Special Master and the Trial Court
are supported by material evidence in the record, and that the Special
Master and the Trial Court properly interpreted this Court's earlier
Opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Trial Court in all
respects.
David Roberts vs. Essex Microtel
Assoc.,et al
- E2000-01356-COA-R3-CV
View
David Roberts vs. Essex Microtel
Assoc.,et al
- E2000-01356-COA-R3-CV (Concur & Dissent)
View
Plaintiff registered as a guest at Defendant's hotel. For
various reasons, the desk clerk asked to see Plaintiff's driver
license. Plaintiff produced his driver license for inspection by the
desk clerk. For those same reasons, the desk clerk later telephoned the
police. She provided the 911 police dispatcher with certain information
from Plaintiff's driver license. With this information, the police
discovered that an individual with the same date of birth and a similar
name was wanted in Florida on a narcotics trafficking charge. The
police came to the hotel, questioned Plaintiff, and then took Plaintiff
into custody. After detaining Plaintiff at the police station for two
hours, the police determined that Plaintiff was not the suspect wanted
in Florida and returned Plaintiff to the hotel. Plaintiff sued the
hotel owner and the desk clerk for malicious prosecution, wrongful
arrest, false imprisonment and invasion of privacy, but later proceeded
only on the invasion of privacy and false imprisonment counts. The
Trial Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. We affirm.
HMC Technologies Corp.vs. Siebe, Inc.
- E2000-01093-COA-R3-CV
View
In this declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff, HMC
Technologies Corp. a/k/a HMC Technologies, Inc. ("HMC"), sued to
enforce an indemnification provision contained in a proposal submitted
to, and accepted by, the defendant, Siebe, Inc. - Robertshaw Tennessee
Division ("Robertshaw"). Both parties moved for summary judgment. The
trial court entered judgment in favor of HMC. We reverse.
Cases Posted the Week of
(11/20/2000)
Tinkham vs. Beasley
- M1999-02809-COA-R3-CV
View
Tinkham vs. Beasley
- M1999-02809-COA-R3-CV (Dissent)
View
This appeal involves the proper measure of damages for breach
of a contract for real estate. Because the evidence does not
preponderate against the trial court's explicit finding that the value
of the house at the time of breach was the same amount as the contract
price, and because the proper measure of damages is the difference
between those two amounts, we must reverse the trial court's award of
damages to the sellers.
Sammartano vs. Sammartano
- M1999-00415-COA-R3-CV
View
In this divorce case, the defendant/wife appeals complaining
of an inequitable division of marital assets, an inadequate award of
rehabilitative alimony and the denial of attorney fees. As modified
herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court
Ford vs. Humphres
- M1999-00423-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a dispute over the estate of Ms. Thelma
Humphres, who was found by the trial court to have died intestate
owning a one-half interest in her home and the approximately twenty
acres on which it was locataed. She also owned some personal items
which sold for $1,355.50. Appellant, Joy Ford, one of Ms. Humphres
eight children, believed that Ms. Humphres had executed a will leaving
her mother's entire one-half interest in the home and property to her.
Ms. Ford objected to the administration of her mother's estate by her
brother, Appellee, Danny Humphres, and attempted to prove a lost will.
Ms. Ford failed to prove a lost will, and the property was subsequently
sold to pay the estate's debts. As Ms. Ford owned the other one-half
interest in her mother's property, she objected to the sale of this
property. She also objected to the allocation of costs and fees related
to the sale and the general administration of her mother's estate. All
of her objections were overruled. She now appeals the trial court's
actions in these matters. We affirm the trial court.
Allman vs. Allman
- M1997-00251-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a dispute over the interpretation of a
provision in the marital dissolution agreement giving the wife an
automobile but requiring the husband to continue making the car
payments. After the automobile was totally destroyed in a one-vehicle
accident, the wife's insurance company paid the balance remaining on
the car loan. After the husband refused to pay the wife an amount equal
to the balance of the car loan, the wife filed a petition in the
Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking to hold him in contempt.
Following a bench trial, the trial judge ordered the husband to pay the
wife $7,644.22 representing the balance of the loan when the automobile
was destroyed, as well as $1,355 for her legal expenses. We have
determined that the marital dissolution agreement allocated the risk of
loss of the automobile to the wife and, therefore, reverse the
$7,644.22 judgment. We have also determined that the $1,355 judgment
must be vacated and that the case should be remanded for further
proceedings.
Martino vs. Dyer
- M1999-02397-COA-R3-CV
View
The trial court granted the motion of an attorney seeking
collection of a pro rata share of his fee from a hospital lien against
his client's settlement. The effect of the trial court's order is to
require the hospital to pay fees to an attorney it did not hire. We
reverse the judgment.
Douglas Shanklin vs. UT
Medical
- W1999-01982-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a trial court's finding that a
subsequent action by Doctor was barred under the doctrine of res
judicata due to the court's decision in an earlier case. On appeal,
Doctor argued that his earlier action for age discrimination and
retaliation in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act was not the
same as the current action, which involves breach of contract and
unjust enrichment. We affirm the trial court's ruling.
The Pointe vs. Lake Mgmt.
- W2000-00211-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action to
determine rights in a privately-owned lake. Plaintiffs purchased land
adjacent to the artificially-created lake for the purpose of developing
residential lots. Subsequent to the sale of the property, Plaintiffs'
grantor conveyed title to the lake to Defendant. Defendant claims it
has the right to control use of the lake and that Plaintiffs have no
right to lake access without Defendant's permission. The trial court
granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that:
(1) the lake is unnavigable, and no riparian rights can therefore flow
to adjoining landowners; (2) the Defendant, as owner of the land
subjacent to the lake, has a right to the unimpeded use and control of
the property; and (3) any use of the lake by the adjoining property
owners without Defendant's consent would constitute a trespass.
Plaintiffs appeal.
Estate of W.O. McIntyre
- W1999-01700-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a will contest. The decedent committed suicide
after writing several notes in which he expressed his wish that the
bulk of his estate pass to his wife of eighteen years, with specific
bequests to his children. The decedent's children contested the
validity of the disposition, arguing that the decedent lacked
testamentary capacity to execute a will at the time that he wrote the
notes. After a jury trial, the jury found that the decedent had
testamentary capacity and that the handwritten notes constituted a
valid holographic will. The children appeal, arguing that the burden of
proving testamentary capacity should have been placed on the will's
proponents, due to the decedent's depression and resulting suicide, and
that the evidence did not support the jury's verdict. We affirm,
finding that the trial court did not err in its instructions on the
burden of proof and that there is material evidence to support the
jury's verdict.
Donnie Johnson vs. Centex
- W2000-00072-COA-R9-CV
View
This appeal arises from an injury by Worker who fell
through a hole in the roof while working on a construction site. Worker
brought suit against the Owner, the General Contractor and Builder, who
through its construction of precast concrete panels had created the
hole. The trial court granted Owner and General Contractor summary
judgment on the basis that both were acting in the capacity of a
general contractor and were thus exempt from suit under the workers'
compensation statutes. Builder, even through it no longer had control
of the area where Worker was injured, was denied summary judgment on
the basis that OSHA regulations created a non-delegable duty to prevent
injuries. We affirm the trial court's granting of summary judgment to
Owner and General Contractor. We reverse the trial court's denial of
summary judgment for Builder, finding that OSHA regulations do not
create a duty for Builder.
State vs. Demetrius McNeil
- W2000-00276-COA-R3-CD
View
Juvenile convicted in criminal court in de novo trial of
appeal from juvenile court appeals the criminal court order denying his
motion pursuant to Tenn.R.Crim.P. 36 to correct a clerical error.
Juvenile asserts that although the criminal court ruled that there was
no clerical error, the criminal court, in failing to remand the case to
a juvenile court, committed plain error for which relief should be
granted. Upon finding that the criminal court had no jurisdiction to
retain the case, the case is remanded to the criminal court to modify
the sentencing order by remanding to the juvenile court.
Pam Hamblen vs. Richard Davidson
- W2000-00144-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a personal injury suit in which
Plaintiff alleged that her ex-husband had negligently infected her with
the virus which causes genital herpes. The trial court granted
Defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that: (1) the one-year
statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104, barred Plaintiff's
claim; (2) Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant knew or should
have known he had herpes, and owed her a duty to warn her of his
condition; and (3) Plaintiff failed to establish that she contracted
the virus from Defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Jennifer Thomas vs. Stephen Thomas
- W1999-00284-COA-R3-CV
View
In this divorce case, the trial court, among other
things, made a division of marital property, awarded Wife alimony in
solido, made an award of child support, and ordered payments of various
debts by the parties. Both parties have appealed presenting issues
concerning the court's above stated actions.
Rhonda Moffitt vs. Paul Moffitt
- W1999-02403-COA-R3-CV
View
In this divorce case, Husband appeals the trial court's
final decree as it deals with the division of marital property, the
division of marital debt (including crediting Wife for monies spent
prior to the sale of the marital home), and child support arrearages.
We affirm.
Harold Angus vs. Western Hert.
- W2000-00902-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a dispute between Contractor and
Insurer over insurance coverage during a building demolition project.
During the project, Contractor knowingly damaged an adjacent structure.
When suit was brought against Contractor by the owners of the adjacent
structure, Insurer refused coverage. The trial court found Insurers'
policy and endorsement to be ambiguous and thus unenforceable. We
disagree, finding that the policy and endorsement are not ambiguous and
that they clearly state that Insurer will provide no coverage for
intentional damage to other structures. We reverse the trial court's
ruling and find that Insurer is not liable under the policy.
Johnny McGowan vs. Robert Gibson,e
t al
- E2000-01385-COA-R3-CV
View
Plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed by the Trial Court
on the basis plaintiff's action was time barred by Tenn. Code Ann.
§41-21-806. We vacate and remand.
E.L. Billingsley and Oneida
Farms, Inc. vs. Alvin D. Escue
- E2000-00463-COA-R3-CV
View
The Trial Judge granted defendant summary judgment on
grounds the action was time-barred. We affirm.
Cases Posted the Week of (11/13/2000)
Linda Taylor vs. James Taylor
- E2000-00476-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a divorce in which the Trial Court
awarded Linda May Taylor ("Wife"), age 58, alimony until she reaches
age 65 or she retires, whichever occurs first. Wife was also awarded
the parties' home. The Trial Court granted James Arnold Taylor
("Husband"), age 61, his interest in the marital home but ordered that
Wife does not have to pay Husband for his interest in the marital home
until Wife reaches age 65. Husband appeals. We affirm.
Mark Addaman, et al vs. Gwendolyn
Lanford
- E2000-00816-COA-R3-CV
View
Plaintiffs, residential sellers, sued an appraiser for
negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract when her appraisal
was far below the contract sales price of their home. The sales
contract was contingent upon the appraised value being equal at least
to the sales price. The buyers declined to purchase the home based on
the failure of that contingency. Defendant moved for a directed verdict
because the appraisal was performed at the request of and for the
benefit and guidance of the mortgagor and not the seller, and because
the sellers did nothing in reliance upon the appraisal. The Trial Court
denied the motion for a directed verdict on the negligent
misrepresentation theory. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Plaintiffs. Recovery for the tort of negligent misrepresentation
requires that the information provided by the Defendant be given for
the Plaintiffs' benefit and guidance and that the Plaintiffs
justifiably rely on that information. While Plaintiffs were affected by
the appraisal, it was not done for their benefit and guidance, and they
did not justifiably rely upon the information. Therefore, Plaintiffs
have no cause of action against the appraiser for negligent
misrepresentation. The judgment is reversed, and the Complaint is
dismissed.
Lawrence Westfall vs. Brentwood Svc.
Grp, Inc.
- E2000-01086-COA-R3-CV
View
Lawrence O. Westfall filed suit against his former employer,
Brentwood Service Group, Inc., seeking payment of post-employment
commissions allegedly due him. The defendant counterclaimed for breach
of a non-competition/non-disclosure agreement. Following a bench trial,
the court below awarded post-employment commissions to the plaintiff
and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim, finding that the parties
had not agreed to the non-competition/non-disclosure agreement. The
employer now appeals, claiming that the plaintiff is not entitled to
post-employment commissions and that the trial court erred in failing
to enforce the parties' alleged non-competition/non-disclosure
agreement. We affirm.
A.W. Brewer vs. Fi-Shock, Inc.
- E1999-01988-COA-R9-CV
View
This is a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal for a determination as
to whether federal district court had exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction to hear this matter. The Appellee filed suit in Circuit
Court averring that he was the owner of an invention known as "The
Boss", and he had entered into a License Agreement with Fi-Shock, Inc.,
in which Fi-Shock agreed to manufacture, market and sell "The Boss" and
compensate Mr. Brewer, and that Fi-Shock breached the agreement. Mr.
Brewer further averred that Fi-Shock intentionally interfered with his
property rights, thereby denying him compensation to which he was
entitled and that his invention was protected by a United States
Patent. Mr. Brewer sued for compensatory damages not to exceed
$1,000,000. Fi-Shock filed a motion to dismiss averring that only the
United States District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a). The trial court denied the motion. Defendant
sought an Rule 9 interlocutory appeal which was granted by the Trial
Court and this Court. We affirm the decision of the Trial
Court.
Sonny Gilliam, et al vs. Loriann
Calcott, et al
- E1999-02365-COA-R3-CV (Correction from 03/30/2000)
View
Judd's Inc. vs. Dors L. Muir, et al
- E1999-01836-COA-R3-CV
View
In this appeal Doris and Allan Muir insist that the
Chancellor was in error in not allowing their homestead exemption as to
certain funds realized from the sale of real estate to satisfy a
judgment previously entered against them. Their attorney, W. Richard
Baker, Jr., insists that the Chancellor was in error in not enforcing a
lien for his attorney fees that he claimed was properly perfected as to
the same funds. We affirm.
Mitchell Bingham vs. Tammy
Bingham
- E1999-01768-COA-R3-CV
View
In this post-divorce case, Mitchell Blain Bingham filed a
petition seeking the custody of his minor child. The trial court,
instead, awarded the child's custody to the child's paternal
grandparents, who, prior to the trial court's order awarding them
custody, were not parties to the action and had not previously
petitioned for custody. Both of the child's parents appeal the award of
custody to the paternal grandparents. We vacate the trial court's
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
In re: Estate of Willette Bonita
Carnahan
- M1999-00494-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a will contest in which the defendant
has appealed from a jury verdict invalidating a will on the grounds of
unsound mind and undue influence. The deceased executed two wills. The
first will was executed in 1985 naming the plaintiff who was a friend,
employee, and the son of the family who cared for her in her later
years as the sole beneficiary. The second will was executed in 1993
naming the defendant, a man who share cropped tobacco on her farm and
was paid to mow her lawn, as the sole beneficiary. The plaintiff
alleged that at the time the latter will was executed, the testator was
of unsound mind and had been unduly influenced by the defendant. At
trial, the jury returned special findings that the deceased was not of
sound and disposing mind on December 29, 1993, when the second will was
executed and that she was unduly influenced by the defendant in making
the last will and testament. On appeal, the defendant presents three
issues: (1) whether there was material, substantial evidence to support
the jury findings, (2) whether the trial judge erred in instructing the
jury regarding a presumption of undue influence and the burden of proof
on finding a confidential relationship, and (3) whether the trial court
erred in assessing court costs against the defendant and not awarding
him attorneys fees. We affirm the judgment.
Mahan vs. Mahan
- M1999-01366-COA-R3-CV
View
In this divorce case, the husband appeals the award of
custody of the children to the wife, the admission of certain evidence
at trial, and the redistribution of marital property on a post-judgment
motion following his bankruptcy. We affirm the trial court.
Burgess vs. Tie Co. 1, LLC
- M1999-02232-COA-R3-CV
View
In this slip and fall action the Trial Court granted defendant
summary judgment. We vacate and remand.
Clifton vs.
Acosta-Delgado
- M2000-00253-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a post-divorce child custody dispute. The mother
filed a petition to regain custody of the parties' three children after
she had entered into an agreed order in 1995 granting custody to the
defendant father. After hearing testimony on, inter alia, the father
driving while intoxicated with the children in the car with him, the
trial court found a material change in circumstances, granted custody
to the mother, and ordered the father to pay child support. The father
appeals, arguing that there was not a material change in circumstances
sufficient to warrant a change in custody, that the trial court
inappropriately considered his child support arrearage prior to the
1995 agreed order, and that the trial court miscalculated his income,
resulting in an unreasonably high child support award. We affirm,
finding a material change in circumstances warranting a change in
custody, and finding that the evidence does not preponderate against
the award of child support.
Heatherly vs. Merrimack Mutual Fire
Ins. Co.
- M1998-00906-COA-R10-CV
View
This extraordinary appeal involves a dispute between two
homeowners whose house was damaged by fire and the two insurance
adjusting companies hired by the homeowners' insurance carrier to
investigate their claim. Believing that their claim had been
fraudulently processed, the homeowners filed suit in the Circuit Court
for Sumner County against their insurance carrier and the two adjusting
companies. The three defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as to
the adjusting companies. After the trial court denied the motions and
declined to grant an interlocutory appeal, the two adjusting companies
petitioned for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal. We granted
the application and now reverse the trial court's denial of the motion
to dismiss because the homeowners have conceded that they have no
breach of contract claim against the adjusting companies and because we
have concluded that the homeowners' claims are barred by the statute of
limitations.
Miller vs. Miller
- M1999-00724-COA-R3-CV (Correction - originally filed 8/31/00)
View
In this divorce, both Husband and Wife have appealed
contesting the trial court's division of marital property and alimony
awards. The division of marital property is affirmed, alimony awards
are modified, and the case is remanded for a determination of the value
of Husband's retirement plan and a proper division thereof.
Stacy's Carpet Steam Cleaning Co. vs.
David McNeely, et al
- E1999-01880-COA-R3-CV
View
Stacy's Carpet Steam Cleaning Company d/b/a Bent Nail
Construction, the Plaintiff, appeals a judgment from the Carter County
Chancery Court. The Plaintiff's issues are whether the Trial Court
erred in calculating the damages, erred in failing to award prejudgment
interest, and erred in failing to enforce a mechanic's lien. The
Defendants raise an issue insisting the parties reached an accord and
satisfaction or a new contract. We affirm the judgment of the Trial
Court pursuant to Rule 10 of this Court as to the Plaintiff's issues
one and two and as to the Defendants' issue and modify its judgment as
to the Plaintiff's issue three regarding enforcement of its
lien.
Rentenbach Constructors, Inc. vs.
Eli Bowen, et al
- E2000-01213-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal from the Jefferson County Chancery Court concerns
whether the Chancery Court erred in determining that Appellant,
Rentenbach Constructors, Incorporated is obligated to indemnify
Appellees, Mathews Corporation and Ball Corporation under the terms of
a construction contract entered into between Rentenbach and Ball. We
reverse the decision of the Chancery Court in this respect and remand
for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We
adjudge costs of the appeal against the Appellees, Ball Corporation and
Mathews Corporation.
Arthur Blair vs. Marilyn Badenhope
- E1999-02748-COA-R3-CV
View
Arthur Blair vs. Marilyn Badenhope
- E1999-02748-COA-R3-CV (Dissent)
View
Arthur Blair ("Father") petitioned the Trial Court to modify
a prior custody decree entered by a North Carolina court. Marilyn
Badenhope, the child's maternal grandmother, has had custody of the
child since the child's infancy. This is Father's second attempt in the
Tennessee courts to obtain a modification of the North Carolina decree.
In this suit, the Trial Court denied Father's petition, holding that
Father failed to show that a material change in circumstances had
occurred such that substantial harm to the child would not result if
Father was awarded custody. Father appeals and contends that the Trial
Court erroneously found no showing of a material change in
circumstances and that substantial harm would result to the child if
the child was placed in Father's custody. The grandmother does not
dispute the Trial Court's ultimate decision, but she contends that the
Trial Court only had to inquire as to whether a material change of
circumstances had occurred and did not have to determine whether
substantial harm would result to the child if custody was changed. We
affirm.
Andrews vs. Salter
- M1998-00953-COA-R3-CV
View
The defendant's automobile ran into the rear of the
plaintiff's car. After the collision, the plaintiff learned that she
had sustained a ruptured disk and commenced the underlying action,
seeking compensation for both personal injury and property damage. At
trial, the court admitted evidence that the plaintiff had been involved
two prior accidents within the past ten months. The trial court granted
a directed verdict to the plaintiff on the issue of liability for the
accident, but left open the question of whether the defendant's actions
caused the plaintiff's injuries. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2,500
in damages, notwithstanding the fact that her undisputed medical
expenses were substantially higher. The plaintiff appealed, arguing
that the admission of the prejudicial and irrelevant evidence of prior
accidents was error and that the jury improperly speculated on the
cause of her injuries. The evidence of the prior accidents was limited,
included no proof of personal injuries, and included no connection
between the mere occurrence of these accidents and the plaintiff's
injuries. Because the evidence of the prior collisions invited
speculation, we reverse.
In re: Estate of Ralph I. Cammack,
deceased
- M1999-02382-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a dispute between the deceased testator's second wife
and the two children of his first marriage. The testator and his wife
executed mutual and reciprocal wills which passed the bulk of their
estate to the survivor. The spouses agreed, and their wills reflected,
that when the survivor died, the estate was to go equally to the
testator's children. In conjunction with the wills, the spouses
executed an agreement that they would not change their wills even after
the death of the other. After the testator's death, the wife began
dissipating the estate, selling the family home, and giving her own
child the testator's expensive grandfather clock. In an effort to
preserve the estate, the testator's children commenced the underlying
action, seeking to establish a resulting trust. After the trial court
granted the wife's motion for summary judgment, the testator's children
lodged this appeal. Because testator's will gave the wife his estate in
fee simple, she inherited the real property as tenant by entirety, and
there is no clear and convincing evidence that the testator intended
her merely to hold the property in trust for his children, we must
affirm.
Clark vs. Lemley
- M1999-01271-COA-R3-CV
View
This case arises from a dispute between neighbors over the
use of an old road which connected Appellant's landlocked farm to a
public roadway. The road crossed Appellees' property. After Appellees
erected a locked gate across the old road, Appellant sought injunctive
relief to permit access to the old road. After a trial, the court found
that the old road was never a public road and that no prescriptive
easement existed. The court declined to provide the requested relief.
Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's
findings, we affirm.
Jarvis vs. Jarvis
- M1998-00905-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves the dissolution of a five-year marriage
in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County. Following a bench trial,
the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of
inappropriate marital conduct, divided the marital estate, and ordered
the husband to pay long-term spousal support. The trial court also
directed the husband to maintain the wife's health insurance for three
years and to reimburse her for medical expenses incurred prior to the
divorce. On this appeal, the husband takes issue with the decision to
award the wife the divorce, the classification and division of the
marital property, and the long-term spousal support award. We have
determined that the spousal support award should be modified and that
the remaining portions of the trial court's decree should be
affirmed.
Stone vs. Stone
- M1997-00218-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a former spouse's efforts to extricate
himself from the spousal support obligations contained in a marital
dissolution agreement. Approximately one year after the entry of the
divorce decree approving the agreement, the former husband requested
the Chancery Court for Putnam County to set the agreement aside because
he did not have independent legal advice and his judgment was impaired
by antidepressant medication when he signed the agreement. The trial
court modified portions of the decree but did not relieve the former
husband of his spousal support obligation. Thereafter, the former
husband filed a second motion seeking to terminate or reduce his
spousal support obligations because of his former wife's improved
financial circumstances. The trial court again declined to relieve the
former husband of his obligation to pay spousal support. On this
appeal, the former husband renews his argument that he should no longer
be required pay spousal support because of his former wife's improved
financial circumstance and his own weakened financial condition. We
affirm the trial court's decision that the former husband has failed to
prove the existence of a substantial, material change in circumstances
that would warrant modifying his spousal support obligation.
Cases Posted the Week of
(11/06/2000)
Whittington-Barrett vs. Johnson
- E2000-00700-COA-R3-CV View
This is a suit between two
inmates of the State of Tennessee. The Plaintiff, a transsexual, seeks
a declaratory judgment "to establish the rights of the Plaintiff," and
damages, attorney fees and costs against the Defendant because of
sexual harassment. The cause of action alleges violation of various
sections of the Constitutions of the State of Tennessee and the United
States of America and of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Trial Judge
dismissed the complaint because there was "no claim of state action in
Plaintiff's complaint, nor is this an employer/employee situation." We
affirm.
Reagan vs. Connelly, et al
- E2000-00451-COA-R3-CV
View
C.M. Reagan filed this action seeking to collect a money
judgment previously obtained against the defendant Dan Connelly
("Connelly"), which judgment was based upon Connelly's guaranty of a
note executed by his brother-in-law. Following a bench trial, the court
below found that Connelly had fraudulently conveyed three pieces of
real property to the defendant corporation, Dan Connelly, Inc. ("the
Corporation"). With respect to a fourth piece of property, the trial
court found that its transfer to the Corporation was not fraudulent.
The trial court, however, went on to disregard the separate identity of
the Corporation and find that 96% of the value of the fourth piece of
property was available to satisfy the underlying judgment. This
determination was based upon the trial court's finding that Connelly
owned that percentage of the Corporation's stock. The Corporation and
its record shareholders appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.
Edmond Brothers Supply Co., Inc.
vs. Boyle and Adams, et al
- E1999-027310-COA-R3-CV
View
Edmond Brothers Supply Company, Inc. ("Plaintiff"), a
building materials supplier, sold materials to a contractor for use in
a construction project for Bristol Regional Women's Center, P.C.,
("Defendant"). Plaintiff did not send statements to Defendant because
the contractor instructed Plaintiff not to bill Defendant. When the
project was completed, the contractor took the Plaintiff's final bill
to Defendant for payment. Defendant's office manager sent a check in
full payment to Plaintiff, but Defendant stopped payment on the check
and refused to pay the bill. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant,
individual defendants, and a partnership to enforce a materialmen's
lien for the outstanding debt. All defendants denied enforceability of
the lien. The Trial Court dismissed the action to enforce the
materialmen's lien, dismissed the action against the individual
defendants and the partnership, and granted judgment to Plaintiff
against Defendant on an agency theory. The Trial Court found that the
contractor had authority to make the purchases for Defendant and that
since Defendant had used the materials in its building, Defendant was
obligated to pay for them, despite its instruction to the contractor
not to charge any materials for the project. Defendant appeals this
judgment. We hold that the contractor had no actual, implied, apparent,
or ostensible authority to charge building materials to Defendant. We
reverse the judgment of the Trial Court, and dismiss the Complaint
against Defendant.
Roden, et al vs. Heck, et al
- E2000-00969-COA-R3-CV
View
This case involves a chicken -- more specifically a rooster
-- that allegedly ran "afoul" of the law. James Roden and his wife,
Janet Roden, brought this action against their neighbors, Clark Heck,
Sr., and Clark Heck, Jr., after Mr. Roden was injured by a chicken that
had escaped from the defendants' property. The trial court granted the
defendants summary judgment. We affirm.
Domincovitch vs. Wilson Co. Bd. of
Zoning Appeals
- M1999-02334-COA-R3-CV
View
Petitioner/Appellant, Gregory Domincovitch ("Petitioner")
made a request to the Wilson County Board of Zoning Appeals for a "use
permissible on appeal" to establish a 250 foot communication tower on
his A-1 zoned property. Defendant/Appellee, Wilson County Board of
Zoning Appeals ("the Board") denied this request. Mr. Domincovitch
petitioned for Writ of Certiorari to the chancery court and
subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in that court. The
chancellor granted Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment finding
that the Board did not have jurisdiction to deny the permit for
construction of the communications tower. The Board appealed the
chancery court's decision. We affirm the chancery court's ruling
finding that Petitioner had presented evidence fulfilling all
requirements set out in Wilson County's zoning ordinance regarding cell
tower location, and thus, the Board had no jurisdiction to deny the
permit to Petitioner.
Inscoe, et al vs. Kemper, et al
- M1999-00741-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a suit filed by Inscoe seeking the
return of earnest money held in escrow for the purchase of Kemper's
residence. When Inscoe decided not to purchase the residence, Kemper
refused to return the earnest money. The trial court found in favor of
Inscoe and ordered the return of the earnest money. In making its
finding, the court stated that Inscoe's promise to buy was illusory and
there was no meeting of the minds, thus the contract was void and
unenforceable. Kemper appeals.
Cases Posted the Week of
(10/30/2000)
Jim Hockaday vs. Dennis Freels
- E1999-02719-COA-R3-CV
View
This is an action for conversion of a $10,169.59 check.
Responding to the plaintiff's allegations, the defendant claimed he had
authority to negotiate the check because he and the plaintiff had
orally entered into a partnership or joint venture. Following a bench
trial, the court below found that no such relationship existed and that
the defendant had wrongfully converted the check. We affirm.
William Davidson vs. Richard
Holtzman, et al
- E2000-01091-COA-R3-CV
View
The jury awarded the plaintiff, William Davidson,
damages for breach of two oral contracts between Davidson and his
former employer, the defendant Richard Holtzman, who, at the time the
contracts were made, was the sole shareholder of the defendant Engel
Stadium Corporation ("the Corporation"). Defendants appeal, arguing (1)
that one of the agreements is barred by the Statute of Frauds; (2) that
the same agreement is too indefinite to be enforced; and (3) that the
trial court erred in admitting the testimony of another former employee
of Holtzman. We affirm.
Scott Yother vs. Laine Yother
- E2000-01046-COA-R3-CV
View
In this post-divorce case, Elaine Hines Yother ("Mother")
appeals from an order awarding primary residential custody of the
parties' minor child, Avery Raechelle Yother (DOB: April 2, 1995), to
the child's father, Scott Christopher Yother ("Father"). Mother argues
(1) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify
the custodial arrangement decreed in the parties' divorce judgment;
and, alternatively, (2) that the evidence preponderates against the
trial court's judgment changing custody. Because we find that the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the issue of
custody, we reverse the judgment below.
City of Chattanooga vs. Kevin Davis
- E2000-00664-COA-R3-CV
View
City of Chattanooga vs. Kevin
Davis
- E2000-00664-COA-R3-CV (Concur)
View
City of Chattanooga vs. Kevin Davis
- E2000-00664-COA-R3-CV (Dissent)
View
The defendant was found guilty of violating a city ordinance
proscribing reckless driving. A Chattanooga city court judge imposed a
"penalty" of $300. On his appeal to the Hamilton County Criminal Court,
the defendant was again found guilty, but this time his punishment was
set at $50. The trial court went further and permanently enjoined the
City of Chattanooga from "imposing or trying to collect" fines or
penalties in excess of $50 for ordinance violations. The trial court
also declared the state statutes and city ordinance providing for the
assessment of penalties up to $500 for such violations to be
unconstitutional and/or invalid. We affirm the trial court's imposition
of a $50 fine. We reverse the judgment of court declaring the statutes
and city ordinance unconstitutional and/or invalid. We further reverse
the judgment of the court enjoining the City from collecting fines or
penalties in excess of $50.
Cheryl N. Buckner, et al vs. David F.
Hassell, M.D., et al
- E1999-02564-COA-R3-CV
View
Ronald L. Buckner was diagnosed with a rare form of melanoma
which ultimately resulted in his death. His wife, Cheryl N. Buckner,
brought this medical malpractice action against her husband's family
physician, Dr. David F. Hassell. The Trial Court excluded portions of
the testimony of Mr. Buckner's dermatologist and dermatopathologist due
to Ms. Buckner's failure to name these physicians as expert witnesses
in her answers to interrogatories pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Hassell, and thereafter, Ms.
Buckner filed a Motion for New Trial based upon the weight of the
evidence and the Trial Court's exclusion of the dermatologist's
testimony regarding the standard of care. The Trial Court denied the
Motion. On appeal, Ms. Buckner contends that the Trial Court erred in
excluding the testimony at issue because Dr. Hassell did not suffer any
prejudice from these physicians not having been identified as expert
witnesses in Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories as his attorney was
aware of the dermatologist's opinions prior to his deposition for
proof, and because each of these treating physicians whose testimony
was excluded was not a Rule 26 expert witness. We affirm.
Cases Posted the Week of
(10/23/2000)
Dunlap vs. Fortress Corp. and Covenant
Health
- E2000-00103-COA-R3-CV
View
Plaintiff's action for personal injuries sustained at
defendant's fitness center was dismissed by the Trial Court because
plaintiff's agreement with the center contained an exculpatory clause.
We vacate the Judgment.
Thomas Fain Dalton vs. Lynda F.
Dalton
- E2000-00255-COA-R3-CV
View
Father's Petition to change custody of the parties' minor
children was granted. The mother's Petition for an increase in child
support was dismissed. We ordered increase in child support to date of
filing.
Beasley Cotton Co. vs.
Ralph
- W1999-00273-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a breach of contract between Farmer
and Broker. After signing a contract to deliver cotton to Broker,
Farmer failed to do so. Broker was then forced to purchase the cotton
elsewhere for a substantial loss and brought suit to recover the
losses. At the start of the trial, Farmer requested that the trial
court dismiss the case and order the parties to proceed to arbitration.
Finding that Farmer had waived his rights under the contract to
arbitration, the trial court refused. Proceeding with the case, court
found that Farmer had breached the contract and awarded damages to
Broker. We affirm.
Russell vs. Russell
- E1999-02742-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal from the Hamilton County Chancery Court concerns
whether the Trial Court erred in awarding primary residential
responsibility of the minor child to the Appellee, Burgess Stephen
Russell. The Appellant, Linda Sharion Russell, appeals the decision of
the Chancery Court. We affirm the decision of the Trial Court and
remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion.
We adjudge costs of the appeal against the Appellant, Linda Sharion
Russell and her surety.
Bailey vs. Bailey
- W1999-01000-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a divorce case involving child custody. Mother and
Father are divorced and have one minor child. The trial court granted
custody of the minor child to Father. Mother appeals, arguing that the
trial court erroneously based its decision on her lack of relationship
with her father, the child's maternal grandfather. We affirm.
Sandra Silverstein vs. William
Rice
- W1999-01336-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a suit to enforce a past child support obligation.
The mother filed suit against the father, seeking past due child
support payments, health insurance premiums and medical costs for the
parties' three minor children. The trial court held for the mother, and
granted her a judgment for the child support arrearages, health
insurance and medical costs, attorney's fees and pre-judgment interest
on the child support arrearages. The father appeals, arguing, inter
alia, that the trial court erred by failing to prorate his child
support obligation as each child attained majority. We affirm, holding
that the trial court was not required to prorate the child support
obligation as each child attained majority, because the child support
award was a lump sum for all of the children and the amount was below
the guideline amount for the remaining minor children.
Cunningham vs. Cunningham
- W1999-02054-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a divorce after seven years of marriage.
The trial court granted the wife a divorce, divided the property,
awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido, awarded
child support for the parties' minor child, established an educational
trust fund, and ordered the husband to maintain life insurance for so
long as he is obligated to pay child support. On appeal, husband takes
issue with all of the above and also raises the constitutionality of
the child support guidelines. In addition, wife takes issue with the
failure of the trial court to award her litigation expenses. We have
determined that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded.
Shirley Williams vs. Donald
Thrailkill
- W1999-01032-COA-R3-CV
View
This case involves visitation rights for an aunt of the minor
child. In 1992, the aunt and her husband were granted visitation rights
by the Shelby County Juvenile Court. In 1997, after the child's father
had moved with the child to Tipton County, the aunt and her husband
filed a petition in the Tipton County Juvenile Court to hold father in
contempt for failing to abide by the visitation order, to change
custody, and alternatively to enforce visitation. After an evidentiary
hearing, the Tipton County Juvenile Court held that the prior Shelby
County Juvenile Court order granting visitation to aunt was in full
force and effect and incorporated the Shelby County order and its order
by reference. Father has appealed.
Laurie Thornton vs. Countrywide
Inc.
- W1999-02086-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a consolidated appeal of two cases, each involving a
trust deed on residential real property owned by Husband and Wife as
tenants by the entirety. Husband was individually indebted to the
holders of the trust deeds, and wife joined in the trust deeds to
convey her "marital" interest in the property. Wife contends that her
execution of the trust deeds merely conveyed her survivorship interest
and did not convey her current possessory interest. Also, as to one of
the loans, Wife contends that it was a consumer loan, and the
lender/holder of the trust deed violated the Truth and Lending Act, 15
USC § 1601 et seq. The chancery court granted summary judgment to
the holders of the trust deeds, and Wife has appealed.
Matter of Fannie Barnhill
- W2000-00289-COA-R3-CV
View
Will contestant voluntarily dismissed chancery court proceeding to contest will. Subsequently, contestant filed another notice to contest the will. The trial court, on motion, dismissed the proceeding as barred, because it had previously been dismissed, and such an action is within an exception to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 41.01 (1). Contestant has appealed.
Blumberg vs. Dept. of Human Svcs.
- M2000-00237-COA-R3-CV
View
Frederic Blumberg ("Blumberg") filed a petition against his
wife in the Sumner County Circuit Court, seeking all his wife's marital
assets and an increase in his minimum monthly maintenance needs
allowance. On September 16, 1998, the Sumner County Circuit Court
issued an Order requiring Mrs. Blumberg to pay as support for the
benefit of Mr. Blumberg, all of her monthly income. Subsequently,
Blumberg applied for Medicaid benefits on behalf of Mrs. Blumberg,
administered by the Tennessee Department of Human Services ("DHS"), for
which he was approved. On October 26, 1998, Blumberg received notice
from DHS that his request for an income allocation was denied.
Thereafter, Blumberg requested an administrative hearing appealing the
denial of spousal allocations. On December 8, 1998, an administrative
hearing with DHS was held, and Blumberg's appeal was denied. The
Chancery Court affirmed the decision of the DHS, finding that the
support order was not validly adjudicated because of lack of notice to
DHS. This appeal followed.
Hall vs. Metro Gov't
- M1999-01590-COA-R3-CV
View
On September 11, 1997, Dr. Bill M. Wise, Director of Schools
for the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, sent Appellant Cecilia
F. Hall ("Ms. Hall") a letter informing her that he had presented
charges against her to the Metropolitan Board of Public Education
("Board") recommending her dismissal. Ms. Hall requested in writing a
hearing before the Board concerning the charges brought against her.
The Board convened for the hearing on March 17, 1998. Before the
hearing the two parties reached what they thought was an adequate
settlement. However, the proposed settlement agreement was never signed
by Ms. Hall. Subsequently, the Board terminated Ms. Hall on June 1,
1998. Ms. Hall filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the
Davidson County Chancery Court seeking judicial review pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-513. The Board filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds that Ms. Hall waived her right to hearing and
was properly terminated. The trial court granted the Board's motion. On
October 28, 1999, Ms. Hall filed a Notice of Appeal and this litigation
resulted.
Hunt vs. Claybrooks, et al
- M1999-01582-COA-R3-CV
View
This litigation began as a pro bono case. Defendant/Appellant
James Goodner ("Goodner") represented himself pro se on October 22,
1997 at the General Sessions Court and received a judgment against him.
Goodner timely appealed the decision to the Circuit Court.
Plaintiff/Appellee Allie Mae Hunt ("Hunt") died after the case was
appealed from the General Sessions Court to the Circuit Court for
Davidson County, Tennessee. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed
Goodner's appeal and this case took on a different character. David E.
Danner ("Danner") filed a Rule 60.02 motion to get the case reinstated,
allegedly accusing Hunt's attorney, C. Bennett Harrison ("Harrison") of
"fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct." Harrison filed a
response to the motion containing a motion for Rule 11 sanctions
against Danner. Subsequently, Danner asked for sanctions against
Harrison, which were denied. Hunt's case was reinstated, but the trial
court ordered Danner to pay attorney fees of $100 to Harrison as a
sanction of Rule 11. We affirm and modify the trial court's
decision.
Madu vs. Madu
- M1999-02302-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves the dissolution of a three-year marriage
between a naturalized citizen and a foreign national attending school
on a temporary student visa. Soon after the parties were divorced by
agreement in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, the foreign
national sought to set the divorce aside because of its effect on her
efforts to remain in the United States. The trial court declined to set
the divorce aside. The foreign national asserts on this appeal that the
trial court should not have declared the parties divorced and that the
trial court erred by denying her motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. We have determined that the record supports the
trial court's decision to declare the parties divorced and that the
trial court did not err when it denied the foreign national's
post-trial motion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Rackley vs. DeKalb Co. Fire Dept.
- M2000-00885-COA-R3-CV
View
A purchaser of real property invited the DeKalb County
Volunteer Fire Department to burn down a house on the property for
training purposes. After the house was destroyed, the seller re-took
possession of the property, because the buyer failed to pay the rest of
the purchase price. The seller brought suit against the County for
inverse condemnation and trespass. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. We affirm.
Simmons vs. Harris
- M2000-00227-COA-R3-CV
View
The basis of this litigation began as a discrimination suit
filed against Middle Tennessee State University ("MTSU") on March 2,
1995. The Appellant Tracy Simmons (Simmons") hired the Appellee
James Harris ("Harris") to represent him in his action against MTSU.
The discrimination suit was ultimately dismissed on May 10, 1995.
Simmons then appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on
July 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Simmons
subsequently filed a complaint against Harris with the Board of
Professional Responsibility, which was later dismissed. Harris then
brought an action against Simmons for attorney's fees. The controversy
now before us concerns the suit brought by Simmons alleging legal
malpractice, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process against
Harris. On October 14, 1999, Harris filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
and on December 14, 1999, the trial court granted Harris' motion,
dismissing claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and
legal malpractice. Thereafter, Simmons submitted a Motion to
Reconsider, which was denied. This appeal ensued.
Cases Posted the Week of
(10/16/2000)
Neely vs. McDonald
- M2000-00099-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a negligence claim asserted against two
members of the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department. The Davidson
County Circuit Court dismissed the case on the grounds the action was
precluded by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.
Horton vs. Parole Eligibility Review
Bd.
- M1999-02617-COA-R3-CV
View
An inmate in custody of the Department of Correction filed a
petition for a common law Writ of Certiorari alleging that the Board of
Paroles acted arbitrarily and illegally in denying him parole. The
trial court entered a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. This appeal followed and we affirm
the trial court.
Geldreich vs. Hall
- M1999-02258-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a suit initiated by Geldriech
("Investors") alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion
by Hall in his capacity as corporate officer. When Hall failed to
answer and appear for hearing, Investors' motion for default judgment
was granted. Thereafter, Hall filed a motion to strike the default
judgment that was denied by the court below. Hall appeals the trial
court's failure to grant him relief from the default judgment.
Clark vs. Farrell
- M1999-01945-COA-R3-CV
View
This is an appeal by the defendant from an action of the
trial court in assessing discretionary costs against the defendant. The
trial court entered an order of dismissal with prejudice on finding
that "the parties have settled all matters in controversy . . ." which
order was approved for entry by counsel for both parties. The plaintiff
filed a motion for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P.
54.04(2). The trial court then granted discretionary costs to the
plaintiff in the amount of $2,185.75. We reverse.
Rutherford Co. Bd. of Ed. vs.
Rutherford Co. Comm.
- M1999-00288-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a declaratory judgment action on undisputed facts.
The question for disposition is whether the Public Building Authorities
Act of 1971 authorizes the Rutherford County Commission to direct the
Rutherford County Public Buildings Authority to hire architects, select
a contractor and prepare school building design plans for presentation
to the Rutherford County School Board. The trial court held that it is
the responsibility of the Rutherford County Board of Education to plan,
locate, erect and furnish public schools in Rutherford County and that
the Rutherford County Commission was without authority to direct the
Rutherford County Public Buildings Authority to act in this respect. We
affirm the trial court.
Tammy C. Powell vs. Charley Crisp, et
al
- E1999-02539-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a suit wherein Tammy C. Powell, formerly Bird, seeks
custody of her minor children, Joshua Daniel Bird (DOB 2/2/86) and
Cherish Richelle Bird (DOB 8/25/88), who are now in the custody of her
parents. The Trial Court was of the opinion that the Court of Indian
Offenses of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, located in Cherokee,
North Carolina, the Court which initially awarded a divorce to Richard
Bird and later granted custody of the children to the maternal
grandparents, Charley and Peggy Crisp, had exclusive jurisdiction of
any action seeking to change custody, and accordingly dismissed the
petition. We affirm.
McBee vs. HCA Health Svcs. of TN
- M2000-00271-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a hospital patient who was injured in a
fall two days following surgery. The patient and her husband filed suit
against the hospital in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging
that her attending nurse had negligently permitted her to ambulate
without adequate assistance and support. The hospital filed a motion
for summary judgement supported by the attending nurse's affidavit
stating that she had complied with the applicable standard of care for
the post-operative ambulation of surgical patients. The patient did not
submit any countervailing expert affidavits, and the trial court
granted the hospital's summary judgment motion. On this appeal, the
patient asserts that she should not have been required to file
countervailing expert affidavits either because her complaint was based
on simple negligence or because the attending nurse's negligence was so
plain that no expert testimony was required. We find that the patient's
complaint is for medical malpractice and that the attending nurse's
conduct is not so plainly negligent that it obviates the necessity of
expert proof. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
Peltz vs. Peltz
- M1999-02299-COA-R3-CV
View
The issue on appeal is whether a notary was negligent when
she attached her certificate to a forged signature on a deed. The
Chancery Court of Williamson County held that she was not. We
affirm.
In the Matter of C.D.B., S.S.B. &
S.E.B.
- M2000-00232-COA-R3-CV
View
This case involves the termination of parental rights. Upon a
petition filed by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, the
Montgomery County Juvenile Court entered a final decree terminating the
Appellant's parental rights.
Ward vs. Turner
- M1999-00719-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises out of a custody dispute between maternal
and paternal grandparents. The issue of custody arose after the
children's parents were killed in an automobile accident. The Overton
County Circuit Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court and
awarded custody to the maternal grandparents.
Russell Graves vs. Kraft Foods
- W1999-02010-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from an appeal made from general sessions
court to chancery court. The appellee, Kraft General Foods (Kraft),
appealed a general sessions judgment to chancery court. Appellants, Mr.
Graves and Ms. Cross, filed motions to dismiss, while Kraft filed a
motion to transfer to circuit court. The chancery court denied the
motions to dismiss and granted the motion to transfer. On review, we
find that the chancery court lacked any subject matter jurisdiction
over the appeal. In addition, we find no statutory authority providing
for chancery court to transfer such appeals. As such, Kraft did not
make a timely appeal of the general sessions judgment. The circuit
court's denial of the motions to dismiss is reversed.
Alfred Tompkins vs. Annie's
Nannies
- W1999-00372-COA-R3-CV
View
Plaintiffs' nine year old child, Alexandria, while under the
direction of her day care center, broke both kneecaps while
participating in a downhill race. Plaintiffs sued the day care center
on a negligence theory, arguing that the day care center breached their
duty of care. The trial court directed a verdict for the day care
center, finding that the injuries sustained by the nine year old were
not foreseeable, and, thus, no duty of care arose. Additionally, at
trial, plaintiffs' counsel made an offer of proof whereby testimony was
introduced that two girls fell and bumped heads in a race immediately
preceding Alexandria's. The trial court excluded this testimony from
the jury. Plaintiffs allege error. We affirm.
General Construction vs. Greater
St. Thomas
- W1999-00829-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a building contract dispute. Owner
and the General Contractor disagreed on several issues of cost and
construction. When the dispute could not be settled, the parties sued
each other for breach of contract. The General Contractor was awarded a
judgment and the Owner filed a Motion to Alter or Amend/New
Trial' not signed by the Owner's trial attorney. The General Contractor
filed a Motion to Strike' the Owner's motion, stating that an
attorney of record' had not filed the motion within the required
period. Upon receiving a copy of the General Contractor's motion, the
Owner's trial lawyer signed the motion. Nevertheless, the trial court
granted the Motion to Strike.' On appeal, Owner argued that an
undisputed attorney of record' had signed the motion as permitted
under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We agree that the trial
court's granting of the Motion to Strike' was in error and remand
this case for consideration of the Owner's Motion to Alter or
Amend/New Trial.'
Mickey Billinsley vs. Diane
Billingsley
- W1999-00338-COA-R3-CV
View
This case concerns a husband's efforts to terminate his
obligation to pay his ex-wife $216.67 per month in alimony in futuro
because of the post-divorce increase in his former wife's income. The
trial court denied the husband's petition, finding that there had not
been a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant the termination of
the spousal support obligation. We affirm.
Christyal Simmons vs. Jimie
Simmons
- W1999-01393--COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a petition by a non-custodial Father
for a modification of his child support obligation. After several
delays, the court refused to modify the Father's obligation on the
basis that he had fallen behind on his support payments between the
filing of the petition and the date upon which the court finally
considered the matter. In addition, the trial court found him in
contempt of court for failing to make his payments and ordered his
incarceration. On appeal, Father argues that the trial court improperly
refused to modify his child support obligation upon his first request.
In addition, he asks that this court vacate the contempt ruling on the
basis that he did not willfully disobey the court's order. We remand to
the trial court for a modification of the Father's child support
obligation based on his current income and order this modification
prospectively applied from the date of his first petition. We also
vacate the trial court's contempt ruling.
Jerry Worrell vs. Ann Worrell
- W1999-01786-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a dispute over insurance proceeds
between Nephews, as remaindermen of their Aunt's life estate, and their
Aunt, as the life tenant of certain property. The trial court awarded
the Aunt sole rights to insurance proceeds obtained after the
destruction of that property to the exclusion of the Nephews. The
Nephews appeal that ruling as well as the trial court's omission of
certain hearsay testimony, and its failure to award them declaratory
judgment. We affirm the rulings of the trial court.
Purchased Parts vs. Royal Appl.
Co.
- W1999-01550-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves a dispute over jurisdiction. The court
below dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, Royal Manufacturing Corporation. Appellant Purchased Parts
Group, Inc. appeals from the trial court's decision.
William Fleming vs. Leatha
Fleming
- W1999-01978-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal involves the division of marital property and
award of alimony in futuro in an action for divorce. Husband receives
retirement income from the United States Army. Wife has an annuity
through her employer which accrued during the parties' marriage. The
circuit court awarded Wife $150 a month as alimony in futuro, but ruled
that the parties should keep their retirement accounts as separate
property. Husband has appealed, and both parties present issues for
review.
Stephen Stamps vs. Victoria
Dibonaventura
- W1999-00534-COA-R3-CV
View
This case arises from the Appellee's legal representation of
the Appellant in a Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The Appellant's
Petition was denied by the Criminal Court of Henry County and the Court
of Criminal Appeals. After denial of his Application for Permission to
Appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Appellant filed a Complaint
of Legal Malpractice with the Circuit Court of Henry County. The trial
court dismissed the Appellant's Complaint following a Motion to Dismiss
filed by the Appellee. The Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his
Complaint filed in the Circuit Court of Henry County. For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.
City of Bolivar vs. Clarence
Goodrum
- W1999-01952-COA-R3-CV
View
The city and county filed suit in chancery court against
landowner to collect delinquent fees due for solid waste disposal
assessed pursuant to authority granted by T.C.A. § 68-211-835 (g).
The chancery court entered judgment against landowner for the amount of
deliquent fees and pursuant to T.C.A. § 68-211-835 (g)(4)
impressed a lien on the landowner's property. Landowner has
appealed.
Bio-Medical vs. K.R. Chary
- W1999-01727-COA-R3-CV
View
This is a lawsuit to enforce covenants not to compete. The
plaintiffs are private companies that own and operate dialysis medical
clinics in West Tennessee. The plaintiffs brought an action against the
defendant physicians to enforce covenants not to compete contained in
agreements for the sale of the dialysis clinics and other related
employment agreements. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
physicians on the ground that the covenants are void because they are
contrary to public policy. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand, finding the covenants enforceable to the extent that they do
not prevent the defendant physicians from practicing medicine in their
specialty.
Cases Posted the Week of (10/09/2000)
Bennett vs. Putnam Co.
- M1999-00716-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from a collision involving a Putnam
County ambulance parked at the site of a previous automobile accident.
Plaintiff, a bystander who stopped to assist the motorist in the
original accident, was severely injured when he was pinned between the
parked ambulance and an approaching vehicle. Plaintiff filed suit
against the County, alleging that the paramedics who responded to the
original accident were negligent in their placement of the ambulance
and in failing to control the accident scene pending the arrival of law
enforcement personnel. Plaintiff also alleged negligence per se based
upon the ambulance driver's violation of T.C.A. § 55-8-158. The
circuit court under doctrine of comparative negligence allocated ten
percent fault to county based on common law negligence and negligence
per se for violation of statute. County appeals.
Consumer Advocate Div. vs.
TN Reg. Authority
- M1999-01699-COA-R12-CV
View
This appeal involves price regulation of
telecommunication companies pursuant to T.C.A. § 65-5-209. In
September, 1998, United Telephone Southeast filed its 1998 Annual Price
Regulation filing with the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. The filing
proposed an increase in rates for non-basic services. In determining
the amount of the increase, UTSE combined the calculations of annual
maximum increases based on the rates of inflation for the three
preceding years and applied this cumulative figure to UTSE's rates in
effect in June 1995. The TRA approved the price regulation plan. The
Consumer Advocate Division appeals that approval under Rule 12 of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Cumberland Bank vs. Smith
- M2000-00052-COA-R3-CV
View
A creditor filed an action to sell a parcel of the debtor's
real estate to satisfy a judgment lien on the property. The Chancery
Court of Smith County granted the relief requested. The judgment debtor
asserts on appeal that the underlying judgment and a nulla bona
sheriff's return are void. For the reasons set forth in our opinion
below, we affirm the action of the lower court.
State, ex rel Boren vs. Town of
Orlinda
- M1999-02240-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises from property owners' quo warranto
challenge to an ordinance annexing their property. Property owners
allege that the annexation was not reasonably necessary for their
health, safety, and welfare and for the annexing municipality. Prior to
trial, the trial court denied Defendant's motion in limine which sought
to exclude testimony of the property owners, a comparison of the
services offered by the annexing municipality and a neighboring
municipality interested in annexing the disputed area, evidence
regarding the public hearing on annexation, and evidence of the
annexing municipality's other annexations. The jury returned a verdict
for Plaintiffs, finding the annexation was not reasonable, and the
trial court entered judgment thereon. Defendant appeals.
Sweatt vs. Bd. of Paroles
- M1999-02265-COA-R3-CV
View
Appellant Antonio L. Sweatt brings this Petition for a Common
Law Writ of Certiorari regarding the Tennessee Board of Paroles'
decision to deny him parole based on the seriousness of the offense
that he committed. Appellant avers that the Board of Paroles acted
illegally or arbitrarily in denying his parole because appellant
asserts that his guilty plea agreement included the agreement that he
would only serve thirty percent of his twenty-five-year sentence and
then he would be released on parole.
Dept. of Transportation vs. Sunset Marine
and Resort
- M1999-00880-COA-R3-CV
View
This appeal arises out of what can loosely be defined as a
condemnation case. The State of Tennessee, acting through the
Department of Transportation, received an easement from the Corps of
Engineers for the purpose of building a bridge across Dale Hollow Lake
in Pickett County, Tennessee. The bridge was to be built across land
owned by the United States and operated by the Defendants as a resort
and marina under a lease for commercial purposes. The State filed a
Petition for Condemnation against the leaseholder in the Pickett County
Circuit Court seeking to take the land under its power of eminent
domain. The trial court determined that the State could not take the
land based on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
However, the State had already begun work on the project, and,
ultimately, the bridge was completed. The court held a trial to
determine the damages which the leaseholder had suffered as a result of
the bridge being placed across the leasehold. The trial court granted a
partial directed verdict and awarded the leaseholder $287,115. The
trial court also awarded the leaseholder $100,000 as attorneys' fees in
lieu of injunctive relief. The State appeals from the partial directed
verdict and the award of attorneys' fees.
Allen vs. Allen
- M1999-00748-COA-R3-CV
View
In this divorce case, Husband appeals the trial court's
decree as it deals with the division of the marital property (including
an award to Wife a part of military retirement), alimony, and child
support. We affirm as modified.
Bryant vs. Bryant
- M1999-01280-COA-R3-CV
View
Petitioners filed a petition to terminate the parental rights
of the biological father and for adoption of two minor children based
on abandonment by the father. On the first appeal, this Court reversed
the trial