Club Chalet Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Kimberly Matthews
The defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict holding her liable to her employer for her involvement in a co-worker’s misappropriation of funds. The jury found that the defendant’s involvement included (1) intentional misrepresentations, (2) concealment of facts relevant to the misappropriation, and (3) breach of contractual duties owed to the employer. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of the proof. The motion was based upon the defendant’s assertion that the statute of limitations barred the claim. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Miller v. R. J. Wherry & Associates et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. After the employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back, the parties reached a settlement of the claim at a benefit review conference. As part of the agreement, the employer agreed to provide a job for the employee within the medical restrictions arising from the injury. The employer eventually decided not to rehire the employee after he failed to return to work. Thereafter, the employee filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking reconsideration of his settlement. The trial court granted the petition and increased the disability award. On this appeal, the employer takes issue with (1) the trial court’s adoption verbatim of the employee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, (2) the trial court’s conclusion that the employee was entitled to reconsideration, (3) the exclusion of evidence related to the employee’s prior back problems, and (4) the claimed excessiveness of the award. We affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. George R. Thacker
A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, George R. Thacker, of solicitation to commit first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment and the law regarding accomplice testimony. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The University Corporation, A California Nonprofit Corporation v. Bruce Wring
This case involves an agreement between the Appellee, a nonprofit corporation, and the Appellant, a real estate agent, whereby the Appellant would acquire foreclosed properties, oversee all necessary repairs and renovations of the properties, and ultimately sell them for the benefit of the Appellee. The Appellee’s executive director was given the authority to act on its behalf in all dealings with the Appellant. As compensation, the Appellant received commissions on the purchase and sale of each property, and a percentage of the repair costs for his oversight of the repairs and renovations of each property. After operating pursuant to the oral agreement for over a year, the parties executed a written agreement for the same purpose. Throughout their relationship, the Appellant acquired approximately eighty-four (84) properties for the Appellee. Subsequently, after discovering that their records did not contain documentation of actual repair costs which the Appellant was required to submit under the written agreement, the Appellee filed a complaint for an accounting. The trial court appointed a Special Master to conduct an accounting. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Special Master filed a report in which he ordered that the Appellant be disgorged of all funds received by virtue of the agreements with the Appellee based on his failure to provide documentation of actual repair costs, and further suggested an award of attorney’s fees and costs in favor of the Appellee. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final order adopting and confirming the Special Master’s findings, and denied the Appellant’s objections to the Special Master’s report. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs on the properties acquired pursuant to the oral agreement. We further conclude that the course of conduct between the Appellant and the Appellee’s executive director modified the written agreement, such that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Josue Segura
The defendant, Josue Segura, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, Segura argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, by refusing to grant a second mental evaluation, and by allowing the State to introduce certain photographs of the victim. Segura also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerome Sawyer v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jerome Sawyer, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As grounds for relief, petitioner argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his eighteen-year sentence for aggravated sexual battery by applying enhancing factors, other than prior criminal convictions, not found by a jury. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirm the judgment of the court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Jada C.H., a minor child
This custody case arises from an agreed order of parentage. After Father’s paternity was established, he filed a petition in juvenile court for custody of the child. At the conclusion of several hearings that took place over a span of years, the juvenile court entered an order naming Father primary residential parent and awarding Mother weekend parenting time. Mother appealed. While awaiting appeal, Mother filed a petition to have the child declared dependent and neglected. The Special Judge presiding over that petition transferred Mother’s petition to Lake County, where Father and the child reside. In response to the allegations in Mother’s petition, Father filed a petition for an injunction and to have Mother’s future parenting time supervised. A different Special Judge granted Father’s request without a full hearing, stating that Mother’s parenting time would remain supervised until further orders of the court. No further orders were ever entered. We affirm the trial court’s order naming Father primary residential parent, but vacate the transfer of Mother’s petition to Lake County and the modification of Mother’s parenting time. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy L. McGowin v. John D. McGowin
In this appeal, a show cause order was entered in this case on August 28, 2012, directing counsel for the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant has responded to the show cause order in a response that does |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Mina Rhea Martin
In this action, the Estate has appealed to this Court the denial of an exception to |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamel Marsh
Defendant-Appellant, Jamel Marsh, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of voluntary manslaughter and received a sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Marsh argues: (1) the trial court’s method of selecting and qualifying the jury violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 22-2-308 and 22-2-313 and as well as Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from cross-examining Rachel Hixson about whether she received preferential treatment in her unrelated criminal cases in exchange for her testimony against Marsh and erred in preventing defense counsel from making an offer of proof regarding this alleged preferential treatment, thereby violating Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); and (3) his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment to show that the jury found Marsh guilty of voluntary manslaughter. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie L. Readus
The defendant, Eddie L. Readus, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury, in count one, of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and, in count two, of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, Class C felonies, as well as, in count three, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell and, in count four, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, Class B felonies. The trial court merged count two into count one and count four into count three and sentenced the defendant to fifteen years on the two remaining convictions, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and also argues that the doctrines of double jeopardy, multiplicity and merger prevented him from being sentenced separately on counts one and three. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel G. Hampton
After the Rhea County grand jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Daniel G. Hampton, for one count of first degree premeditated murder, Hampton entered an Alford plea, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), to second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court accepted the parties’ agreed sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction and, after a sentencing hearing, ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to Hampton’s unserved federal sentences. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering a consecutive sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Emilie A.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which Lisa C. and Michael C. filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Christopher M. to his child. The paternal grandparents filed an intervening petition to adopt the child. The trial court terminated Christopher M.’s parental rights and granted Lisa C. and Michael C.’s petition to adopt the child. Christopher M. appeals the termination of his parental rights. Following our review, we conclude that the court erred in relying upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3) in terminating Father’s parental rights and reverse that ground of termination. Additionally, we are unable to review the remainder of the court’s decision because the final order failed to set forth findings of fact as required by section 36-1-113(k) in support of its second ground of termination. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon section 36-1-113(g)(3) and vacate the remainder of the final order. The case is remanded for entry of an order that sets forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the termination of Christopher M.’s parental rights. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Colin D. Savage
After pleading guilty to the indicted charges of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at $10,000 or more, and theft of property valued at less than $500, appellant, Colin D. Savage, was tried and convicted on the remaining charges of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the convictions for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at $10,000 or more and sentenced appellant to four years in confinement. The court pronounced a six-year sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction, twenty-four years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, twenty-four years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court ordered that the sentences for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping run consecutively to each other, with the remaining sentences running concurrently with them, resulting in an effective sentence of forty-eight years. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and claims the following errors: (1) the State’s evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in declining to merge the convictions for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. After reviewing the record for sufficiency of the evidence, consecutive sentencing, and propriety of the trial court’s refusal to merge the convictions, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of: D.C., Jr., G.C., D.C., and H.C.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights. The four children at issue were removed from the father’s home by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services due to neglect and abuse. After three years, the Department instituted termination proceedings. The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistent conditions, but it declined to find abandonment by failure to support. The father appeals both the grounds for termination and the best interest finding. We reverse the trial court’s holding on abandonment by failure to support, affirm to the remainder, and so affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
William R. Adams, et al. v. Maria Walker Gardino
The appellant filed a single-page brief on appeal that fails to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert G. Barham
A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Robert G. Barham, of driving under the influence, first offense, and driving under a revoked license, fifth offense, both Class A misdemeanors, and imposed a five hundred dollar fine for each. The trial court sentenced Barham to a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty nine days confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support Barham’s convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Serena Carter
Defendant-Appellant, Serena Carter, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s imposition of a twenty-five-year sentence for facilitation of first degree felony murder. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doris Sharphine Halliburton
The Defendant-Appellant, Doris Sharphine Halliburton, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a term of three years, with Halliburton to serve one year in the Dyer County Jail before serving the remaining two years of her sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Halliburton argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and (2) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emmett Hartnest, Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Emmett Hartnest, Jr., was convicted by a Hardin County jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with Hartnest to serve ten days in the Hardin County Jail before serving the balance of his sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Hartnest argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Lamont Jones
The Defendant-Appellant, Jonathan Lamont Jones, was indicted by a Dyer County grand jury of tampering with evidence, a Class E felony, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. Jones was acquitted of tampering with evidence and convicted of resisting arrest. He was sentenced to six months probation after serving ninety days in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steve William Pollock
The Defendant-Appellant, Steve William Pollock, appeals his two convictions for vehicular assault in the Obion County Circuit Court. On appeal, Pollock argues: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the State’s expert to rely on a study, a copy of which he was not provided, in forming her opinion regarding the likelihood of his intoxication at the time of the collision and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s proof and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cole Woodard
The Defendant-Appellant, Cole Woodard, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, Class C felonies, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three concurrent sentences of ten years. On appeal, Woodard argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Upon review, we affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting merger of the jury verdicts into a single conviction for sale of cocaine. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trutonio Yancey and Bernard McThune
A Shelby County jury convicted appellant Trutonio Yancey of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The jury also convicted appellant Bernard McThune of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced appellant Yancey to an effective twenty-year sentence and sentenced appellant McThune to a twelve-year sentence. In this consolidated appeal, both appellants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. In addition, appellant Yancey argues that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to elect upon which dangerous felony it relied for the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony charge, and appellant McThune argues that the trial court erred by not applying mitigating factors when sentencing him. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm appellant Yancey’s convictions for aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. Discerning error, we reverse appellant Yancey’s convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and remand the case for a new trial. We affirm appellant McThune’s conviction and sentence. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of John Daniel Tate
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of a motion for |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |